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Jang Song-thaek (second from the right) stands with his hands behind his back as North Korean leader Kim Jong-un checks out the outdoor ice rink at the Ryugyong Health Complex before its opening in Pyongyang

By Park Byong-su, senior staff writer

Jang Song-thaek, former head of the Administrative Department of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), was executed on Dec. 12. The execution came four days after Jang purged from all of his positions in an expanded meeting of the KWP Political Bureau on charges of anti-state and counterrevolutionary factionalism.

Nov. 2012.

It is unusual for the North Korean regime to move so quickly to eliminate a political foe following a perfunctory trial. When Park Heon-young of the Workers’ Party of South Korea was purged in 1953, he was executed not long after his trial. Park’s sentence came two years after his arrest. In 1967, when the Gapsan faction was eliminated, Park Geum-cheol the trial and execution were carried out in total secrecy.

If anything, the “August faction” incident was more of a typical case. In 1956, North Korea had been forced to delay the purging of the Yeonan and Soviet factions because of pressure from China, the USSR, and other socialist countries that provided considerable aid for rebuilding the North after the Korean War (1950-53).

Nevertheless, this incident has once more reinforced and perpetuated the perception that North Korea is a bizarre country. Jang’s execution is an example that reaffirms the cruelty, insularity, and undemocratic nature of the North Korean government in the eyes of South Korean society, which achieved democracy after the June movement in the late 1980s.

“During the Yushin dictatorship in the 1970s, South Korea experienced similar things,” said a government official on condition of anonymity. “There was the People's Revolutionary Party incident, in which the victims were executed only 18 hours after being sentenced to death, an incident that was criticized as judicial murder.”

“Nevertheless, it is a tragedy that such vicious events, which reek of dark plots and conspiracy, are still openly taking place in the 21st century.”

The charges against Jang were wide-ranging. They included serious crimes such as anti-state and anti-revolutionary factionalism, refusal to obey orders, and throwing the financial system into disarray, as well as more personal issues such as disseminating smutty photos, gambling, and living a life of debauchery. Since North Korea did not make public the specifics of Jang’s alleged crimes, it is impossible to know how credible the charges actually are. Nevertheless, when viewed using the judicial standards of South Korea, it seems rather unlikely that some of these charges would stand up in a court of law.

In Jang’s trial, North Korea added one more charge: insurrection. This was not included in the North Korean news report about the expanded meeting of the Party’s Political Bureau on Dec. 8 in which it was decided to purge Jang.

The state-run Korean Central News Agency (KNCA) provided Jang’s confession to insurrection. But aside from Jang’s ambiguously phrased confession, there was no other mention of evidence or specific information about when or how Jang attempted to overthrow the government.

Jang’s purge is not expected to result in any immediately major changes for North Korea’s policy toward the South or toward other countries. Indeed, after purging Jang, North Korea has been abiding by its existing agreement with Seoul, agreeing to begin construction of the RFID admission system at the Kaesong Industrial Complex.

Nevertheless, this incident also could further exacerbate the prevailing image of North Korea as a country that is hard to understand. It is very likely that this could lead to an increasing mistrust of North Korea, which ultimately could hamper efforts inside South Korean society to improve inter-Korean relations. This could make it even difficult to restore inter-Korean relations and could further isolate North Korea from the international community.

The perception of the North in South Korean society improved considerably as inter-Korean exchange blossomed during the administrations of former presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun (1998-2008). However, the attitude toward North Korea in the South took a major turn for the worse during the presidency of Lee Myung-bak, continuing into the administration of current president, Park Geun-hye.

While the increasing hostility toward the North is partly due to South Korean conservative forces engineering inter-Korean conflict for political ends, to some extent North Korea has brought this on itself. The shooting of a South Korean tourist at Mount Keumgang in July 2008, the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, and the military threats against South Korea that followed the nuclear test in the first half of 2013 have made it much harder to express even relatively neutral opinions about North Korea.

The recent succession of Kim Jong-un, the third ruler in the Kim family dynasty, was an inexcusable incident that made North Korea look once again like an old feudal kingdom.

“This purge will reinforce the perception not only among South Koreans but also in other countries that North Korea is a country that is not trustworthy and that it has a bloodthirsty government,” said Yang Moo-jin, professor at the University of North Korean Studies. If distrust of North Korea increases internationally, who will want to invest in the North or trade with the North?”

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