Six-party talks produces draft verification protocol

Posted on : 2008-12-10 13:26 KST Modified on : 2019-10-19 20:29 KST
References to ‘sampling’ replaced by alternative terms as negotiators search for a compromise on the issue
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Host nation China circulated a document with the character of a preliminary draft for a verification protocol on Tuesday, the second day after the opening of six-nation talks among chief delegates on the North Korean nuclear issue. After the circulation of this document, the participant nations began working out compromises in earnest, including the pursuit of two-party discussions centering on China.

China called a second plenary session at Beijing’s Diaoyutai State Guesthouse Tuesday morning and circulated a document related to verification drafted after gathering opinions from each participant nation. The meeting was adjourned 35 minutes after it started so that participant nations could conduct internal examinations and additional discussions, officials at the talks reported.

China, with the status of host nation, conducted a series of two-party discussions with North Korea and the other participant nations after the adjournment to hear and harmonize opinions. Various two-party discussions also took place, including between South Korea and the United States and between North Korea and Russia.

Content of the draft verification protocol

The document circulated by China was based on agreed-upon items related to verification from the July round of six-party talks among chief delegates and the content of October’s North Korea-U.S. Pyongyang agreement and contained information about verification agents, methods, targets and time periods that reflected the opinions gathered from participant nations on Sunday and Monday, it was reported. China’s draft was said to contain no use of the term “sampling,” a core point of contention. Reports indicate that the draft instead contained the terms “scientific verification procedures,” “international standard,” and the “role of the International Atomic Energy Agency” as proposed by Russia and others.

At the July meeting of chief delegates, agreement was reached on: verification agents (experts from the six nations); verification methods (facility visits, document examination, interviews with technical personnel and other measures agreed upon unanimously by all six parties); and the welcoming of verification-related consultation and support from the IAEA. October’s Pyongyang agreement, in addition to the items agreed upon in the July meeting, also contained items of oral agreement on access to unreported facilities by mutual agreement and verification according to scientific procedures, including sampling and forensic identification.

The North Korea question

But can these six-party talks resolve the difficult puzzle of documenting the verification protocol? The most important variable is North Korea’s strategy at the talks. Will Pyongyang opt for agreement, or is it willing to risk a breakdown in talks with the logic that the verification issue is a task for discussion in the third stage (nuclear dismantlement) not included in the Pyongyang agreement? The deciding factor is Pyongyang’s determination as to which approach would be more beneficial for hastening two-party discussions with the United States after the administration of U.S. President-elect Barack Obama takes office.

“North Korea likely does not want a breakdown either,” an official at the talks said Tuesday. This may be wishful thinking, but a look at North Korea’s stance to date suggests that it does not seem likely to reject verification protocol documentation in itself. North Korean representatives announced Monday that they would announce their opinions after looking at the document to be circulated by China at the plenary session. Following the circulation of that document on Tuesday, North Korea conducted two-party discussions with China and Russia. At the very least, this is not an “intransigent stance.” It is also not disavowing the content of October’s Pyongyang agreement with the United States, which is to form the basic structure for verification protocol documentation. A report Monday in the Choson Sinbo, the newspaper of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryun, Chosen Soren), stated, “It appears that the verification procedures and methods agreed upon by Chosun (North Korea) and the United States in October were reconfirmed” in the Singapore discussions between North Korea and the United States last Thursday and Friday.

U.S. emphasis on verification protocol documentation

The “Maginot line” for negotiations for another core party, the United States, is verification protocol documentation at the six-party talks level based around the content of October’s Pyongyang agreement with North Korea. This is also the “guideline” passed on to Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill by U.S. President George W. Bush. Because the Pyongyang agreement was a precondition for the decision to remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism on October 11, a failure in verification protocol documentation would be close to a diplomatic disaster for the United States.

The problem is the content of the protocol, in particular specific verification methods such as sampling and accessing (unreported nuclear program-related) facilities, an area in which the positions of South Korea and Japan are sharply set against that of North Korea. Assistant Secretary of State Hill said that there were documented items of agreement and oral items of agreement in the Pyongyang meeting from October 1 to 3 and emphasized, “If the promise was made verbally, there should also be a willingness to document.” This means that “documentation” of the Pyongyang agreement at the six-party level is the core issue. On the issue of “sampling,” an area of high media interest, Hill indicated that it was “one of various methods of verification.”

The ‘sampling’ issue

Sources indicate that the document circulated by China contained no use of the term “sampling,” to which Pyongyang has shown an aversion. South Korea and the United States are not insisting that the term “sampling” must be in the document either. Even Kim Sook, Office of Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs special representative, who has spoken frequently of “sampling,” used the term “core verification item” after his arrival in Beijing. The key is whether a “delicate expression” can be found to which all participant nations can agree. In connection with this, the predominant view is that the role of holding together diplomatic compromises will be performed by the terms “scientific verification procedures,” “international standard,” and the “role of the IAEA,” the importance of which has been stressed by Russia, a nation rich in experience with nuclear dismantlement. Also subject to discussion are undisclosed sub-agreements with slightly more specific content or plans that adopt memoranda of understanding. There is also the possibility that high-level negotiations will be attempted through a series of phone conversations among foreign ministers from each nation, including U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in the later stages of the talks.

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