hankyoreh

Mar. 5. (image captured from a Korean Central Television broadcast)

By Kang Tae-ho, senior staff writer

The North Korean supreme command’s threat to nullify the ceasefire that ended the combat phase of the Korean War is at once carefully calculated and also something they have already warned about. In addition, it once again shows the North doing what it has always done: countering the actions of Seoul and Washington with increasingly severe threats. If, for example, the third nuclear test was a response to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)’s resolution to impose sanctions on the North, this measure is aimed at the “Key Resolve-Foal Eagle” joint US-South Korea military exercises.

Just as notice was given concerning the third nuclear test through statements by the North Korean foreign ministry and National Defense Commission, this move was foreshadowed in a telephone message sent to James Sherman, commander of US forces in Korea, by Park Lim-su, representative of the North Korean contingent at Panmunjeom.

In this sense, it is possible to predict how Pyongyang will respond. First of all, if, as expected, the UNSC comes to an agreement on implementing additional sanctions on Mar. 7, it is likely that Pyongyang will react by testing the KN-08 new long-range intercontinental ballistic missile or the Musudan 4,000km mid-range missile, which reports indicate has already been deployed but has not yet been launch-tested. We can also predict that the North will start preparing in earnest for a fourth nuclear test.

In response to the US-South Korea joint military exercises, North Korea has already prepared for exercises throughout its territory, including combined army, naval, and air firepower exercises and firing by coastal batteries. As was announced in the statement issued by the high military command, on Mar. 11, when the Key Resolve exercises begin, North Korea will respond with nationwide exercises that mobilize all available firepower and manpower, along with actual measures corresponding to the nullification of the cease fire.

On Mar. 6, the day after Pyongyang’s announcement that it would nullify the armistice, the Rodong Sinmun, North Korea’s state-run newspaper, ran a statement by a spokesperson for the high command on the front page. Below that were statements and responses from various sectors, along with pictures of a military review, increasing the mood of military intimidation.

The article took the form of responses from different sectors to a statement by North Korean general Jong Hyon-il, who was quoted as saying, “If the US imperialists brandish their nuclear weapons, we will turn not only Seoul, but even Washington, into a sea of fire, through a precision nuclear strike.”

In addition, Jon Yong-nam, chair of the central committee of the Kim Il-sung Socialist Youth League, said, “We vow to plant the flag of the central military command and the North Korean flag on Halla Mountain on Jeju Island.”

Viewed in terms of its political, legal, and symbolic significance, a declaration that the ceasefire is no longer in force could have tremendous ramifications. However, in terms of actual consequences, it means no more than that another means of communication will be cut off. Until now, on-duty officers from the North Korean military and the United Nations Command (UNC) had been confirming the status of the phone lines once a day, but now Pyongyang is saying that it will end this practice.

Even in the past, North Korea had long maintained that it was not constrained by the terms of the ceasefire. Further, since the North had neutralized the function of the military armistice commission by establishing an army post at Panmunjeom, it could even be said that the ceasefire had for all intents and purposes already become meaningless. This is in the same context as an earlier statement by the foreign ministry in which the six-party talks and the Sep. 19 joint statement were pronounced defunct.

Of course, as the high command statement itself emphasizes, the move by Pyongyang is dangerous in the sense that it provides grounds that can justify any provocative action. As the North said, “We also can strike a blow of justice without any restrictions, and without being constrained by the ceasefire, at a time of our choosing, and against a target of our choosing.”

Additionally, in legal terms, this in effect represents a declaration of war. In this sense, when the South Korean joint chiefs of staff issued a response on Mar. 6 saying that they would firmly respond to any North Korea provocation by attacking Pyongyang’s command structure, they were essentially promising to retaliate against a sea of fire in Seoul by creating a sea of fire in Pyongyang. This can be seen as helping Pyongyang’s strategy of increasing the possibility of the outbreak of war as much as possible.

However, the strategy of increasing the severity of threats according to such a preordained sequence decreases the effectiveness of the threat because of its very predictability. Despite this, the fact that North Korea is not choosing unpredictable threats and is instead carefully adhering to this “advance warning system” shows that the North is providing time for negotiations before it acts on these threats. This is because what the North is demanding is that a choice be made between peace talks between North Korea and the US and war. While we cannot yet predict how much time there will be to make that choice, paradoxically, the more dire the possibility of war is, the more likely peace talks become.

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