hankyoreh

By Kang Tae-ho, senior staff writer

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2087, spearheaded by the US, and the statement made by North Korea’s Foreign Ministry on Jan. 23 in response to the resolution warn of a full-scale confrontation based on an eye-for-an-eye rivalry and the logic of escalating reprisals.

The sanctions, which come in response to North Korea’s launch of the Unha-3 rocket on Dec. 12, 2012, are significant in two regards. First, their format is not a presidential statement but a resolution, and second, the content of the resolution expands existing sanctions. Furthermore, the resolution includes a warning that the UNSC will take “significant action” if North Korea makes any further provocations.

China has already implied that North Korea would conduct a nuclear test if the UNSC adopts additional sanctions. Considering this, the North is likely to counter with an even stronger and more provocative military threat.

In fact, the North‘s statement is the first time the country has declared the six-party talks and the September 19th joint statement to be defunct. The joint statement had not ever been brought up before in this way. This sets it apart from previous statements, which have suggested that the six-party talks no longer have any raison d’etre or that the North no longer considers itself bound by the six-party agreement.

Additionally, the threats mentioned in this statement are different from before. The North is essentially vowing, not just to strengthen its nuclear capabilities, but furthermore to “take steps for physical counteraction to bolster the military capabilities for self defense,” which include the nuclear option. In addition to the threat of a third nuclear test and the launch of a more powerful missile expressed in the statement, the North could also escalate the crisis further by making full use of unexpected and seemingly random military actions.

As its past behavior reveals, North Korea has always taken specific actions to show that warnings such as these are not merely empty words. This could play out as a test of the North’s new KN-08 ballistic missile.

On Jan. 17, the New York Times quoted a source in the military in a report that North Korea is positioning the missiles around the country. In the view of military experts, this new mobile ballistic missile will probably be greatly superior in terms of performance and range to the currently deployed Rodong medium-range missile. When the missile was revealed in a military parade in April 2012, it raised a flurry of questions about whether it was a mock-up or the real thing. Since then, engine tests of the ballistic missile have been detected, but there have been no tests of its launch capabilities.

In addition, mid-February is when the Key Resolve US-Korea joint military exercises will begin in earnest. If we are not careful, we could see a replay of the first nuclear crisis, which took place in March 1994. At that time, the Korean peninsula teetered on the brink of war, as the North threatened to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire,” the US countered with UN sanctions, and the North declared it was ready to begin hostilities.

No exit strategy can be seen in the US-sponsored resolution passed by the UNSC. This point leads one to wonder why China voted in support of the resolution. Considering the fact that, up until very recently, China had insisted that the UNSC response be prudent and appropriate, the change in China’s attitude raises many questions. Even Li Baodong, China’s ambassador to the UN, said that a resolution at this time would not be a fundamental solution, emphasizing the importance of dialogue.

Of course, the UN resolution is also aimed to reboot the six-party talks. The Chinese spokesperson for the foreign ministry emphasized dialogue and negotiations, including the resumption of the six-party talks, as well.

When the UNSC issued a presidential statement condemning the North’s first launch of the Eunha-3 missile in April 2012, China was there to promise significant investment in Hwanggeumpyeong and Wihwa Islands and to coax North Korea into making a statement that it would refrain from additional nuclear experiments.

The problem lies in the fact that, this time, it is hard to see how China could play the same role. There is even a certain sense in which North Korea’s statement that the six-party talks and the September 19th joint statement are defunct is aimed at China, since China presides over the six-party talks.

With this in mind, we should look instead to the exit strategy that North Korea hints at in its statement. Even as it declares the end of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula, the North also suggests the possibility of dialogue to guarantee peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and the region. This brings to mind a framework entirely different from the six-party talks: the direct meetings between high-ranking North Korean and American officials that took place during the Bill Clinton presidency.

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