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Following North Korea’s second nuclear test, the South Korean government has adopted the “tough response” of declaring full participation in the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) on weapons of mass destruction. We sought the opinions of two experts on how to view the current situation and what the Lee Myung-bak government needs to do in response.

North Korea’s real aim is not to become a fully-fledged nuclear-armed state. Its real aim is to gain more economic support for itself and to establish diplomatic relations with the U.S. quickly in order to achieve its greater goal of becoming a “strong and prosperous country” by 2012.

First, if North Korea becomes a nuclear state, South Korea, the U.S. and Japan will impose　long-term sanctions, and China will become very critical of and uncooperative with North Korea. If that happens, North Korea will be unable to maintain its system. Second, it becomes impossible to prevent Japan’s nuclear armament. South Korea, too, will vow to attain nuclear capabilities. Ultimately, as North Korea has no economic might to back it up in the competition, its relative advantage will disappear.

Of course, North Korea can outwardly profess aspirations of becoming a nuclear state. This is a high-level negotiation tactic. It can also inform the people of North Korea that it does not intend to abandon its position as a nuclear state. This, too, follows along a strategy of deception where it is impossible to mislead the enemy without misleading your own people. Only in doing so can the cards value increase. In conclusion, because becoming a nuclear state has multiple likely side effects and will leave it in an inferior position militarily, it is difficult to view it as North Korea’s real objective.

If it is, negotiations need to begin immediately. For China to make a move, the U.S. needs to first present its own vision. It is time for the South Korean government to assist with a meeting between North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-il and figure like former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger of current U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton.

The government has now announced formal participation in PSI, and if it is to deal with the ramifications, it has to engage in the diplomacy of close dialogue with the U.S. in order to actively persuade the U.S. to send a message of dialogue to North Korea as soon as possible.

The current situation is different from the past. If North Korea becomes a nuclear state, it would bring a qualitatively different character to the political situation on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. A long-term Cold War-style confrontation could carry on, and an arms race will heat up Northeast Asia. This is not the situation South Korea wants.

How can this be stopped? What is needed now is for someone to present a solution. If Lee Myung-bak’s administration cannot present an effective response, it will have to take historical responsibility for sitting on the sidelines while North Korea became a nuclear state. Sanctions are both improbable and ineffective. What effect have they had in the 20-year history of the North Korean nuclear issue? They have actually accelerated North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. Sanctions have no effect without the substantial participation of China, which accounts for a considerable portion of North Korea’s overseas trade.

By declaring full participation in PSI, South Korea has declared that it is shutting off inter-Korean relations. At a crucial historical crossroads where North Korea stands ready to go nuclear, South Korea has closed off all possibilities of playing a part in things. The possibility of a military clash on the peninsula will increase, and the already struggling South Korean economy will take a direct hit from these national security issues.

Please direct questions or comments to [englishhani@hani.co.kr]