hankyoreh

shakes hands with Kim Yong-chol

By Park Byong-su, senior staff writer

The argument over the “facts” at a surprise meeting of South and North Korean military authorities on Oct. 15 encapsulated everything about the state of inter-Korean relations today: the battles of nerves, the refusal to concede, and the deep underlying distrust.

The Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of Unification each held press conferences on Oct. 17 to state Seoul’s position in response to a report by the (North) Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) the day before on developments in the talks. Taken together, the ministries’ accounts and the KCNA report indicate the two sides had exchanged a total of nine communications for the talks since Oct. 7, the day of an exchange of fire between South and North Korean warships. The five messages from North Korea and four from South Korea showed a consistently proactive stance from Pyongyang - which proposed the talks in the first place - and a much more grudging one from Seoul.

In its second message on Oct. 8, North Korea responded to the Blue House’s initial passivity and mention of discussing matters “at a suitable time in the future” by threatening to “reconsider the high-level talks we have already agreed upon.” Indeed, Seoul appear to have been noncommittal about the talks up until Pyongyang’s third communication on Oct. 10.

“Our position is that all problems will be resolved if [both sides] honor the Northern Limit Line (NLL),” said a Ministry of National Defense source on condition of anonymity. “We notified [North Korea] of this position and proposed discussing the matter later.”

It was only after the third message, in which North Korea said it planned to “make all details public if there is no position statement by 10 o’clock [in the morning] on Oct. 11,” that the Blue House immediately sent a response agreeing to the proposed talks. Describing the message as an “ultimatum,” the KCNA portrayed the Blue House as capitulating to Pyongyang’s threat.

“Perhaps this struck a chord of urgency, because [Seoul] sent a message about the talks within the hour,” the report said.

A senior military officer disputed this account on condition of anonymity.

“Because North Korea had made so many requests, and because it’s a sensitive time with major items on the agenda and the second round of senior-level talks coming up, we decided on a policy of agreeing to talks, and the message from North Korea just happened to come in when we went our response,” the officer said.

The decision to hold the meetings behind closed doors was confirmed at Seoul’s request.

“We asked for a closed-door meeting when we responded on Oct. 10,” the military officer confirmed. “North Korea agreed to this, and specified that it was a ‘closed-door meeting’ when it provided its delegate list on Oct. 14.”

This account conflicts with the one delivered at an Oct. 15 press briefing by another Ministry of National Defense Official who said the idea of a closed-door meeting was first proposed by North Korea. When asked whether the approach conflicted with Seoul’s principles on openness and transparency, the officer said, “We decided there was no need to make public the entire process of discussions between South and North. We plan to share things if there are suitable results.”

In its first communication on Oct. 7, North Kora proposed an emergency one-on-one meeting with Blue House Office of National Security chief Kim Kwan-jin. As its own special envoy, it said it planned to send senior adviser for the National Defense Commission secretariat senior adviser and general reconnaissance bureau chief Kim Yong-chol, who ultimately served as chief delegate at the latest talks.

But in its response on Oct. 10, the Blue House proposed sending the head of the office of National Defense Policy at the Ministry of National Defense as senior representative instead of Kim Kwan-jin. The apparent judgment was that Kim Kwan-jin and Kim Yong-chol’s ranks didn’t “match.”

Discussions at the Oct. 15 talks in Panmunjeom, which lasted a little over five hours, focused mainly on the NLL and propaganda leaflet issues. A proposal from Pyongyang at the talks made vague reference to “measures to avoid crossing sensitive waters and sensitive lines.”

“We asked the North Korean delegation, and they explained that ‘sensitive line’ refers to the maritime security line in the West Sea, while the ‘sensitive waters’ are located between the maritime security line and the NLL,” a military source said. The maritime security line in question was unilaterally declared by North Korea.

The South Korean side responded by stressing the importance of honoring the NLL. On the issues of leaflets and the 2010 sinking of the ROKS Cheonan warship, both sides reiterated their previous positions.

The decision to call the meeting a “contact of inter-Korean military authorities” was proposed by South Korea. In its initial communication on Oct. 7, North Korea referred to the encounter as an emergency meeting between one representative from each side.

“That was our proposal, and North Korea didn’t raise any objections,” a military officer said.

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]