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The new US Forces Korea Combined Forces Command

Efforts to speed up the wartime operational control (OPCON) transfer are expected to take more concrete shape after the Ministry of National Defense reported to President Moon Jae-in’s governance planning advisory committee on May 25 that it will be working to honor his election pledge to have the transfer take place during his term.

But the need to reach an agreement with the US and concerns about the South Korean military’s capabilities and the security environment around the Korean Peninsula mean there is still a long way to go for the OPCON transfer to actually happen during Moon’s five-year presidency, which is set to end in May 2022.

According to the ministry’s report, the date of the OPCON transfer is to be moved up three to four years from the mid-2020s to the early 2020s. “As far as a specific implementation plan or road map goes, there are going to need to be more discussions and examination,” a government official said.

The path to an early OPCON transfer is expected to take one of two forms. First, South Korea may request discussions with the US to reach a new agreement. The transfer date has already been postponed twice by South Korea-US agreement: from Apr. 2012 to Dec. 2015, and then again to the mid-2020s.

Seoul may also decide to move up the transfer date within the framework of the existing agreement with the US. At an Oct. 2014 Security Consultative Meeting, South Korea and the US agreed to have the transfer take place once three conditions were met in terms of the South Korean military’s capability of leading combined operations, the ability to respond to the North Korean nuclear and missile threats, and the security environment around the peninsula. Each year, the two sides hold a joint assessment of the readiness to meet these conditions. The OPCON transfer date could be moved up if the conditions are met sooner or the barriers are lowered. The ministry’s report to the governance planning advisory committee that it plans to “re-examine the OPCON transfer conditions and situation” is seen as indicating it may pursue this approach.

The big issue is the large budget outlay that would be required to meet the conditions. The date of the OPCON transfer coincides with South Korea building its own Kill Chain and Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system as key components to its response to the North Korean missile threat. When the ministry initially gave the mid-2020s as a date, it was chosen because the military reinforcement plan had those capabilities in place by the middle of the next decade. The new administration has hinted that plans to increase the defense budget by 7-8% each year to beef up military capabilities - but a more detailed estimate will needed to see if that is enough.

Some maintain a shortage of military capabilities are not the only factor to blame.

“The South Korea-US alliance will remain in place even if the OPCON transfer happens,” said one expert speaking on condition of anonymity.

“One idea is to condition accepting US support for now in areas where our capabilities are lacking, and leaving some time to supplement them. To say everything has to be in place for us to assume [OPCON] is basically the same as saying we’re not going to assume it,” the expert said.

“It’s a matter of political will,” the expert added.

The Korean Peninsula’s security environment is another factor. The ministry is already moving to hasten development of military capabilities to respond to the North Korean nuclear and missile threats, announcing in its 2018-2022 mid-term national defense plan in April that it was moving the kill chain introduction date up from the mid-2020s to the early 2020s. The move was made on the determination that the North Korean nuclear and missile threats are growing by the day. Public opinion in the South is such that if North Korea does speed up its nuclear weapon and missile development without any resolution to the current military antagonisms between South and North, an early OPCON transfer could meet with a backlash. Establishing the right environment with improved inter-Korean relations and progress on the North Korean nuclear issue is another essential part of the process.

By Park Byong-su, senior staff writer

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