U.S. sanctions against N.Korea do not include ultra-hardline measures

Posted on : 2010-08-01 11:52 KST Modified on : 2019-10-19 20:29 KST
The previous report of ultra-hardline measures came from statements issued by Secretary of State Clinton

By Kwon Tae-ho

It has come to light that contrary to what was previously suspected, the United States’ financial sanctions against North Korea do not include ultra-hardline measures such as sanctions against financial institutions in other countries that conduct business with North Korea.

Diplomatic sources in South Korea and the United States said Friday that the financial sanctions currently being planned by the United States depend solely on diplomatic cooperation. According to these measures, the United States will request that countries take measures against North Korean bank accounts connected with illegal activities, and there are no plans to use any coercive means. The method would involve issuing an executive order that would supplement the existing Executive Order 13382 targeting for sanctions any North Korean organizations, companies, and individuals connected with weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, and include as additional targets illegal activities involving luxury goods, drugs, counterfeit cigarettes, and counterfeit currency.

This stands in stark contrast to the country’s sanctions against Iran, which also punishes overseas businesses that engage in transactions with nuclear-related companies in Iran. The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) in the United States, which went into effect on July 1, legally stipulates that U.S. banks are not to conduct business with financial institutions in other countries connected with Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps. This act, based on legislation passed by the U.S. Congress, differs from the North Korea sanctions plan currently under examination in that it possesses legal force.

A remark made during a briefing Wednesday (local time) by Assistant Secretary of State Philip Crowley also revealed the U.S.’s intentions.

“All countries have obligations under existing sanctions [against North Korea], including Resolution 1874,” said Crowley.

The reason the U.S. plans for sanctions against North Korea have failed to reach the initially predicted level of intensity is China’s opposition. Since most of North Korea's financial transactions are with China, pushing extraterritorial measures would spell inevitable friction with China. In addition, the suspension of transactions with Chinese financial institutions would actually become a burden for the United States as well. A U.S. government official recently said that there was no way for the U.S. to compel China to participate in sanctions against North Korea.

The decision also appears to have taken into account the fact that direct financial sanctions in the past, such as freezing 52 North Korean accounts at the Banco Delta Asia in September 2005, ultimately resulted in North Korea carrying out a nuclear test in October 2006, and that severe sanctions with a legal basis could hinder the future resumption of the six-party talks.

The belief that U.S. sanctions against North Korea would be “ultra-hardline” stemmed from statements made by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. During a press conference following the first “2 plus 2” South Korea-U.S. Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting in Seoul on July 21, Clinton strongly implied that severe sanctions against North Korea were in the works. The confusion subsequently mounted when this combined with uncertain predictions for the future within and outside the Lee Myung-bak administration, which is advocating hardline measures against North Korea.

A foreign affairs specialist at one U.S. think tank said that Clinton “has always made hardline statements about North Korea,” and commented that this is “intended as a strong response against North Korea, but at times she has a tendency to go farther than the administration’s stance.”

Sources indicate that the United States has recently expressed concern about these predictions within South Korea. In the event that a South Korean plan for sanctions against North Korea is actually announced, its political and diplomatic effect could be drastically reduced if it is far stronger than the one pursued by the United States. The final plan is scheduled to be announced after a visit to South Korea and Japan by Robert Einhorn, U.S. State Department Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, to discuss sanctions against North Korea, followed by coordination with the various relevant departments in the United States.

Please direct questions or comments to [englishhani@hani.co.kr]

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