[Analysis] N. Korea sanctions largely depend on China’s implementation

Posted on : 2016-03-03 17:37 KST Modified on : 2016-03-03 17:37 KST
Though sanctions are exceptionally strong, China has a track record of not carrying out such measures
US Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power votes for Security Council resolution passing sanctions on North Korea
US Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power votes for Security Council resolution passing sanctions on North Korea

“The majority of the 52 new sanctions against North Korea taken by the UN Security Council are specified as ‘decided.’ This places a legal responsibility on UN member states, who will be found in violation of the resolution if they do not implement these sanctions. The new resolution not only entails a wide range of sanctions but also includes a very strong obligation for implementing these sanctions.”

The remarks were made on Mar. 2 by a senior official from South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The assessment is in line with a statement released by the South Korean government, which proclaimed that it “fully welcomes and supports” the UN Security Council’s new resolution.

Nevertheless, South Korean and foreign experts alike agree that, since China and North Korea share a 1,500km-long border and China accounts for more than 90% of North Korea’s foreign trade, the willingness of the Chinese government to implement the new sanctions resolution against North Korea will determine its effectiveness.

In regard to China’s implementation of the UN Security Council’s four previous sanctions resolutions imposed on North Korea in response to its first three nuclear tests and a rocket launch, the general view of those who have analyzed trends in trade between North Korea and China is that the Chinese government made a sincere effort for only three to six months before switching to a more flexible approach.

Quite a few experts predict that the Chinese government’s approach this time will not be substantially different from what it has done before.

 

Three changes made at the request of Moscow

The Russian government requested a number of changes to the draft of the resolution agreed to by the US and Chinese governments, and additional deliberations between the US and Russia resulted in three of these changes being reflected in the final version of the resolution.

First, Jang Seong-cheol, representative of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation in Russia, was dropped from the new list of sanctions drafted by the US and China. The government of Russia - which, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, has veto power - had refused to accept Jang’s inclusion on the list, arguing that there was no evidence for it.

Second, an exception was added to the ban on the sale and supply of aircraft fuel to North Korea to allow the refueling of North Korean civilian aircraft returning to Pyongyang. The adjustment was based on Russia‘s argument that, in order for passenger flights to Moscow operated by Air Koryo, North Korea’s state-run airline, to return to Pyongyang, they would have to refuel. Given that Air Koryo only provides service to China and Russia, this exception could serve as a loophole in the ban on aircraft fuel.

Third, Russia was granted an exception on the embargo on coal produced in North Korea. This exception states that the UN Security Council’s sanctions committee will grant approval to applications for coal produced in third countries that is exported from the North Korean port of Rajin. This reflects Russia’s considerable interest in the Rajin-Hasan Project, a trilateral project that Russia is working on with North and South Korea, analysts explain.

While some believe that Russia’s requests for revisions to the sanctions bill reveal its avarice, a closer look at the revisions reveal them to be closer to working-level adjustments that take into account Russia’s economic interest without compromising the fundamental goals of the sanctions.

 

Blocking Pyongyang from the international financial network

The new resolution prevents North Korean banks from setting up new branches and offices overseas and requires them to shut down those that currently exist within 90 days. It also bans financial institutions in UN member states from establishing offices or bank accounts inside North Korea. The only exception granted by the resolution is for international aid groups and UN organizations to set up offices and bank accounts inside North Korea.

“These financial sanctions will go much further than the sanctions imposed on Banco Delta Asia in 2005 because of concerns about money laundering,” South Korea’s Foreign Ministry said. “The damage they inflict will be direct and strong.”

However, there are conflicting views about how effective these measures will actually be. Since the sanctions on Banco Delta Asia, North Korea has been avoiding normal financial transactions using the international financial network. Furthermore, the majority of North Korea’s overseas financial entities - which reportedly number in the dozens - are located in China, and they camouflage their financial activities by presenting themselves as establishments that handle cash remittals.

 

Embargo on mineral and weapons deals, cargo searches and expulsions

The ban on exports of North Korean minerals (coal, iron, gold, vanadium, titanium and rare earths); the ban on sale and supply of aircraft fuel (including rocket fuel); mandatory inspections of cargo originating from or bound for the North; the expulsion of North Korean diplomats, government officials and nationals from other countries that are implicated in illegal activities; and the tightening of the “catch-all” system that restricts exports of all items that could be put to military use were included in the final version of the resolution exactly as they appeared in the US-China draft.

Once again, the mineral embargo and cargo searches will depend on China‘s commitment to implementation. An exception that permits the export of coal and iron ore for the purpose of “livelihood” could be exploited as a loophole.

 

North Korea’s overseas work assignments and the controversy about human rights violations

The new resolution expressed “deep concern at the grave hardship that the DPRK people are subjected to,” making this the first time that a UN Security Council sanctions resolution against North Korea has mentioned the North Korean human rights issue.

South Korea’s Foreign Ministry indicated that this could be used as grounds to urge the international community to impose sanctions on North Korea for its human rights violations.

Indeed, South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se reportedly brought up the issue of the violation of the human rights of North Koreans dispatched for work overseas while addressing the North Korean human rights issue during a keynote address at a meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva on Mar. 2.

North Korea’s overseas workers are thought to be one of Pyongyang’s main sources of foreign currency. There are reportedly between 50,000 and 200,000 such workers, mostly assigned to China and Russia. The sanctions in the new resolution do not prevent North Korea from sending its citizens on overseas work assignments.

By Lee Je-hun, staff reporter

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]

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