hankyoreh

It was an event that shocked the world. Jang Song-thaek, “guardian” of the Kim Jong-un regime and powerful second-in-command in North Korea, was summarily executed exactly one year ago on December 12. Jang, Kim’s uncle by marriage and first secretary of the Workers’ Party of (North) Korea (WPK), had been accused of “conspiring to overthrow the state.” It was the first time in history a relative of the country‘s top leader had ever been put to death. The execution was a signal of the cold-blooded calculus of an unopposed leadership, a willingness to brutally remove any potential challenges to the third-generation power succession - even when they came from within the family.
A year later, the leadership in Pyongyang has undergone major changes. A new group of leaders has moved into the foreground, and efforts to wipe away Jang’s legacy continue today. In this article, the Hankyoreh looks at the changes inside North Korea and in relations with Beijing (where Jang was once a crucial link) in the wake of what Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS) senior fellow Hyun Sung-il calls the “single most tragic episode in modern North Korean history.”

The mighty fall of Pyongyang’s second-in-command touched off a firestorm of purges that continues even now in the name of “clearing way the vestiges.” Jang experienced his ups and downs with the regime, but held down positions of great power at the core of the Pyongyang leadership for over four decades. He leveraged his association with wife Kim Kyong-hui - herself part of the ruling “Baekdu bloodline” (descendents of founding leader Kim Il-sung) - and the WPK executive to install supporters in various power organizations. Indeed, his influence is believed to have only grown during the preparations to hand power over to Kim Jong-un, with the tacit consent of then-leader Kim Jong-il.

The key figures of the “Jang system” were all removed around the time of his execution. His closest confidants, first deputy vice minister of administration Ri Yong-ha and vice minister Jang Su-gil, were both put to death before him. Other relatives and associates were summoned soon after, including his nephew, then ambassador to Malaysia Jang Yong-chol, and brother-in-law, Cuban ambassador Jon Yong-jin. The purge would later spread to other major figures in the system, including WPK international secretary Kim Yong-il and Pyongyang party secretary Mun Kyong-dok.

In 2014, purges resumed after an order from Kim Jong-un to “fully reevaluate matters executed by the ‘modern faction’ and find and eliminate outside elements.”

“In October alone, around ten central and local party officials associated with Jang Song-thaek were shot at Kanggun Military Academy for violating the ‘system of monolithic leadership,’” reported Hyun Sung-il of INSS.

A Nov. 12 report in the Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the WPK, discussed “resolute purging of the modern factional group.” “There is no place to survival for power-mongers who use the people’s labors for their own personal pleasure,” the article said. It was a sign that the internal ideological battle has continued to rage since Jang’s execution.

Jang’s widow, WPK secretary Kim Kyong-hui, also lost her power. The last time she was seen publicly was at a military review on Sept. 9 of last year, the 65th anniversary of the North Korean government’s founding. Her name was absent from the list of representatives elected for the 13th Supreme People’s Assembly in March. Some have speculated that she may have committed suicide in protest of her husband’s execution, or died after a cancer relapse, but the South Korean government believes she is more likely to be ill.

“The reason Kim Kyong-hui hasn‘t appeared publicly is because of her health,” said one a South Korean government official on condition of anonymity. “Our understanding is that the speculation about her death is not consistent with the facts.”

Today, a new group of leaders is rapidly emerging to take the place vacated with Jang’s death. Some of the new faces include the so-called “partisan group” - among them WPK standing committee member Choe Ryong-hae, WPK military department chief O Il-jong, and People‘s Army deputy chief of general staff O Kum-chol - along with another member of the Baekdu bloodline, Kim Jong-un’s younger sister Yo-jong. Indeed, Kim Yo-jong was recently confirmed to have risen to the vice ministerial-level position of WPK vice minister at the age of 27. Some are predicting she could take over aunt Kim Kyong-hui‘s role in bolstering the legitimacy of her older brother’s regime.

Choe Ryong-hae, who has ties to Jang Song-thaek dating back to his time as Youth League committee chair, had appeared to take a step backward since Jang‘s execution, yielding his post as chief of the military’s general politburo to Hwang Pyong-so to take a new position as party labor group secretary. Now he looks to have returned to a position of power, recently receiving the title of WPK politburo standing committee member and visiting Russia as a special envoy for Kim Jong-un. Some are suggesting he may have established as a new “second-in-command” with powers beyond even what Jang held in the past.

Other rising figures in the regime come from the WPK organizational leadership that directed the Jang purge: first vice minister for social affair, Cho Yon-jun, Hwang Pyong-so,

and minister of state security Kim Won-hong.