hankyoreh

Dec. 29. (Cheong Wa Dae photo pool)

01/통일부

Son Won-je, Staff Writer

Despite a reference to both “strong national security and inter-Korean dialogue” in President Lee Myung-bak’s foreword, the 2011 operational report for the Unification Ministry released Wednesday adhered consistently to a line of aggressive pressure against North Korea. Analysts say the document reads like a farewell declaration to the Sunshine Policy.

The first of the three North Korean policy goals announced by the ministry Wednesday was “inducing desirable changes in North Korea,” followed by “establishing proper inter-Korean relations” and “preparing for reunification.” This contrasted with the three goals presented in 2009, which led off with “principled development of inter-Korean relations” and also included “productive humanitarianism” and “strengthening reunification capacities for the future.”

Analysts say that in contrast with last year, when a margin was left for advancement of relations through inter-Korean dialogue even while emphasizing principle, the 2010 goals made it clear that Seoul has no intention of engaging in dialogue unless it is premised on changes in North Korea. Even the slogan presented on the report was "Proper Inter-Korean Relations, Preparing Together for Reunification."

Also striking in its aggressiveness was the direction presented for changes in North Korea, which included non-nuclear peace, opening to the outside, and changing from songun, military first, policy to an emphasis on public welfare. At the second inter-Korean summit in October 2007, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il demonstrated a strong aversion to the use of the word “opening” by then President Roh Moo-hyun. The reference to Songun policy, which forms the backbone of the North Korean regime, is also likely to be taken as interference in domestic affairs.

As a plan for inducing changes in North Korea, the report offered the approach of placing priority on “the North Korean people.” This reference was not present in the late 2009 operational report. Analysts say it is likely meant to flesh out recent statements by President Lee emphasizing changes among the North Korean people and to approach the people and administration of North Korea as separate issues.

As North Korea policy measures emphasizing the people of North Korea, the Unification Ministry included human rights improvement and aid to North Koreans. Plans included quickly enacting the North Koreans Human Rights Act, currently pending in the National Assembly, and creating a human rights foundation based on it, as well as investigating the North Korean human rights situation and stepping up support for activities by North Korean human rights groups in South Korea and overseas.

The report also stressed that it would strengthen the transparency of humanitarian aid to North Korea to ensure that direct benefits go to the North Korean people.

All of the ideas are things that North Korean authorities have objected strongly to in the past.

No concrete plan was presented for restoring inter-Korean dialogue and exchange, as referred to in President Lee’s foreword. The report did include a reference to “pursuing proper inter-Korean dialogue to solve key issues,” but analysts say this is a far cry from an actual declaration of intent to engage in dialogue. In reference to President Lee’s statement in the report to the effect that “national security and inter-Korean dialogue need to be carried out in tandem,” Unification Ministry Hyun In-taek said in a briefing following the report Wednesday, “We do not interpret that to mean ‘We are proceeding into inter-Korean dialogue right away’ or anything like that.”

Of the summit meeting issue, Hyun said, “We have not considered or thought about that at the moment.”

The Unification Ministry also added plans for “actively responding to North Korea’s onslaught of fraudulent peace overtures,” suggesting that it will not accede readily to North Korean proposals for dialogue involving matters that are not key issues Seoul wishes to discuss, including denuclearization and acknowledgement of responsibility for the sinking of the Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island.

Analysts say that President Lee’s dismissal of the notion of unification by absorption was made out of a consciousness of factors such as concerns in Beijing.

“I do not think things like the ‘unification by absorption’ that some quarters are speaking of are things that should be discussed,” the president said.

In connect with this, sources reported that there were some calls for using the term “byeonhwan conversion” instead of “byeonhwa (change),” in the Unification Ministry report, but that byeonhwa was selected in the final fine-tuning process following a suggestion that the former might come across as “pursuing a regime change or unification by absorption.”

However, some observers are saying the decision to openly stress calls for change, which are vehemently rejected by the North Korean leadership, and to foreground the notion of inducing change from below seems to reflect expectations of a sudden upheaval or unification by absorption rather than gradually changes in North Korea through dialogue and exchange.

Please direct questions or comments to [englishhani@hani.co.kr]