hankyoreh

statues of deceased North Korean leaders Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang. (Xinhua)

Kim Jong-un appears to have solidified his control of North Korea over the three years since he took power. Even at the time of the summary execution of Jang Song-thaek, at then-Director of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) Administrative Department, in Nov. 2013, no major disturbance was detected in the North. This is being seen as evidence that Kim Jong-un is maintaining effective control of the primary power holders in North Korea: the party, the military, and the government.

Dec. 17 marks the 3rd anniversary of the death of Kim Jong-il, former leader of North Korea, as well as the rise to power of Kim Jong-un, his son.

Since then, Kim has made use of a variety of methods to tighten his grip on power. First of all, he has compensated for his limited experience and lack of charisma by modeling his appearance and his behavior on Kim Il-sung, his grandfather and the founder of North Korea.

In terms of the system of government, he has reinforced the single-leader system by restoring the Korean Workers’ Party - which had been sidelined under the songun, or military first, policy of his father Kim Jong-il - to its original status while strengthening the Party’s control of the army. By replacing the old guard with younger blood, installing close associates such as Choe Ryong-hae as party secretary and Hwang Pyong-so as chief of the General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) and appointing professional bureaucrats in their 50s and 60s, Kim is taking steps to make the regime his own.

Since Kim Jong-un emerged on the political stage at the KWP Congress in Sept. 2010, he has been more often compared to his grandfather Kim Il-sung than to his father Kim Jong-il. For one thing, Kim Jong-un’s appearance - including his chubby features, his stocky figure, and his close-cropped hairstyle, leaving his forehead bare - brings to mind how Kim Il-sung looked in his youth. His outgoing, crowd-pleasing behavior is also more akin to his grandfather than to his father, who was something of a hermit.

When Kim Il-sung met the leaders of other countries, he was generous with physical contact and big smiles. We see a hint of this when Kim Jong-un links arms with soldiers and laughs with them during his inspections of military bases.

In addition to this, numerous people are reminded of Kim’s grandfather in the way he dresses, the gestures he uses, and the way he walks.

There are quite a few political interpretations of Kim Jong-un’s resemblance to Kim Il-sung. One is that Kim is imitating his grandfather intentionally in the hopes that his grandfather’s legacy will help him increase his own power base.

But beyond his appearance and his physical demeanor, on a more substantial level Kim is thought to lack his grandfather’s maturity. On Feb. 29, 2012, Kim’s regime promised the US that it would stop launching missiles. But only one month and a half later, Pyongyang shot off a long-range missile, cementing North Korea’s reputation as untrustworthy. Then in April of the following year, the North shot itself in the foot by arbitrarily shutting down the Kaesong Industrial Complex, creating all kinds of difficulties when it later decided to reopen it.

Last month, after the US sponsored a UN resolution about North Korean human rights, Kim personally criticized the US in the crudest of terms, calling Americans “cannibals” and “murderers.” Many analysts regarded this as the equivalent of diplomatic suicide.

“During the North Korean nuclear crisis in the early 1990s, Kim Il-sung demonstrated his ability to create a favorable impression of North Korea. Once, when he invited and spoke with foreign reporters, he said he would like to go fishing in the US. There are times when Kim Jong-un lacks discretion, and he makes a lot of mistakes. In terms of substance, he is not on his grandfather’s level,” said Kim Chang-soo, head of research at the Korea National Strategy Institute.

In contrast with his father, Kim’s leadership style is open and forthright. The regime’s admission that the long-range rocket launch in Apr. 2012 was a failure came as a surprise given the North Korean doctrine that the monolithic leader cannot make mistakes. North Korea also broke with precedent last year when it suddenly announced that Jang Song-thaek had been executed and more recently when it released video of Kim limping and holding a cane.

The sudden announcement of Kim’s marriage to Ri Sol-ju and the images of the two walking around arm in arm, as well as the appearance of Mickey Mouse and the performance of the theme song from the Hollywood movie “Rocky” during a choir concert by the Moranbong Band in July 2012 are also seen as examples of Kim Jong-un’s openness.

“Even while Kim Jong-un plays upon the nostalgia for the past by mimicking the gestures and appearance of his grandfather Kim Il-sung, he is also developing his own unique leadership style,” the South Korean Unification Ministry said in a recently released document assessing the first three years of Kim Jong-un‘s regime.

On an institutional level, Kim Jong-un has helped his regime become established by restoring the organs of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) to their normal functions. While his father Kim Jong-il ruled North Korea through the National Defense Commission (NDC) under the “military first” doctrine, Kim Jong-un has tended to use the Party‘s official decision-making apparatus. This represents a return to a normal party-ruled state, in which the party is paramount.

The restoration of the Party is also confirmed by the numbers. Since Kim Jong-un took power, the KWP Congress has convened once, the KWP Central Military Commission three times, and the KWP Politburo six times, while two plenary meetings of the KWP Central Committee have taken place. Until the KWP Congress convened in order to officially recognize Kim Jong-un’s appointment as successor to his father in Sep. 2010 - while Kim Jong-il was still alive - these organizations had existed in name only.

Party organizations have also begun to assert themselves once more in deciding state policy. During the plenary meeting that took place in Mar. 2013, the KWP Central Committee resolved to adopt a two-track course of developing both the economy and nuclear weapons. During a meeting of the KWP Politburo on Dec. 2011, Kim Jong-un was appointed as the supreme commander of the Korean People‘s Army.

Even the purges of Kim’s uncle Jang Song-thaek and Ri Yong-ho, chief of the KPA General Staff - major hurdles that Kim had to clear as he consolidated power - were decided, at least formally, during a meeting of the KWP Politburo.

These represent Kim Jong-un’s attempt to replace the “military first” emergency system, which had been implemented to survive the “arduous march” (referring to the desperate conditions in North Korea during the mid- to late 1990s), with a normal party-run system of government.

“Strengthening the Party’s control over the government is a way to compensate for Kim Jong-un’s vulnerable power base and leadership skills and to guarantee that the Party is in control of the army, which are measures designed to help Kim Jong-un’s regime become more firmly established,” said Hyeon Seong-il, senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Strategy.

Kim has also increased his control over the military through a peculiar appointment style that involves frequent demotions and promotions of the military leadership. Since Kim took power, four people have worn the hat of the Minister of People’s Armed Forces, with Kim Jong-gak, Kim Kyok-sik, Jang Jong-nam, and Hyon Yong-chol all taking turns. 31 generals have been demoted, with 19 of them later being restored to their former positions. This is believed to represent Kim’s attempt to find the right combination of officials, since he had a relatively short time to prepare for assuming his father’s mantle.

Another break from the past is Kim’s appointment of close associates and former party leaders as director of the army’s General Political Bureau. Under the leadership of Kim Jong-il, the position was filled by military veterans such as O Jin-u and Cho Myong-rok, but Kim Jong-un has appointed figures with civilian backgrounds to the post, including Choe Ryong-hae and Hwang Pyong-so.

“Kim Jong-un appears to have maintained a relatively stable situation in North Korea by strengthening his power base through appointing members of the younger generation to power while giving some degree of respect to the older generation as well,” said Kim Yeon-cheol, professor at Inje University.

By Park Byong-su, senior staff writer

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]