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UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expresses harsh criticism of North Korea’s fourth nuclear weapons test during a press conference at UN Headquarters in New York prior to the UN Security Council’s emergency meeting

With the UN Security Council announcing on Jan. 6 that it would immediately begin work on a new resolution containing “further significant measures” in response to North Korea’s fourth nuclear missile test, attention is focusing on what kind of sanctions the resolution will contain and how tough they will be.

Needless to say, since the Security Council deliberations are still in their initial phase, it is not possible to predict the resolution’s specifics. Broadly speaking, however, it seems clear that the sanctions in the new resolution will be tougher than those in previous resolutions.

Thus far, the Security Council has issued four resolutions in response to North Korea’s long-range rocket launches and its three previous nuclear tests.

The sanctions in previous resolutions can be largely divided into four categories: an embargo on the movement of suspicious materials that could be used in the development of nuclear weapons and missiles; cargo searches; measures designed to prevent financial transactions; and sanctions against individuals, corporations, and organizations that violate these rules.

Consequently, the deliberation at the Security Council is expected to focus on toughening the existing sanctions, either by finding new measures to take within their scope or by devising completely new sanctions.

Reportedly, the “secondary boycott,” a powerful financial sanction that was used against Iran, will not be included in the new resolution. A secondary boycott would ban transactions between US financial institutions and companies in other countries that work with North Korean companies, organizations and individuals.

A secondary boycott was effective in Iran because of that country’s numerous petroleum transactions with Western countries. Such a measure would be unlikely to have much of an effect in North Korea, however, because of the current isolation of the North Korean economy.

The biggest problem with a secondary boycott, though, is that it would cause considerable harm to the Chinese companies that are North Korea’s main clients. This means the chances of Beijing signing off on such sanctions is virtually nil.

In addition, the idea of searching airplanes, which has been raised every time North Korea tests a nuclear weapon, would be impossible without China’s cooperation. Almost all air travel to and from North Korea passes through China. There is almost no chance that China would agree to airplane searches, as these could impinge on its national sovereignty.

The general view of analysts is that the specific sanctions that will be included in the new resolution and the actual effect they will have once implemented are ultimately in the hands of China.

Experts think that China was blindsided not only by North Korea’s disregard for its intolerance of the North’s nuclear weapons but also by the North’s decision to not even notify it before moving forward with the test. Because of this, they expect that China will actively participate in the sanctions against North Korea.

“China will take part in UN Security Council sanctions that are tougher than before, and it will also be stricter about enforcing those sanctions,” said Cheng Xiaohe, professor at China’s Renmin University.

Even so, precedent suggests that, once discussion of sanctions gets underway at the Security Council, the Chinese government will probably ask for the weakening of sanctions that might provoke North Korea too much.

On Jan. 7, Renmin University professor Jin Canrong argued in the China’s Global Times, an English-language newspaper affiliated with the People’s Daily, that sanctions against North Korea must be handled within the framework of the Security Council. As these comments suggest, experts also think it unlikely that Beijing will carry out its own sanctions against North Korea outside of the Security Council.

The scenario that concerns China the most is one in which tough sanctions precipitate a collapse of the North Korean regime, which could send large numbers of North Korean refugees flooding into China’s three northeast provinces, creating chaos and bringing US troops to the border with China.

In related news, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced before a general session of the House of Councillors on Jan. 7 that Japan would be reviewing the option of imposing its own sanctions against North Korea.

This is thought to spell the end of a number of measures in the Stockholm agreement, which Japan and North Korea signed in May 2014. In that agreement, Japan relaxed travel restrictions on leaders of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon) who wanted to leave Japan to visit North Korea, and it also raised the maximum amount of money that Japanese citizens could remit to North Korea.

By Yi Yong-in, Washington correspondent, Seong Yeon-cheol, Beijing correspondent, and Gil Yun-hyung, Tokyo correspondent

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]