Why is the government hiding away N. Koreans who defected from restaurant?

Posted on : 2016-06-21 17:01 KST Modified on : 2019-10-19 20:29 KST
The whole process of bringing the defectors to and settling them in South Korea has differed from standard protocol
13 North Korean workers (one man and 12 women) at an overseas restaurants who entered South Korea on Apr. 7
13 North Korean workers (one man and 12 women) at an overseas restaurants who entered South Korea on Apr. 7

An apparently unprecedented situation is unfolding as the South Korean government insists on hiding away the waitresses involved in a group defection in April from a North Korean restaurant in China. The situation has changed markedly since Apr. 8, when Seoul took the initiative to tell the media that the group defection had taken place and was the result of its sanctions encouraging patrons to avoid the restaurants. The government’s approach to receiving and managing the defectors has been almost without precedent in terms of practices and systems for settlement assistance.

Seoul’s decision not to send the 13 defectors - one manager and 12 waitresses - to the Settlement Support Center for North Korean Refugees (Hanawon) is highly unusual. In past cases, senior-level defectors possessing “high-level information” have been sheltered and managed outside of Hanawon to ensure their protection and acquire internal intelligence. But none of the employees from the recent group defection could be classified as requiring such special management. For this reason, even the Unification Ministry predicted early after the defectors’ arrival that they would spend no more than two months at the National Intelligence Service’s Defector Protection Center (formerly the Joint Interrogation Center) before going to Hanawon for settlement education. The purpose of joint questioning by the NIS and investigators is to determine if the defection is legitimate. Yet the 13 defectors in the recent case were all acknowledged by the South Korean government to have defected as a group of their own free will. Under the circumstances, no apparent reason exists for the questioning to drag out.

Sources said the NIS has provided the defectors with basic settlement education since early after their arrival at the Protection Center, including experience shopping at department stores and supermarkets. Most defectors receive similar education after being admitted to Hanawon. In other words, the irregular treatment and break with practice began from the earliest stages.

Stranger still is the NIS’s refusal to grant a meeting with the defectors to researchers from the Korea Institute for National Unification’s Center for North Korean Human Rights Studies (CNKHRS). The Protection Center is primarily a place for joint questioning by the NIS, prosecutors, and police. Researchers from the CNKHRS are nearly the only civilian non-investigators allowed access to defectors there.

 wearing masks to prevent their identities. This picture was provided by the Ministry of Unification
wearing masks to prevent their identities. This picture was provided by the Ministry of Unification

“Once every two weeks, we visit the Protection Center to meet [defectors] and conduct a survey,” explained a KINU researcher. “Early this month, we asked the NIS if we could meet with the 13 individuals in the group defection, and they turned us down.”

Another KINU researcher said refusals to allow meetings “are not common” - further evidence that there is something abnormal surrounding the defection.

Given the NIS‘s actions, its decision not to allow the 12 waitresses to attend a closed-door habeas corpus hearing requested by the group MINBYUN-Lawyers for a Democratic Society was in some sense predictable. The agency made no attempt to conceal its discomfort when ordered by a court to allow all 12 to attend. It twice refused to comply with a court-ordered submission of a copy of the protection relief request, and even made the unusual move of hiring the law firm Bae, Kim & Lee to respond to the MINBYUN request. Most of all, it has consistently claimed that it “cannot offer confirmation” in response to media requests for clarification on the group defection.

After its unusual decision to make the defection public on Apr. 8 - the day after the employees arrived, and five days before the parliamentary elections - the South Korean government has yet to disclose any further details. Early allegations that the defection was orchestrated by the NIS have persisted over 70 days later. Indeed, many experts knowledgeable on defector issues claim the allegations are only appearing more plausible.

“My sources tell me that the male manager and some of the female employees had a special relationship, and entered South Korea without any knowledge that as many as nine others would be coming,” said one expert and defector who has been involved in defection-related efforts.

Even the NIS itself has claimed it “no longer matters what the circumstances were” when the employees arrived.

“The moment they arrived, anyone with common sense would be worried about how they would live safely in the South Korea,” the agency said.

The implication is that some of the employees may not have had any intention of leaving.

By Kim Jin-cheol, staff reporter

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]

 

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