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A THAAD missile interceptor is tested. (US Missile Defense Agency)

Specifics on military information sharing and missile defense cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Japan emerged in a Ministry of National Defense operational briefing at the Blue House on Jan. 22.

In particular, the ministry reported plans to President Park Geun-hye on establishment of a real-time information sharing channel with the US within the year - in what would mark the first step in setting up a bilateral missile defense network - as well as other networks connecting South Korea with Japan and with both Japan and the US. The move is part of a push by the US toward stronger trilateral defense cooperation as part of its Northeast Asia strategy.

The indigenous Korean Air and Missile Defense System (KAMD) allows the Korea Theater Missile Operation Cell (KTMO Cell) to issue interception orders for Patriot and other missiles upon receipt of North Korean missile launch information detected by South Korean military radar. The structure is similar to that of the missile defense used by USFK, which also employs separate means of detection and its own TMO Cell and means of interception.

The bilateral information sharing channel reported by the Ministry of National Defense would allow for real-time exchanging of information through linking and interlocking of the two separate missile defense networks through the US military’s tactical data exchange network Link 16.

“If our radar detects a North Korean missile launch, that information gets passed on to the US military in real time, while information picked up by the US military’s early warning satellites gets reported to us immediately,” explained a ministry official.

But the information sharing is also seen as a likely first step toward either joint operation of two independent missile defense networks or KAMD’s incorporation into the US missile defense system.

While a ministry official insisted that the plan was for “information sharing, not incorporation into the [US] missile defense system,” the need for some form of cooperation and sharing on decisions, resolutions, and fire control for the efficient operation of the South Korea-US missile defense network - or a unified command system - is likely to be raised. The result could be South Korea’s de facto incorporation into US missile defense.

Linking the South Korea and US systems would also connect the former to the missile defense system of the Japan Self-Defense Forces, leading to closer military cooperation with Japan.

An agreement on the sharing of information on the North Korean nuclear and missile threats signed by the three countries in Dec. 2014 prioritized the interoperation and connection of their missile defense systems. Military cooperation with Japan is also poised to gain further momentum after an effective “embargo” on it was lifted with last December’s agreement on the comfort women issue.

“The US military cannot pass any of our information on to Japan without our approval,” insisted the Ministry of National Defense in an apparent gesture to South Korean public sensitivities about security cooperation with Japan. In reality, the characteristics of real-time information sharing through a network make it difficult to filter out things that are not to be shared.

For now, North Korea’s nuclear test earlier this month is offering a strong shield for trilateral information sharing. But many are cautioning against allowing South Korea to be drawn into bilateral defense cooperation with Japan, or trilateral cooperation with the US and Japan. The concern is that the country could end up being roped into helping the US curb China as part of its “rebalancing to Asia” strategy.

As part of its response to the North Korea nuclear and missile programs, the Ministry of National Defense announced that it would begin work this year on acquiring five reconnaissance satellites by the early 2020s. Other plans announced for the year included an extended deterrence tabletop exercise (TTX); a joint “4D drill” with the US for responses to North Korean nuclear weapons at the four stages of detection, disruption, destruction, and defense; and the establishment of a national defense cyber technology research center.

By Park Byong-su, senior staff reporter

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