hankyoreh

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un observes the test of a high-powered rocket engine

Dec. 10 marked ten days since the United Nations Security Council’s Nov. 30 adoption of Resolution 2321 in response to North Korea’s fifth nuclear test on Sep. 9. Pyongyang is unlikely to take the move lying down. In a Dec. 2 statement, a spokesperson for its Foreign Ministry called the resolution an “infringement of sovereignty” and expressed “strong denunciation” and “utter rejection” of it. The statement also said the resolution would “bring on even more intense self-defensive response measures from us.” Is Pyongyang really prepared to go beyond words and take military action in response to Resolution 2321?

After the UN adopted Resolution 2270 on Mar. 3 in response to its fourth nuclear test on Jan. 6, North Korea fired six rockets the same day. It quickly ratcheted up the intensity of its military actions, launching a SCUD missile on Mar. 10, a Rodong missile on Mar. 18, a Musudan missile on Apr. 15, and a submarine-launched ballistic missile on Apr. 23. Leader Kim Jong-un was quoted in the Mar. 4 edition of the Rodong Sinmun newspaper as saying the North “needs to be permanently prepared to shoot down a nuclear warhead at any moment.” Eventually, the fifth nuclear test came.

So what about now? Self-professed experts and the governments of South Korea, the US, and Japan see Pyongyang as very likely to take some kind of “military response action” during the transition of administrations in Washington. USFK 8th Army commander Lt. Gen. Thomas Vandal predicted on Dec. 6 that North Korea could carry out some provocation in the next 30 to 60 days. But while many view North Korean military provocations during transitional periods in the US government as some kind of constant, history tells a different story.

Consider just the period after 2000. When the George W. Bush administration took over in 2001, North Korea didn’t engage in any provocations; it waited. Neocons warned of a hard-line North Korea policy, but the Bush inauguration happened amid thaws in inter-Korean and North Korea-US relations, with the first-ever inter-Korean summit in June 2000 and an attempted US presidential visit in October that same year. From Pyongyang’s position, the need for some preemptive military action would not have appeared too great.

In contrast, it fired a long-range rocket and scattered ashes on Apr. 5, 2009, the day President Barack Obama announced his vision of a “nuclear-free world” in Prague. The following May 25, it conducted its second nuclear test. Why would the same North Korea that professes to want dialogue with an “enemy state” slap Obama in the face rather than taking the hand he extended? To answer that, it’s important to recall that Pyongyang was in the middle of its third-generation transfer of power from Kim Jong-il - then incapacitated by a stroke - to his third son Kim Jong-un. Its biggest priority was to solidify his leadership base by showing the people just how tough this inexperienced third-generation leader was. This subordination of foreign policy to domestic political needs is not unique to North Korea; it’s been a common theme through Eastern and Western history.

What does that mean for today, as the inauguration of the Donald Trump administration approaches? There’s no obvious pressing need in domestic political terms for Kim Jong-un to attempt another nuclear test or long-range missile launch. In that case, the crucial thing is to assess the political situation.

“Trump’s first message to the North is going to be very important,” said a former senior official with longstanding experience dealing with North Korea. “Kim Jong-un probably isn’t going to take any strategic action until then.”

In a meeting with former US leaders in Geneva on Nov. 17-19 - not long after the US election - the head of the North Korean Foreign Ministry’s American affairs bureau, Choe Son-hui, reportedly said Pyongyang would “not do anything to close the doors to North Korea-US relations until our review of the Trump administration’s policies is complete.” At the same time, she suggested joint military exercises by South Korea and the US in Feb. 2017 would be “an exception.” The Rodong Sinmun and other North Korean news outlets have yet to even mention Trump by name.

For now, it’s tough to tell just what sort of message President-elect Trump will send to Pyongyang. During his election campaign, he denounced Kim as a “madman,” but also said he would have dialogue with him over a hamburger. In foreign policy terms, however, his chief interest will clearly lie in strategies for dealing with Islamic State and other radical Islamist forces - not North Korea policy. What message with Trump send to the North, and when? Will Pyongyang really wait until then without taking some kind of military action? It’s fortunate at least that the National Assembly’s impeachment of Park Geun-hye meant suspending the duties of a President who flew into a rage over the slightest provocation from the North.

By Lee Je-hun, staff reporter

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]