hankyoreh

By Park Byong-su, staff reporter

North Korea’s third nuclear test is a symbolic indication of a change in direction in the country’s strategic approach to the US. To this point, North Korea has largely used its rocket launches and nuclear tests as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the US. At the time of the first nuclear test in Oct. 2006, the relevant issue for the North was relief from US financial sanctions in connection with the Banco Delta Asia incident. The second test in May 2009 was largely viewed as an attempt to push the new Obama administration to enter direct, bilateral talks after the six-party talks were shut down.

However, under leader Kim Jong-un, North Korea has used this nuclear test to show that it is placing more stress on deterrence and the possession of nuclear weapons than on negotiations. Since Jan. 23, the North has issued a series of statements by the foreign ministry, the National Defense Commission, and the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland (CPRF) to make it quite clear that it considers the six-party talks to be over, that it believes the declaration for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula to be null and void, and that it will expand and strengthen nuclear deterrence, both in terms of quantity and capability.

Additionally, Pyongyang signaled that, in the future, dialogue will not take the form of denuclearization talks, in which the North gives up its nuclear program in exchange for financial aid and a guarantee of security, but rather that it will only take part in talks for nuclear arms reduction and peace between nuclear equals. This shows a completely different attitude from what North Korea had been emphasizing up to this point: that “Kim Il-sung’s dying wishes were for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.” North Korea has clearly stated that it will no longer discuss giving up its nuclear weapons. This move can be read as a declaration to the outside world that the North is set on possessing nuclear weapons and using those weapons for deterrence.

According to analysis by CNN, after having been in North Korea’s top post for more than a year, Kim Jong-un is determined to move out of his father’s shadow and build his own legacy as a leader.

These changes appear to reflect North Korea’s frustration and anxiety concerning the fact that discussions for peace on the Korean peninsula never even got underway, despite the country’s agreement to the Sep. 19, 2005, joint statement. Even though more than four years have passed since the six-party talks fell apart at the end of 2008 because of disagreements concerning the sampling and inspection of spent fuel rods, talks between the US and the North can’t seem to get off the ground. It appears that, in the end, the North decided there was no reason to keep hoping the denuclearization talks would work out. It is doubtful, however, how North Korea’s move to prioritize peace talks will go over with the US, which has put denuclearization ahead of any direct talks.

It appears that North Korea will respond to additional UN sanctions by increasing the level of tensions on the Korean peninsula. As it said in the statement by its foreign ministry in Jan. 2013, North Korea could go in the direction of “expanding and strengthening the quantity and quality of its independent military capacity, including nuclear deterrence.”

Along these lines, one analysis is that the North could carry out a fourth nuclear test. Indeed, before the third test took place, North Korean workers were detected carrying out work in two places, both the west tunnel and the south tunnel, at Mantap Mountain in Punggye village, Gilju county, North Hamgyeong province. It is possible that the tunnel where the nuclear test did not take place was being prepared for a subsequent nuclear test.

Pyongyang could also launch another long-range rocket or missile. On Feb. 11, North Korea held a meeting of the politburo of the Workers’ Party, at which it “emphasized that it would continue to launch satellites in the Kwangmyongsong line and long-range rockets,” the KCNA reported. In the case of missiles, it is possible that the North could move to test-launch the new KN-08 ballistic missile. So far, only engine testing has been completed on this model.

North Korea might also use South Korean participation in further UNSC sanctions as an excuse to carry out a direct provocation against the South. On Jan. 25, the North made a threat using a statement released by the CPRF, saying “If the South takes part in UN sanctions, we will adopt strong physical countermeasures.” There are even concerns that the West Sea, which has in the past been the site of armed clashes between the North and South, will once again become a dangerous place of military conflict between the two countries.

But insofar as North Korea also does not want a complete collapse, many believe that there is still room for negotiations. Considering that North Korea must be assumed to have the strategic goal of ensuring its survival through aggressive responses that pit “strength against strength,” we can infer that North Korea must also be thinking about negotiations.

The very fact that the North was so domestically and internationally vocal in emphasizing its plans to carry out a nuclear test can be interpreted as a forceful call for negotiations. In this sense, many analysts suggest that the attitude and efforts of the incoming Park Geun-hye administration will play an important role in changing this high-stakes showdown on the Korean peninsula into an opportunity for negotiations.

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