Experts await further developments following North Korean NDC hardline statement

Posted on : 2010-01-18 11:55 KST Modified on : 2019-10-19 20:29 KST
According to experts, Lee administration should issue affirmative response to prevent further deterioration in inter-Korean relations
 navy and air force is shown in this undated photo released by North Korea’s Korea Central News Agency (KCNA)
navy and air force is shown in this undated photo released by North Korea’s Korea Central News Agency (KCNA)

In the wake of the statement by a spokesman for the North Korean National Defense Commission (NDC) threatening “retaliation through a holy war” against South Korea and “the exclusion of South Korean authorities from all dialogue and discussions” in response to reports by a South Korean media outlet on contingency plans in the event of a sudden change in North Korea, a wide range of interpretations have been prompted by the unusual announcement of a visit Sunday by North Korean leader Kim Jong-il to combined training exercises by North Korea’s army, navy and air force. The divergent analyses have arisen because of the difficulty in discerning the North Korean leadership’s strategic concept, including Kim, represented in the country’s string of hardline messages, or the effect this will have on inter-Korean relations and the future political situation on the Korean Peninsula. Government authorities and experts, unable to formulate confident predictions of North Korea’s future course of action, are recommending a “wait-and-see” approach.

The variety of analyses stems largely from the fact that even though the content of the NDC statement contradicts the tenor of recent inter-Korean relations and North Korea-United States dialogue, including the six-party talks framework, it cannot be viewed lightly, as it is a formal policy delivered by the NDC, effectively North Korea’s supreme organ, with the “authorization” of chairman Kim Jong-il.

Predictions of North Korea’s future actions and the future political situation have followed several different directions. First, a number of observers are predicting an inevitable hardening in inter-Korean relations, as the Friday statement should logically be viewed as a “final decision at the highest level of authority” by North Korea. University of North Korea Studies Professor Yang Mu-jin said, “Other things have to be viewed as secondary to an NDC statement.” This interpretation would suggest that cooler inter-Korean relations are inevitable. However, a former high-ranking official who asked to remain anonymous showed a more circumspect approach. The former official commented, “There have been no previous cases of North Korean NDC statements being issued on the topic of inter-Korean relations, so we have no precedent to refer to in determining what specific effects this statement will have.”

Second, observers are waiting to observe how North Korea proceeds in the future with issues the country addressed last week, including its agreement to hold an assessment meeting on the joint inspection of overseas industrial complexes on Wednesday at the Kaesong Consultation Office for North-South Economic Cooperation, its proposal for a working-level meeting for the resumption of the Mt. Kumgang and Kaesong tourism projects, to be held on Jan. 26 and 27 at Mt. Kumkang and its acceptance of South Korean plans to provide 10,000 tons of corn aid. On this issue, opinions are divided within the government, with one side expecting North Korea to proceed according to schedule and the other questioning the likelihood of this. Experts are forecasting the possibility of North Korea either completely scrapping the schedule or at the very least deferring it. Some observers are noting as a possible point of reference the “December 1” measures in 2008, when the NDC adopted measures to halt passage between North Korea and South Korea and reduce the number of personnel allowed to stay in North Korea, then normalized both of these on Aug. 20, 2009.

Third, some observers are saying that the NDC statement’s remarks about excluding South Korean authorities from all future dialogue and discussions has implications for anticipated North Korea-U.S. dialogue and the resumption of the six-party talks. A number of differing analyses were presented within the government, ranging from some dismissing the remarks as “mere threatening language” to others predicting active attempts to exclude South Korea from the six-party talks and discussions on a peace agreement. An expert who requested anonymity noted, “If North Korea tries to exclude South Korea from the six-party talks, the U.S. might find its hands tied, and that is a development even North Korea does not want.” Jang Yong-seok, research director at the Institute for Peace Affairs, said that the response of the South Korean government is crucial. Jang said, “Rather than insisting solely on ‘denuclearization first,’ the Lee Myung-bak administration needs to take an active approach to discussions on a peace regime.”

Fourth, many observers are predicting that North Korea will find it difficult proceeding with a strictly hardline approach in light of its national goal of becoming a “strong and prosperous nation” by 2012 and the need for regime stability to ensure a smooth succession of power.

Among these divergent analyses, however, the prevailing view is that an overall hardening in inter-Korean relations is inevitable, at least in the short term. A government official said, “It looks like it will be a rocky road for inter-Korean relations, at least in the first half of the year.” In connection with this, many experts repeatedly commented on the importance of an active and affirmative response from the Lee administration to manage the situation and prevent inter-Korean relations from deteriorating.

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