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President Park Geun-hye speaks during the joint 2016 policy report to the president by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs

“Now is the time to focus on forceful and effective sanctions.”

These were the words of a South Korean minister at the joint 2016 policy report to the president on Jan. 22, reaffirming the administration’s current policy response to North Korea’s recent fourth nuclear test.

During the briefing, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, National Defense, and Unification presented a “focused strategy” for 2015 of “a concerted and omnidirectional response to the threat of North Korean provocations” and a “general approach to the North Korean nuclear issue and North Korea issues as a whole.”

But the omnidirectional and general response and approach discussed left essentially no room for dialogue or negotiation with Pyongyang, with dialogue discussed only as a diplomatic instrument to apply pressure.

“We need to create an environment where North Korea has no choice but to change,” President Park Geun-hye said by way of a guideline. She also suggested attempting to address the nuclear issue through a five-party talks framework without North Korea’s participation.

The five-party talks idea is not new in itself; indeed, it has been discussed in response to every crisis that has occurred since the six-party talks framework was first launched in 2003. The noteworthy part of Park’s comments was that they were her first public mention of the idea. The suggestion, combined with Park’s remark that “you have to question [the six-party talks’] effectiveness when . . . even the ones that are held don’t help with North Korea’s denuclearization,” could be read as a dismissal of the six-party talks approach as fruitless.

“We’re in a situation now where we can’t really expect any kind of meaningful six-party talks,” said a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official.

“We’re planning to step up the pressure on North Korea as much as possible through closer coordination of the five [other] parties within the six-party talks framework,” the official explained.

As in a previous address to the nation on Jan. 13, Park stressed the importance of Beijing’s role at the briefing, arguing that “China’s cooperation will be key” to changing North Korea’s attitude and behavior.

The approach appears influenced by a previous nuclear deal reached with Iran by the five permanent member nations of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) - the US, China, the UK, France, and Russia - and Germany. But its focus is squarely on the effectiveness of sanctions, while ignoring the tenacious negotiation efforts that were needed to reach the Iran deal.

Perhaps the biggest problem is one of practicability. China has never agreed to talks under a five-party framework - and it does not appear likely to this time either, despite South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Yun Byung-se insisting that “the grave situation of North Korea’s fourth nuclear test is an excellent time to set five-party talks in motion.”

Speaking at a regular press briefing on the afternoon of Jan. 22, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Hong Lei affirmed that “dialogue and negotiation are still the basic approaches to problem resolution in the current situation on the [Korean] Peninsula.”

“We need to resume the six-party talks as quickly as possible,” Hong declared.

Previously, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi stressed the importance of three core principles - denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, guarding the peninsula’s peace and stability, and resolving problems through dialogue - during a Jan. 8 telephone conversation with Yun.

“Not one of these three things can be omitted,” Wang said at the time, emphasizing the need for efforts to maintain stability and pursue dialogue and negotiations alongside sanctions. The same attitude is mostly shared by Russia.

Another guideline presented by Park at the meeting involved “approaching the North Korean nuclear issue in terms of resolving North Korea issues in general.” In principle, this was a reiteration of her previous insistence of reunification as a “fundamental resolution” - but in practical terms, the emphasis was on general, omnidirectional pressure in areas such as human rights. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs affirmed plans for “international coordination of the North Korean human rights issue,” while the Ministry of Unification announced plans to expand aid to domestic NGOs working on the matter.

Plans for additional sanctions by the South Korean government were deferred until after the UNSC decides on a resolution. While the Ministry of Unification discussed plans for “stable management” of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, it also hinted at possible later measures depending on the terms of the eventual UNSC resolution and Pyongyang’s response.

By Lee Je-hun, staff reporter

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]