2nd anniversary of Cheonanham sinking

Posted on : 2012-03-26 12:47 KST Modified on : 2012-03-26 12:47 KST
Sinking of corvette has prompted serious changes to military philosophy and capability
 a combat ship which participates in a combat readiness exercise ahead of the 2nd anniversary of Cheonanham sinking
a combat ship which participates in a combat readiness exercise ahead of the 2nd anniversary of Cheonanham sinking

By Lee Soon-hyuk, staff writer

Two years ago today, the Cheonanham, a warship in the South Korean Navy’s Second Fleet Command, split in half in the waters near Baengnyeong Island at 9:22pm. The incident, which took 46 young lives, led to chaos on the Korean Peninsula. Frictions among South Koreans intensified during the investigation process, and inter-Korean relations sunk to Cold War-era levels. The sinking also completely altered the South Korean military’s national defense strategy, and critics have pointed to numerous problems with the new one.

Shin In-kyun, president of the Korea Defence Network, a defence NGO, said the biggest change in military terms since the Cheonan sinking was the adoption of a principle of “sufficiency” rather than “proportionality”. This meant a shift from retaliating in proportion to the enemy provocation to retaliating until the response is deemed “sufficient.”

“In the past, commanders weren‘t sure whether to even apply the principle of proportionality [in the event of an incident],” Shin said. “Now, they are reprimanded if they don’t follow the principle.”

Indeed, after the Cheonan sinking and North Korean artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island, the military was rife with a “never again” and “hit us with your best shot” mentality. Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin gave instructions on numerous occasions to retaliate not just on the source of an enemy provocation but any support forces as well.

In essence, the military‘s goal has shifted from crisis management to victory in local conflicts. Kim Jong-dae, editor-in-chief of the online military journal “Defense 21+,” explains this in terms of the “Truman method” and the “MacArthur method.” MacArthur, who was commander during the Korean War, called for an air strike against the Chinese mainland, even if it meant triggering World War III. But US President Harry S. Truman decided that a larger war should be prevented, even at the cost of a stalemate on the front. The South Korean military’s strategy has shifted from a Truman approach to a MacArthur one, with a greater potential than ever for local conflict to escalate into total war.

A posture of active readiness to return fire has taken shape since the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents, and this has led to a strengthening of fighting power. But it remains to be seen how much national defense capabilities have improved on the whole. A number of structural problems remain, including weapons system changes.

After the two 2010 incidents, several efforts began toward the fortification of the five West Sea islands. This included the positioning of a large number of state-of-the-art weapons, including K-9 howitzers, Guryong multiple rocket launchers, artillery hunting radar, and acoustic target detection devices. A new West Sea Islands Command was founded, and the Marine presence was beefed up.

But a lot of the equipment that was brought in was inherited from the Army, and a serious conflict erupted between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Army headquarters in the process. In effect, the military reinforcement involved robbing Peter to pay Paul.

Questions also remain as to how effective the preparations will be, given that they presume similar provocations from North Korea will continue. With priority placed on bringing in state-of-the-art weaponry in anticipation of local warfare, the supply of weapons needed for traditional fighting power has been delayed or reduced.

Around one month after the Cheonan sinking, the government formed a comprehensive national security examination council under the President, with Lee Sang-woo as its chairman. Headed by Lee, the National Defense Advancement Committee gave a report on plans for advancing national defense in Dec. 2010 after being converted from a Ministry of National Defense organization to a presidential body in July of that year.

The ideas centered on promoting a proactive deterrence strategy and stepping up coordination. Emphasis was given to the need for stealth aircraft for bombing North Korean nuclear bases as part of the move toward active deterrence by “taking preemptive measures in cases where a provocation is viewed as certain.” As a result, the push for the F-X, next-generation fighter, initiative gained steam. Also, a reorganization of the military command structure was suggested, with Army, Navy, and Air Force chiefs placed under the combined military command in the interests of promoting cooperation.

The roots of the reorganization in the military’s top command structure, which has continued to be a subject of recent debate, lie in the Cheonan sinking. But the plan has yet to be passed by the National Assembly. Objections from the Navy and Air Force, as well as reserve forces, have intensified as a result of the top-down nature of the plan, which was formulated without wide-ranging efforts to gather opinions and win over the parties involved. Despite the growing calls for “retaliation,” there is still a long way to go in making the fighting power efficiencies and military system reorganizations necessary to bolster it.

 

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