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along with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. The NIS claimed on May 13 that Hyon had been executed on Apr. 30. Usually

The way that the alleged purge of North Korea‘s Minister of the People’s Armed Forces Hyon Yong-chol was reported in the South Korean media reveals to the public what is currently wrong with the National Intelligence Service (NIS). It shows how the NIS, South Korea’s main spy agency, appears to have actively peddled unconfirmed intelligence.

At 8:30 am on May 13, the NIS reported before the National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee that Hyon Yong-chol had been sent to the firing squad for treason. The agency was in such a hurry to set the date for the briefing that hardly any lawmakers from either party were able to attend, and the briefing itself apparently wrapped up after an NIS official read a document for half an hour.

Then, one or two hours later, the head of North Korea intelligence for the NIS delivered the same briefing to about 30 reporters who were taking a tour of the NIS. During this briefing, NIS First Deputy Director Han Ki-beom reportedly came to the microphone to provide additional information about Hyon’s execution.

The reporters who had applied for what they assumed was a simple tour of the NIS a few weeks prior were unexpectedly handed a major scoop. While the NIS added the caveat that the intelligence about Hyon’s execution was still unconfirmed, it was immediately reported by various media outlets. Later, it became a major story not only in South Korea but around the world.

These acts are not the same as the NIS briefing about Jang Song-thaek’s fall from power on Dec. 3, 2013. While the behavior of the NIS at that time also seemed aimed at manipulating the media, it was not as overt as in this case. This time, the NIS crossed a line that a spy agency should never cross.

First, the NIS’s media manipulation controverts its original mission. The NIS is supposed to collect important intelligence that can help the country survive and thrive. This information should first be reported to the government - including the Blue House and the Ministry of Unification - which can use it to frame the national strategy. This is the kind of NIS that the people want to see: one that works in the shadows to help the country develop.

However, after squandering its public trust by posting politically motivated comments during the 2012 presidential election, the NIS seems to have forgotten its original mission and has instead been focusing more and more on making shocking revelations to help it stay relevant. While that might make sense for a big private detective agency, it doesn‘t suit a national intelligence service.

Second, peddling unconfirmed intelligence will in the end seriously undercut the NIS’s credibility. As the NIS itself admitted, the report about Hyon Yong-chol’s execution was based on unconfirmed intelligence. When South Koreans see the NIS peddling unconfirmed intelligence, they will start to have doubts about the agency’s motivations. This time, a number of theories have been floated, including that the news was released to bury the Sung Wan-jong list corruption scandal.

Imagine how great the damage would be if this intelligence turns out to be wrong. Spy reports can be wrong, after all - that’s why they are classified as unconfirmed intelligence.

Suppose, then, that the report about Hyon Yong-chol’s execution turns out to have been false. The damage that the NIS will suffer will be immense. Even worse, the global credibility of the country as a whole will take a huge hit. There is no need to mention how this will effect inter-Korean relations.

For these reasons, it’s difficult to understand why the NIS would have gone ahead with peddling intelligence it had not confirmed.

Third, the NIS’s manipulation of the media will cause controversy about the status of the National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee. The Intelligence Committee was created as a mechanism by which the National Assembly could exert a minimum degree of control over the NIS.

However, examining how the news about Hyon Yong-chol’s execution was used to manipulate the media, we can see that the NIS took advantage of the Intelligence Committee to provide itself with an alibi. This is enough to make South Koreans wonder why they need this kind of Intelligence Committee.

This case of media manipulation by the NIS is often said to be the first thing that Lee Byung-ho has achieved during his tenure as NIS director. This brings to mind the proverb, “You can know a tree will grow well as soon as it buds.”

One hopes that the NIS will resist the temptation to peddle unconfirmed intelligence and will return to its original mission before public concerns about the agency under Lee grow even greater.

By Kim Bo-geun, director of the Hankyoreh Unification Institute

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]