hankyoreh

Minister of Foreign Affairs Yun Byung-se speaks during a parliamentary audit of the Ministry

In a Sep. 23 speech before the 71st United Nations General Assembly, Minister of Foreign Affairs Yun Byung-se said it was “time to give serious reconsideration to whether North Korea is qualified to be a member state of the peace-loving UN.” It was the first time since South and North Korea both became member states on Sept. 17, 1991, that the South Korean government formally took issue at a General Assembly with North Korea’s membership. On Feb. 15, South Korean UN Ambassador Oh Joon had said during a UN Security Council (UNSC) open debate on the topic of “Respect of Purposes and Principles of the UN Charter” - not long after the North’s fourth nuclear test on Jan. 6 - that Pyongyang’s “continued violations of UNSC resolutions raise questions as to its fitness as a member state.” With his remarks, Oh was following directives to use arguments from a Feb. 7 Ministry of Foreign Affairs document titled “UNSC Response to North Korea‘s Fourth Nuclear Test.” In it, North Korea was described as “one large development organization for weapons of mass destruction”; the situation, it argued, “is enough to raise questions about its eligibility as a UN member state.” This was the position Yun formalized before the General Assembly. These days, he has been traveling around imploring other countries to sever or reduce diplomatic ties with North Korea.

Four questions come to mind. First, is it even possible to kick North Korea out? Second, is there any precedent? Third, will the Park Geun-hye administration translate its words into action? And fourth, will this help solve the North Korean nuclear issue?

To begin with, there are the regulations in Article 6 of the UN Charter on expulsion of member states and Article 5 on suspension from the exercise of rights and privileges of membership. Both may be decided by the General Assembly upon recommendation from the UNSC. Conversely, this means it is impossible if any one of the five permanent members of the UNSC (the US, China, Russia, the UK, and France) exercises its veto powers.

Second, there is the fact that no member state has been expelled since the UN was established in 1945. The situation in terms of suspending membership is a complex one. South Africa found its status as a member state under de facto suspension for 21 years from 1974 to 1994 due to its apartheid policies of racial segregation. On Sep. 30, 1974, the 29th General Assembly adopted Resolution 3206, a report from the Credentials Committee recommending that it deny the eligibility of the South African delegation to the UN. But a plan to actually suspend South Africa’s eligibility was voted down when three UNSC permanent members - the US, the UK, and France - exercised veto powers. In response, the General Assembly president declared on Nov. 12 that the General Assembly would refuse the South African delegation‘s participation in meetings, citing Resolution 3206. The move was approved in a plenary session of the General Assembly by vote of 91 for, 22 against, and 19 abstentions. The end result was a de facto suspension of member state eligibility without a UNSC recommendation, with the General Assembly Rules of Procedure cited as its basis.

So to sum up, an expulsion is out of the question because of China and Russia’s veto powers. That said, a suspension of eligibility exists as one possible way around their objections.

Third, there is the question of whether the Park administration actually plans to commit its diplomatic energies to running North Korea out. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs official said on Oct. 7 that the administration’s policy would be to “continue noting issues with North Korea’s eligibility as a UN member.” But a mid-level official in the same ministry said Yun‘s statement was based on “tactical considerations - he wanted to make sure the international community’s sense of alarm toward North Korea‘s runaway nuclear and missile programs is not blunted.” This suggests it was intended as a form of shock therapy, achieving effects through words rather than actions. It’s a frivolous approach: using a strategic matter that strikes at the roots of inter-Korean relations as a means of achieving a “tactical strike.”

But the bigger problem lies elsewhere. Whether it’s the “sanctions or bust” approach favored by the Park administration or the combination of sanctions with dialogue and negotiations recommended by multiple experts, either way requires keeping North Korea penned behind a fence of multilateralism (the UN) to work. The big danger of a suspension of its membership is that it would merely add to its excuses for breaking free from the multilateral protections (rights) and restraints (obligations) of the UN and running wild.

Another thing is that the suspension of South Africa’s membership was not a big contributor to its eventual abolition of apartheid. It was more the product of a number of other factors: changes in the post-Cold War security environment, the existence of the African National Congress under the leadership of Nelson Mandela after he emerged as an undeniable political force, and the strategic determination of the white South African government of F. W. de Klerk that it would be “better to get rid of nuclear weapons than hand them over to the blacks.” The North Korean nuclear issue remains a problem that won‘t be solved without the strategic resolve to identify and lead changes in the internal and external situation and seek out ways of coexisting.

By Lee Je-hun, staff reporter

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