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Photos from North Korea‘s state media of the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) in the East Sea on Apr. 23. They claimed the launch was successful.

I recently found myself chuckling over North Korea’s response to the joint Key Resolve/Foal Eagle exercises by South Korea and the US. Not long after they carried out their large-scale Ssang Yong (“double dragon”) amphibious assault drills, North Korea carried out its own large-scale amphibious assault and anti-amphibious assault defense exercises. The South’s precision strike exercises with its F-15K and F-16 aircraft were met by long-range artillery unit strike exercises and a KN-06 surface-to-air missile launch by the North. It makes sense to want to devise some response to the other side’s military activities, but the seemingly improvised “tit for tat” just seemed childish.

There has been a lot of argument lately over the factors behind North Korea’s recent missile launches. Some have called them a show of force aimed at drawing concessions from the South and US, while others say they are meant to rally the North Korean public ahead of the upcoming Workers’ Party congress, to be held in May. But as I watched North Korea‘s behavior during the Key Resolve/Foal Eagle exercises, I had the funny feeling it may have been influenced by a 2012 RAND Corporation report by Markus Schiller. In a report titled “Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat,” Schiller raised questions over the North’s missile capabilities, arguing that its missiles were less an actual means of military action than something to show off to improve Pyongyang’s diplomatic bargaining position and achieve practical gains.

Part of the basis for Schiller’s argument is the small number of actual launches. According to his report, most of the North’s Scud, Nodong, and KN-02 missiles were test-launched one to three times before going into position, and three to eight times afterwards. The Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and KN-08 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) haven’t been launched at all. Those numbers appear very small compared to countries like the US and the Soviet Union/Russia, which test-launched their missiles a dozen times or so to ensure their reliability before putting them in position, and which have conducted launch exercises about once a year since. Could it be that this huge jump in missile launches since Kim Jong-un took over as leader is meant to protest those assertions? ‘Oh, no,’ he seems to be saying. ‘You just watch.’

Indeed, North Korea’s missile launches did pick up sharply in 2014. It has launched its Scud and Nodong missiles ten or more times a year - five times already in 2016. “In less than five years in office, Kim Jong-un has launched more [missiles] than in the 18 years of the Kim Jong-il era,” South Korean Minister of National Defense Han Min-koo said in a broadcast appearance last month.

If Pyongyang’s actions are meant for the attention of the outside world - and some level of credibility does need to be established if it is to appear a threat and achieve its strategic goals - then they haven‘t entirely failed. North Korea attempted its first Musudan launch on Apr. 15, but the missile immediately exploded in midair, calling the capabilities of the North’s medium- and long-range missiles into question. But the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launched on Apr. 23 remained in the air for 30 km, which means missile capabilities have improved from last year. There now looks to be a strong chance the missile could be in position within a few years. The North also made the unusual decision to go public with its atmospheric re-entry, solid fuel rocket, and ICBM engine jet tests - all of which gave the impression that it is very serious about missile development.

Schiller’s questions still stand. How long can North Korea expect to keep going with a dozen different missile programs with a gross domestic product (GDP) on par with Costa Rica’s? And with many saying that the North‘s missile program began with a three-year reverse engineering of the Scud B in the 1980s, how is it that similar reverse engineering capabilities haven’t been seen in other areas of the economy, like vehicles or industrial machinery? Could it be that North Korea’s reverse engineering prowess - and its missile development prowess - has been exaggerated? Donald Gregg, former chief of the CIA’s South Korea station and US Ambassador to Seoul, has called North Korea “the longest-running intelligence failure in the history of US espionage.” So what about the missiles? Should we trust everything Pyongyang shows us?

By Park Byong-su, senior staff writer

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