hankyoreh

By Park Byung-soo, staff writer

North Korea’s defiant rocket launch on April 13, and its failure, have left the country a loser on all fronts. The North went ahead with the launch because of the domestic political need to provide stability to the Kim Jong-un regime in its early days. The rocket‘s explosion just two minutes after launch, however, has left the North facing increased isolation and the possibility of extra sanctions on the international front, and a credibility crisis, rather than political success, at home.

The North’s unprecedented admission of its failure, made four hours after the launch, appeared to be a desperate measure aimed at dealing, in any way possible, with its pitiful situation. “The fact that the failure was too obvious to be disguised as a success, as in the past, appears to be because internal control of information is not as easy for the North as it used to be,” said one South Korean government official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “But it seems to be trying to leave some extra margin for the easing of sanctions and further negotiations with the international community by admitting its failure.”

It appears that the North’s actions from now on will be affected by factors such as the strength of sanctions and means of response adopted by the US and other states. It is hard to be sure whether the North will make further provocations such as a nuclear test. Until now, the North has been calling the launch “a peaceful satellite launch” and emphasizing that it does not contravene its February 29 agreement with the US. No claims of peaceful intentions can be made about a nuclear test.

A hard-line response by the United Nations Security Council would make it likely that the North will put up strong resistance in return. If a vicious cycle of provocation-hardline response-resistance is formed, the possibility remains that the North will choose to perform a third nuclear test. This hypothesis is backed up by precedent: North Korea conducted a nuclear test after each of its earlier rocket launches in 2006 and 2009.

But the choices available to the Obama administration facing an election in the second half of this year could be limited. Exacerbating the situation by driving the North into a corner could turn into a political burden. Moreover, if China is reluctant to apply sanctions, it will be difficult to apply these through the UNSC. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu Wei-min called on Friday for calm and restraint, warning against actions that could damage peace and stability in the region.

Kim Jong-un’s regime has taken a big hit domestically, too. North Korea has been publicizing this year, the hundredth anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s birth, as the year that it would become a strong and prosperous country [Kangsung Daeguk]. But the failure of the rocket has left the regime with little to support this claim. At the end of last year, the North cited the rocket, together with nuclear weapons, as part of the late Kim Jong-il’s revolutionary legacy. In North Korea, which takes rule according to injunctions of dead leaders as a core political ideology, leaves Kim Jong-un’s regime in a situation where cracks will inevitable appear in its credibility among its own people.

Particularly noteworthy is the immature behavior of the four-month-old Kim Jong-un regime. Immediately after reaching an agreement with the US on February 29 this year, it announced that it would launch a satellite. The concurrent messages of improved North Korean-US relations and of confrontation put a dent in the North’s credibility.

Also dubious is the fact that this year’s rocket launch was little better technologically than that of 2009. While the 2009 rocket flew for more than 3,000 kilometers before falling into the Pacific, this one blew up as soon as it was launched, leaving its debris in the Yellow Sea. It appears that the North went ahead hastily with the launch while still lacking the necessary technology. Some speculate that this slapdash approach is attributable to the pains of government transition.

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