[Interview] One year into the Park Geun-hye administration

Posted on : 2013-12-18 15:30 KST Modified on : 2019-10-19 20:29 KST
Professor Lee Sang-don says Park needs to go back to the promises that got her elected president
 Dec. 16. (by Ryu Woo-jong
Dec. 16. (by Ryu Woo-jong

By Kim Jong-cheol, political correspondent

Chung-Ang University emeritus professor Lee Sang-don was one of the leading figures who helped create President Park Geun-hye.
Prof. Lee served on the emergency committee under chairwoman Park Geun-hye. She was given full power by a full assembly of the ruling Grand National Party in Dec. 2011 after the party experienced a crisis because of the mismanagement of former president Lee Myung-bak.
When the party changed its name to the Saenuri Party (NFP) before the general elections and the presidential election in 2012, Lee symbolized a change in the conservative party along with Kim Jong-in, former Minister of Health and Welfare and An Dae-hui, former Supreme Court justice. By keeping these figures close to her side, Park was able to win the presidential election, having built trust among political moderates.
Before the first anniversary of Park’s election, the Hankyoreh met with Lee to hear about his experiences along with his assessment of Park Geun-hye and her administration’s performance throughout its first year in office.

“At this rate, the Park Geun-hye government is bound to fail,” Lee said.

Lee did not pause for a second before offering criticism. He described the year that passed since Park Geun-hye prevailed in the presidential election as “a year that provoked antagonism, tension, and conflict.”

Nor did he mince words about the National Intelligence Service’s interference in the presidential election or the suppression of labor. It was enough to make one briefly wonder whether Lee was not expressing his irritation at being neglected by Park.

Nevertheless, Lee wants the Park administration to succeed. When Lee spoke about restoring Park’s brand of trust and promises and urging her to break away from the Lee Myung-bak narrative, his loyalty was noticeable. He has repeatedly stated that he will not leave the Saenuri Party as long as Park is in office.

The interview with Lee took place on the morning of Dec. 16 at the Hankyoreh offices in Seoul’s Gongdeok neighborhood.

Hankyoreh (Hani): Already a year has passed since Park was elected president. When Park was still running for president, she talked a lot about economic democratization, welfare, and the great union of the people. But now, all of that talk has disappeared and she just comes across as arbitrary and hard-line. I wonder why she has changed in this way.

Lee Sang-don (Lee): There are a number of theories about this. First is the idea that she never intended to keep those promises to begin with. But that would mean that she has been lying to the Korean people for several years, so I don’t see that as being feasible. Second is the opinion that it’s standard practice to cast one’s nets wide during the election and to return to one’s base after coming to power. But since this is the road that the Lee Myung-bak government went down, she is bound to fail if she does that. There is also a third view, that Park is trapped in the narrative laid down by Lee Myung-bak. Park has not been able to eradicate corruption and illegal acts in the government. This theory suggests that this is because she is stuck in conservative Daegu-North Gyeongsang Province politics. If that is true, I don’t think she will succeed, either.

Hani: Why do you think that she will fail?

Lee: In every administration, there is a zeitgeist, there are tasks that the time demands. The demands of this time are dismantling the structure of conflict that has built up over the past ten years and improving economic conditions. This will require bold reforms, which cannot be implemented without popular support. In particular, we have to have the support of the opposition party. If [Park and the ruling party] insist on a political approach that is based on conflict with the opposition party, reform will not happen. In the end, the only possible outcome for Korea is running aground.

Hani: But don’t Park’s approval ratings remain high?

Lee: This is because there are a lot of people who are very loyal to Park as an individual. This sort of personal support does not lead to support for policies or support for the party. That’s why I think it is unlikely for her administration to succeed if her approval rating makes her complacent.

Hani: When we look over the past year, it seems like Park has not really done anything special.

Lee: There have been a lot of crises including the [temporary shutdown of the] Kaesong Industrial Complex and the [insurrection conspiracy in the] Unified Progressive Party, but unexpected situations like these occur in every administration. These can be dealt with as each situation calls for. However, President Park was elected by the people because she promised some kind of change. That’s why she has to implement her own agenda. Over the past year, none of her agenda has been implemented.

Hani: Typically, the success or failure of a five-year term is decided in the first year. Why didn’t the administration do anything in the first year?

Lee: I think the nomination failures were the biggest reason, and the impact from them is still going on today. Look at the Cabinet and Blue House and you’ll have trouble finding anyone capable of steering the President’s policies or agenda. They also failed to cultivate a “future-oriented” image with the so-called “new 386 generation” (elderly figures in government) appointments. That’s one of the main things that has made it difficult to react to the NIS allegations. Ultimately, it was a year spent fanning confrontation, tensions, and conflict.

Hani: Didn’t it also hurt trust for them not to hire their symbols of moderate reform once the election was over - people like you, [former Minister of Health] Kim Jong-in, or [former Supreme Court Justice] Ahn Dae-hee?

Lee: (laughs) The President’s policies are important to her, but it’s also important to have people who symbolize the policies. If you look at the [Ronald] Reagan administration in the US, when they pledged to cut down the huge federal bureaucracy and federal budget, they had already designated the people to do that during the election. The person with the “sword,” so to speak, was a young Representative named David Stockman. During the Clinton administration, they put a professor named Laura Tyson in charge of globalization policy. So you have this system of using people to embody your policies. In that sense, the current administration seems to have no answer on economic democratization or policies for the so-called “20-30” generation [people in their 20s and 30s].

