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Minister of National Defense Han Min-koo takes his seat at a National Assembly National Defense Committee hearing

Politicians from the ruling Saenuri Party have been calling for South Korea to acquire its own nuclear-powered submarines following North Korea’s recent successful test-launch of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).

But many observers are calling for a more circumspect approach, noting the weak rationale amid a debate over whether the introduction would violate the principle of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula - as well as the more practical impossibility of introducing the submarines without US approval.

Saenuri Party floor leader Chung Jin-suk issued a call to consider introducing nuclear-powered submarines during an Aug. 29 meeting of the party’s supreme council.

“Given the difficulty of detecting the launch point for North Korean submarine-launched ballistic missiles, [the threat] is more serious than a surface-launched missile,” he explained.

Chung also noted that construction of three 4,000-ton nuclear-powered submarines had been pursued and abandoned during the Roh Moo-hyun presidency in 2003.

Former floor leader Won Yoo-chul also spoke out in favor during a morning broadcast. “We need to deploy nuclear submarines that can monitor and check the North’s provocations on a permanent basis,” he said.

23 lawmakers with the party’s Nuclear Forum released a statement on Aug. 28 calling for the submarines’ immediate deployment.

Minister of National Defense Han Min-koo avoided a direct answer on the question when asked by Saenuri lawmakers at a National Assembly National Defense Committee hearing that day whether he had plans to introduce a nuclear-powered submarine.

“It would be inappropriate for me to comment on that here,” Han replied.

In response to a follow-up question on whether this was meant as a “neither confirm nor deny” response, Han added, “No decision has made on whether to introduce a nuclear-powered submarine.”

“Many people have said there is a need militarily. We will take that into consideration and examine its integration,” he continued.

Ministry spokesperson Moon Sang-kyun repeated the message that “no decision has been made” at a briefing the same day. With the response leaving more room for interpretation than a simple “no,” the next question is how the government proceeds.

The idea of introducing a nuclear-powered submarine is based on the military’s determination that the best alternative for preventing an SLBM attack would be to have ongoing tracking and monitoring of North Korean submarines carrying the missiles, with the capability of destroying them in emergency situations. The argument is that because submarines are difficult to detect once they enter the water, tracking and monitoring them from their departure would require a nuclear-powered submarine, which theoretically could remain underwater indefinitely. A conventional submarine is seen as inappropriate for tracking and monitoring because it would need to rise close to the surface several times a day for storage battery recharging, which increases the likelihood of detection.

But a debate over whether introducing the submarines would violate the principle of denuclearizing the peninsula appears inevitable. The Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which was adopted by South and North Korea in Dec. 1991, prohibits military use of nuclear energy, restricting it to “solely peaceful purposes.” While some argue the North’s nuclear tests have already reduced the declaration to dead-letter status, many claim it should not be abandoned because it provides a strong rationale for demanding North Korea‘s denuclearization and was intended as an open pledge to the international community. During the Roh administration (2003-2008), the Ministry of National Defense denied speculation about nuclear-powered submarine development on the grounds that it would “violate the Denuclearization Declaration.”

Realistically, introducing the submarines would require a number of hurdles to be cleared. Military use of nuclear facilities and materials is blocked by the South Korea-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, which was amended in Apr. 2015. Article 13 of the agreement states that nuclear material, moderator material, equipment, and components transferred according to its terms cannot be used for any military purposes. South Korea also has no way of acquiring enriched uranium to fuel the submarine’s reactor without US approval: Article 11 states that enrichment would only be possible through written agreement by South Korea and the US, and then only if the uranium-235 isotope accounts for less than 20%.

Barriers to overseas purchasing are also high.

“All of the countries that produce enriched uranium have nuclear weapons. To buy enriched uranium, you need to explain what purpose you’re purchasing it for,” explained a Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power source. “There’s no way to avoid the US hearing about it.”

The issue is that it’s almost impossible to get agreement from the US, which regards preventing nuclear proliferation as a key global strategy, agreeing to South Korea acquiring nuclear-powered submarines. Its fear is that doing so could trigger a nuclear domino effect in Northeast Asia as Japan and Taiwan also move to acquire their own.

By Park Byong-su, senior staff writer, Kim Kyu-won and Lee Kyung-mi, staff reporters

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