[Special series- part 1] North Korea’s nuclear program

Posted on : 2012-05-21 15:51 KST Modified on : 2012-05-21 15:51 KST
May 18 debate provides forum for progressives and conservatives to trade views on the North
 Kang Tae-ho
Kang Tae-ho

By Jung Hyuk-june, staff writer

Inter-Korean relations and unification policy may be the area where the so-called “politics of extremes” stand out sharpest. Conservatives and progressives differ widely in their views on North Korea, and many have sought to use the issue for domestic political ends.
May 18 saw a debate on “A New Direction for Unification Policy to Promote Social Harmony,” jointly organized by the Presidential Committee on Social Cohesion (chaired by Song Suk-ku) and the Hankyoreh Social Policy Research Institute (chaired by Lee Chang-gon). The aim was to bridge a yawning gap in views on inter-Korean and unification-related issues, locating a new policy direction that both conservatives and progressives can get behind. Attendees of both persuasions agreed that any unification should be gradual and based on consensus rather than one side “absorbing” the other. It was also generally agreed that problematic provisions in the National Security Act should be amended quickly.
North Korea’s nuclear program

The North Korean nuclear program is something of a hot potato. Heated discussion ensued on whether inter-Korean economic cooperation should be made contingent on a resolution to it or whether a two-track approach was needed. Both progressives and conservatives agreed North Korea was unlikely to give up its nuclear capabilities, but failed to find common ground on how to handle the situation. Progressives at the debate called for the two-track approach, while conservatives argued for connecting economic cooperation with North Korean moves away from nuclear power development.

Sejong Institute senior researcher and former Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok noted that a United Nations Security Council resolution on sanctions against North Korea adopted on June 12, 2009, in the wake of the country’s second nuclear test on May 25 was undermined by North Korea’s economic cooperation with China.

“The Lee Myung-bak administration’s aim in linking inter-Korean economic cooperation to the North Korean nuclear program was to mend North Korea’s ways and punish it by causing economic pain, but trade between North Korea and China increased substantially after the UNSC resolution’s adoption,” Lee said.

“Meanwhile, South Korea was stripped of a real opportunity to generate profits due to the lack of economic cooperation with North Korea,” he added.

Korea Institute for National Unification president Kim Tae-woo was quick to take issue with the Lee administration’s claims. “The one principle I have consistently maintained for the past twenty years is that it is meaningless to adopt a two-track approach on the nuclear program and economic cooperation in the absence of any transparency guarantees,” he said.

“There has been a lot of aid given to North Korea over the past ten years, but it’s still been developing its nuclear program,” Kim added.

He went on to say, “While the Sunshine Policy was going on, North Korea took what was given and built up its nuclear capabilities, beefing up its special units, artillery, and tanks.

"So long as North Korea’s transparency is not assured, we obviously need to link the nuclear issue with economic cooperation, and we cannot give aid to North Korea as long as the nuclear program remains an issue," he argued.

Kim concluded by saying, "If North Koreans have the ability to choose their government, North Korean authorities could be stopped from developing nukes."

Some participants assigned responsibility for the situation to the United States. Noting that Pyongyang’s demands from the United States were that it drop its antagonistic approach and establish diplomatic relations, Yonsei University professor and former Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative chairman Moon Chung-in argued that getting North Korea to abandon its nuclear program would require Washington to establish diplomatic relations with Pyongyang and sign a peace treaty. "If North Korea still doesn’t cooperate after that, then you have the option of getting it in hand with the threat of severing ties," he explained.

Moon went on to say that Pyongyang kept its promises when the six-party talks functioned well and abandoned them when they failed to work out.

"The US needs to leave behind its Washington bureaucrat politics and show a forward-thinking approach," he said.

Another option mentioned at the debate was a multi-track approach in which the government would address political, economic, and diplomatic issues all at once rather than simply linking the nuclear program to economic cooperation.

Seoul National University international relations professor and former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Yoon Young-kwan said, "It’s not wise to hang improvements in inter-Korean relations on the single issue of the nuclear program. Denuclearization takes too long. If you go all in on denuclearization while ignoring other issues, then there is no hope for inter-Korean relations," he added.

Yoon stressed the need to discuss market-oriented economic cooperation with North Korea, while also making proposals that link human rights issues to other types of compensation.

"We need a multi-dimensional approach to North Korea policy," he argued.

 

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