Hani: They also don’t seem to have kept their political pledge of a “clean and transparent government.” And the most important kinds of internal communication aren’t happening.

Lee: I’m skeptical as to whether the President really communicates well with her advisers, or with the Cabinet - or whether she’s connected with the public, for that matter. Transparent government is about going through public debate. You can’t just come out with policies out of nowhere. As far as corruption goes, we have to get rid of not just the examples from this administration but also previous administrations.

Hani: What kind of things from previous administrations do we need to get rid of?

Lee: The area where you have a wide consensus among the people has to do with the irregularities with the Four Major Rivers Project. Also, the public thinks that things like public enterprise debt or overseas resource development can’t just be ignored. And now that the issues with the NIS and the military’s Cyber Command have been verified, there are a lot of people who are skeptical about how committed the administration is [to eliminating their political interference].

Hani: Since you mentioned the illegal election activities by the NIS, you‘ve said a number of times that there needs to be a special prosecutor. . . .

Lee: This was a serious violation of the law - a state institution suspected of interfering in a presidential election. A lot of people, not just the political opposition but a good portion of the public, are questioning the way the administration is handling it. If the administration doesn’t do something to answer those questions, it won’t be able to do very much at all. If it’s an issue of clearing up doubts, then there’s no reason they can’t agree to what the opposition is calling for. And if a special prosecutor’s investigation isn’t possible, then they should at least have a specially appointed prosecutor [to investigate independently without receiving directions from the Public Prosecutor General].

Hani: Why do you think the Park administration insists on shielding the NIS without resolving the issue? Is there a possibility that members of her election committee were involved?

Lee: I don’t know about that. If that sort of thing did happen, those people would have to be punished sternly for the President to escape from it. That’s what happened with Watergate, when [former US President] Richard Nixon resigned, not because of the lawbreaking but because of the cover-up. In the Clinton case, he came clean with an apology later, and everyone moved on. Not many people right now really think that Park herself was involved. I think that if she really wants to be a leader for this administration, she needs to show a willingness to erase every last shadow of doubt.

Hani: What is your position on NIS reforms?

Lee: The NIS is saying it needs to handle both domestic and international intelligence because of North Korea. That doesn’t make sense. If that’s the case, how do you explain Israel’s situation? They have an even more dangerous security situation than we do, but they keep their external and internal intelligence separate with the Mossad and Shin Bet. It’s always a problem to have one enormous organization. You get internal corruption, but also incompetence. What we need isn’t a short-term, ad hoc approach. We need sweeping reforms for the whole, broader package: the NIS, the prosecutors, and the police.

Hani: The administration has also been rigid on labor policy. We’ve had the Korean Teachers’ and Education Workers’ Union losing its legal union status, and now the large-scale disciplinary action on the striking Korail workers.

Lee: In politics, you need to be steering things as much as possible in a direction that reduces conflict. That’s the only way to get broad-based public support, which an administration needs to do. These days, the administration seems to be a bit too rigid. They keep making enemies. I’m not really sure how they’re planning on running things for the next four years.

Hani: Any advice as one of the people who “made” the Park administration?

Lee: They need to get away from the “Lee Myung-bak frame.” They don’t have a lot of time, either. If they can’t shake the allegations from that administration - the NIS, the Four Majors Rivers Project, overseas resource development - then they’ll end up shackled to it and running aground.

Hani: What are the most urgent fixes the administration needs?

Lee: There’s no dialogue between the public and the government. The Lee Myung-bak administration failed because they didn’t have any dialogue or communication.

This administration needs to not follow in their footsteps. And President Park needs to start where her brand was, in trust and promises, by honoring 100% of her pledges to the public.

Lee Sang-don was a vocal critic under the Lee Myung-bak administration. As a “major shareholder” from the Saenuri Party in the Park Geun-hye administration, the emeritus professor had some frank words for it early on. Why did he take the bullet when he knew better than anyone how much Park dislikes outspokenness? “There actually were some people who told me, ‘Keep quiet,’” Lee recalled. “They told me it would be better if I joined the administration.”

“Nowadays, they tell me that if I keep quiet, there would be no one saying anything,” he laughed.

 staff photographer)
staff photographer)
Lee was born in Busan in 1951 when many Koreans fled there during the Korean War, but he came from a long line of Seoulites that had put their roots down in the Jongno neighborhood of the capital city. Lee’s maternal grandfather was Go Hui-dong, who had been a bureaucrat under the Korean Empire. Go was a nationalist who studied painting so that he would not have to cooperate with the Japanese colonial administration and who never gave up his Korean name for a Japanese name.
After studying at Kyunggi High School and Seoul National University School of Law and getting a doctorate at Tulane University in the US, Lee began working as a law professor at Chung-Ang University in 1983. Known as a “conservative liberal”, Lee worked closely with Park as an emergency council member for the Saenuri Party during last year’s general election and as a political reform special committee member during the presidential election. However, in order not to become a “poli-fessor,” [or professors who neglect their work to pursue a political career], Lee voluntarily stepped down from his professorial position at the beginning of 2013 shortly after the election.

 

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]

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