hankyoreh

The tragic accident that befell a navy ship Friday night in the area around the West Sea island of Baengnyeong is putting the nation into a panic. In the face of our inability to determine the cause of the explosion, our common sense and reason are incapacitated. Even navy reservists who pride themselves on their considerable experience with the military hesitate to offer any explanations on this nonsensical incident, which runs counter to their intuition. And the tragic history of the area around the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea seems to become a more complicated interwoven mass, with the sad fates of the deceased growing layer upon layer amid sorrowful cries and wails.

The behavior of the Cheong Wa Dae (the presidential office in South Korea or Blue House) and Ministry of National Defense in the immediate wake of the incident has been commendable, effectively cutting off any speculation about North Korean involvement and focusing attention on rescue efforts. An incident such as this, if handled poorly, has the explosive potential to sharply heighten military tensions in the West Sea and leading to another hair-trigger situation. It is fortunate that such a risk is being kept under control so that the negative effects do not spread to inter-Korean relations. However, the Cheong Wa Dae’s crisis management still has certain aspects in need of further consideration.

We have seen a clamor of action, as several meets have been called of ministers involved in national security, the entire military and public officials have been put on standby, and the ruling party chairman who had been traveling overseas swiftly returned to South Korea. It is difficult, however, to discern what the standards and principles are for crisis management. If the current situation is indeed a crisis, then there needs to be response procedures and principles for managing the situation, as well as direct communication with the public. Meetings have been held, but they appear to have produced little in terms of what to do and how. It is troubling that the president and a number of the major figures below minister level who attended the security ministers’ meetings were either exempted from military service or served on reservist duty, and that there were almost no crisis management experts in attendance. There is still a question as to whether the experts and the system are performing their proper functions.

But there is one truth that we must face squarely with this incident. Not long ago, when the crashes of an air force fighter and an army helicopter took place in succession, I had a vague sense of unease about the South Korean military. This continuation of incidents where vessels that leaked and should have been repaired instead were sent into action and sank provides concrete confirmation of a deep-rooted vice that runs through all branches of the military.

This vice is the disappearance of humanism from national defense. We are witnessing a phenomenon in which “internal risks” that have grown as antiquated equipment remains in operation without being screened out are now threatening human lives. What is the real reason that the military possesses weapons that have passed through their life cycle? It stems from an obsession with maintaining numbers. If the numbers of weapons drop, the number of units and personnel must also drop, so each branch considers such a drop in weapons numbers taboo. The results have been a paradox in which internal risks become greater than the threat of the enemy.

Even if we ignore this much, a bigger problem is a landscape in which the military leadership is not focusing its attention on properly managing and operating its current equipment, but placing priority instead on buying newer weapons. Making the absurd decision to put off maintenance of weapons and an insufficient maintenance workforce are dramatically reducing the operation rate of weaponry. Despite this, the limited budget is being devoted to the competition for expensive new weapons.

What does it say when we have so many rosy visions unsuited to our reality, such as the “digital army,” “strategic air force” and “ocean navy,” with the aim of introducing new weapons? For the U.S. military, the criteria for a powerful military include the operation rate and demonstrated weapons capacity, but for the South Korean military, we talk of a powerful military simply in terms of weapons numbers. Is this not the type of military management that has produced such a plethora of visions that are all about padding the numbers?

In addition to carrying out an urgent investigation of the incident, President Lee Myung-bak should open his eyes to the need for defense reforms to eradicate the fundamental problems facing South Korea’s military.