hankyoreh

By Park Byong-su and Seok Jin-hwan, staff reporters

The continuing crisis on the Korean peninsula has finally engulfed the Kaesong Industrial Complex.

The South Korean government went to considerable lengths to keep the complex in operation, making unexpected proposals for talks with North Korea on two separate occasions.

Nevertheless, critics are arguing that the way the government chose to respond revealed a number of problem areas that plagued the entire process. These include a lack of internal communication, mixed signals, an absence of strategic judgment, and hastiness.

On Apr. 11, South Korean President Park Geun-hye made a sudden proposal for talks with the North. This was the first time the government had actively sought an alternative to the military measures that had been employed since the North launched a long-range missile at the end of 2012.

This surprise proposal raised expectations. But if we look at the government’s policy decision-making process that led to this proposal, the problems in Park Geun-hye’s administration are readily apparent.

Even after Ryoo Kihl-jae, Minister of Unification, released a statement asking North Korea to come to the negotiating table, he emphatically told reporters that this was not a proposal for talks.

But later that same day, Park corrected Ryoo’s remarks, saying that she planned to engage in talks with North Korea. In other words, the government ministry responsible for North Korea and the president contradicted each other on the subject of North Korea on the same day.

Especially considering reports that Ryoo had issued this statement after meeting with Park at the Blue House, one cannot help but wonder how exactly decisions were being made on Apr. 11.

At that time, North Korea had been making belligerent statements not only about South Korea but also about the US. Bearing this situation in mind, the South Korean government had emphasized cooperation with the US in regard to policy toward the North.

But even though the proposal Park made on Apr. 11 took place the day before US Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit to South Korea, there is no evidence that this had been run by the US. Sources report that the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs had to work overtime to explain Ryoo’s statement to the US. It initially insisted that nothing had changed in the existing policy and then had to backpedal later.

When North Korea criticized the proposal for talks on Apr. 14 as a “cunning ploy,” the Ministry of Unification and the Blue House once again had trouble coordinating their efforts. The Ministry at first claimed that the North’s response was not a rejection of the proposal for talks, but the Blue House expressed its regrets, saying that it did amount to a rejection.

The proposal for talks that the South Korean government made on Apr. 25 was much more aggressive than before.

Pyongyang had objected to the proposal for talks on Apr. 11, calling it “an empty shell” and “a ploy.” Despite this, the proposal made by Seoul on Apr. 25 did not contain any additional substance to replace the “empty shell” the North had complained about.

Instead, the South Korean government offered an ultimatum that threatened “grave measures” if the North did not accept the proposal by Apr. 26, raising suspicions that Seoul had already planned on giving up on the Kaesong Complex.

The problem is that it is unclear whether the Park administration is working on an broad plan for inter-Korean relations after the Kaesong Industrial Complex has been evacuated.

“Once the safety of the workers at Kaesong is ensured, the government will take time to carefully deliberate about inter-Korean relations,” said a senior government official. This indicates that, rather than making plans for the future, the government intends to wait and see what actions North Korea will take.

“If workers are withdrawn from Kaesong without any strategy for what comes after, that would make me seriously concerned about the future of inter-Korean relations,” said Kim Yeon-cheol, professor at Inje University. “Park must release a strategic plan for her five years in office in order to increase predictability and consistency.”

There are also some observers who claim that the government’s proposal for talks came at the wrong time.

They argue that South Korea should have coordinated its offers with signs that the situation on the Korean peninsula was tending toward talks. It was around this time that Kerry had finished his tour of South Korea, China, and Japan and that Wu Dawei, China’s special representative for North Korea policy, was visiting the US.

“At the end of this month, the combined US-ROK military exercises will conclude, and next month, the first summit meeting between the leaders of the two countries will take place. These are both significant events that can bring about new developments on the Korean peninsula,” said Kim Geun-shik, professor at Kyungnam University. “There is the worrisome possibility that the Korean government took ‘grave measures’ out of impatience, without making any plans.”

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]