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Korean Central Television news anchor Lee Chun-hee announces North Korea’s fifth nuclear test at 1:30 pm (1 pm Pyongyang time) on Sept. 9. She reported

North Korea described its fifth nuclear test as “Part of our practical response measures to the sanctions ruckus and the threat posed by the US and other hostile powers” in a statement issued by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Nuclear Weapons Institute on Sept. 9. It also called the test “A display of the party and people’s ultrapowerful commitment.”

A fifth nuclear test was not unexpected – indeed, it was simply a matter of time. On March 15, just after the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2270 in response to North Korea’s fourth nuclear test, leader Kim Jong-un declared that he would “conduct a nuclear warhead detonation test and test-launch various kinds of ballistic rockets capable of carrying warheads as soon as possible.”

He gave orders at the time for “scrupulous preparations in the corresponding sectors.” Test-launches of various ballistic missiles followed, including the Musudan on April 15 and 28, May 31 and June 22 and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) on April 23 and Aug. 24. After succeeding with both types, Kim gave orders to “further hasten nuclear weaponization efforts and continue showing at various levels all of [North Korea’s] theoretical actions as a military power,” according to the first two pages of the Aug. 25 edition of the Rodong Sinmun newspaper. The statement, which came just after the North’s successes with its major ballistic missile test-launches, amounted to an order for a fifth nuclear test.

When conducting a nuclear test, the typical considerations are the demands of domestic politics, the diplomatic message in terms of foreign strategy and military technology needs. To begin with, Kim’s repeated orders indicate the perceived military technology needs. In its Sept. 9 statement, the North declared, “Through standardization and normalization of nuclear warheads . . . nuclear weaponization has firmly reached a higher level.” The message is that in the space of six months, it has backed up Kim’s March 9 claim to have “achieved standardization and normalization for a light enough warhead to suit a ballistic rocket.”

But more answers are needed for the question of “Why now?” The fact that Sept. 9 was the 68th anniversary of the establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea suggests domestic political demands were another consideration behind the test. Experts argue that these demands were most likely not the most important factor behind the fifth nuclear test, however. So far this year, the North has been showing off its “political/military deterrent” in various ways: with its fourth nuclear test on Jan. 6, the launch of its Kwangmyongsong rocket on Feb. 7 and its seventh Korean Workers’ Party congress from May 6 to 9.

For this reason, attention should be paid to an additional consideration: sending a diplomatic message as part of foreign strategy. As North Korea said itself in its statement, the fifth nuclear test could be seen as an attempt to send a message to the outside: sanctions will not stop it. On Sept. 8, it declared that its shows of force had produced a breakthrough, with a Foreign Ministry spokesperson arguing that “true peace and security are not achieved through any humiliating requests or negotiating tables.” It also chose a moment when it was able to exploit difficulties in achieving coordination against it, with Northeast Asia facing a growing security dilemma amid the frictions and antagonisms between South Korea, the US and Japan on one side and China and Russia on the other in the wake of Seoul and Washington’s July 8 announcement of a decision to deploy a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system with US Forces Korea and a July 12 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling denying China’s claims to territorial rights in the South China Sea.

Most of all, the fifth nuclear test – which took place just eight months after the last one, breaking a pattern of nuclear tests being conducted once every three years – can be seen as Kim’s way of showing how confident he is about having achieved breakthroughs in both nuclear technology and the political situation. That also means an already unstable Northeast Asian political situation is now poised to grow even dicier.

By Lee Jae-hun, staff reporter

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]