Pres. Moon objects to Defense Ministry’s stealthy THAAD launcher deployment

Posted on : 2017-05-31 16:58 KST Modified on : 2019-10-19 20:29 KST
Administration orders thorough investigation into who mandated and carried out delivery procedure
 a former golf course in Seongju
a former golf course in Seongju

After confirming on May 30 that four THAAD launchers had been secretly delivered to South Korea and were being stored at a US military base near Seongju, North Gyeongsang Province, President Moon Jae-in instructed the Blue House National Security Office and the Office of the Senior Secretary to the President for Civil Affairs to determine why this information had been omitted from briefings by the Ministry of Defense. Since this implies that Moon considers the Ministry’s failure to brief him on this information as a serious infringement on the national order, the fact-finding investigation could lead to wholesale reform measures and a major reshuffling of personnel in the military and the Defense Ministry.

“President Moon has been briefed about the fact that in addition to the two THAAD launchers that are already installed at Seongju, four more launchers were secretly brought into South Korea and are in storage. Moon has instructed the Office of the Senior Secretary to the President for Civil Affairs and the National Security Office to thoroughly investigate the circumstances surrounding the delivery of these four launchers,” Blue House Senior Secretary to the President for Public Relations Yoon Young-chan said during the briefing on May 30.

“After being briefed on this yesterday [May 29] by Blue House National Security Office Chief Chung Eui-yong, Moon said it was ‘very shocking’ and called Defense Minister Han Min-koo to personally confirm that four launchers had already been brought into the country,” Yoon added. He explained that the Defense Ministry had failed to mention the delivery of additional THAAD launchers when it briefed President Moon’s governance planning advisory committee on May 25.

“Moon’s instructions were to figure out how the four additional launchers were delivered, who decided that they would be delivered, why the public was not informed and why the new government was not briefed until now,” Yoon said. He added that Moon had also ordered officials to look into whether the reason the Defense Ministry did not disclose the delivery of more THAAD launchers was so that it could avoid an environmental impact assessment of the THAAD site in Seongju County.

The Blue House has determined that the four launchers were delivered to South Korea before the new administration took power and are currently being stored at a US military base near the Seongju site. There had been reports in the media at the end of April, before the presidential election, that six launchers for the THAAD battery had been delivered to South Korea, two of which had been deployed at the THAAD base and four of which were being stored at another US base. “The reports about four more launchers were pure speculation. There had been no official confirmation of any facts related to that,” Yoon said in response.

A THAAD interceptor pointed skyward at the deployment site
A THAAD interceptor pointed skyward at the deployment site

THAAD controvery entering a new phase 

THAAD deployment formation
THAAD deployment formation

Moon’s instructions for an inquiry into the delivery of the additional THAAD launchers suggests that the controversy over the THAAD deployment is moving into a new phase. The inquiry could now be a chance to clear up the South Korean public’s suspicions about the THAAD deployment.

The initial position maintained by the administration of former president Park Geun-hye was summarized as the “three nos”: that the THAAD deployment had not been requested nor deliberated and that no decision had been made. But last year Seoul seized North Korea’s testing of a nuclear weapon and launch of its Unha rocket as a pretext to officially announce in Feb. 2016 that it would begin deliberations about deploying THAAD with US Forces Korea (USFK).

Citing the “president’s resolution,” the Defense Ministry abruptly announced the decision to deploy THAAD with USFK on July 8, 2016. Three days before this announcement, Defense Minister Han Min-koo testified in a hearing before the National Assembly that he would “exercise prudence” about the THAAD deployment. This triggered rampant speculation that the Blue House National Security Office had spearheaded the final decision to deploy THAAD, leaving the Defense Ministry to pick up the pieces afterward.

Determining who decided to deploy THAAD, when they did so, and for what reasons is also necessary in order to deal with the political fallout of the THAAD deployment. At the end of June 2016, barely two weeks before the decision was made to deploy THAAD, then Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn spent five days in China as the guest of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. Chinese officials who met Moon‘s special delegation to China on May 18 related how Chinese President Xi Jinping had told Hwang during his visit that the two countries should use various channels to discuss how to handle the THAAD issue in a way that would not harm either of their interests. The implication is that the reason that China’s backlash to the THAAD deployment was unexpectedly intense was that China felt that it had been betrayed.

Another matter that must be addressed is why the schedule for deploying THAAD was moved forward, disregarding official protocol such as giving advance notification to local residents and carrying out an environmental impact assessment. When the decision to deploy THAAD was announced in July 2016, the Defense Ministry and USFK said that THAAD would not actually be deployed until about Dec. 2017. But the THAAD deployment began to accelerate as Park’s impeachment proceedings got underway. Around this time, then National Security Chief Kim Kwan-jin visited the US on two occasions to discuss the matter. Allegations have also been raised that Kim and US Secretary of Defense James Mattis decided during a meeting in Seoul at the beginning of February to bring THAAD to South Korea before the South Korean presidential election. Indeed, USFK took the unusual step of publishing images of the delivery of THAAD components, including two launchers, to Osan Air Base, on the evening of Mar. 6, four days before the Constitutional Court was scheduled to decide whether to uphold Park’s impeachment.

And then on Apr. 26, just two weeks before the presidential election, the Defense Ministry and USFK deployed THAAD at the Seongju Golf Course in the middle of the night, as if they were carrying out some kind of raid. The abrupt deployment was criticized as an attempt to make the THAAD deployment a fait accompli before the election and to meddle in the election by making THAAD an issue. “Both the decision to deploy THAAD and the actual deployment occurred abruptly without going through the normal decision-making process. We need to carefully scrutinize the entire process of hurrying to deploy THAAD before the presidential election when it was obvious that this would put pressure on the new administration,” said Korea National Strategy Institute director Kim Chang-soo.

By Jung In-hwan, staff reporter

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]

 

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