hankyoreh

staff photographer)

Looking at the third inter-Korean summit on Apr. 27 through the lens of the historic first inter-Korean summit in 2000 and the second summit in 2007, it is apparent that each of these summits encountered obstacles both great and small. It is worth examining how this year’s summit – which brings together South Korean President Moon Jae-in, who aspires to be a “guide” for the upcoming North Korea-US summit, and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, a new strategist on the scene – differs from those that came before.

First, this inter-Korean summit is different from previous ones in that it is taking place less than one year after Moon took office. The summit between former president Kim Dae-jung and former North Korean leader Kim Jong-il in June 2000 was held in the middle of Kim Dae-jung’s presidency, which began in Feb. 1998.

The summit between former president Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Jong-il was not held until Oct. 2007, at the tail end of Roh’s presidency. Following the victory of President Lee Myung-bak in the presidential election two months later, the various agreements for joint prosperity and the development of inter-Korean relations that the two leaders had attempted to promote through the Oct. 4 Summit Statement lost momentum.

By contrast, Moon is holding his first summit with four years left in office. This basically means that if the summits are held regularly as he intends, he will be guaranteed an opportunity to implement inter-Korean agreements, in contrast with the two previous summits.

South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un cross the Military Demarcation Line together entering the North Korean side during their summit on Apr. 27. (by Kim Kyung-ho

The process by which this summit has become a reality is also different from the previous two summits. Both the summit in 2000 and the summit in 2007 occurred when relations between North Korea and the US were fully relaxed. While Kim Dae-jung expressed his willingness to hold an inter-Korean summit when he announced his “Sunshine Policy” of warmer relations with the North in his inaugural address, his efforts to promote a policy of inter-Korean reconciliation faced difficulties such as North Korea’s launch of a Taepodong-1 missile in 1998, his first year in office.

After that, Kim addressed the sudden chill in relations through his close involvement with the creation of the US’s “Perry Process,” with the help of Lim Dong-won, who served as Kim’s senior secretary for foreign affairs and national security. Following a visit to the North by William Perry, the American official in charge of coordinating policy toward North Korea, Kim Jong-il announced a moratorium on missile tests, and the US continued to take measures to relax sanctions against the North. Once the mood was right, in Mar. 2000, there were three closed-door meetings between special envoys (namely then-Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism Park Jie-won and North Korea’s Asia-Pacific Peace Committee Vice Chairman Song Ho-kyung) that culminated in an agreement to hold a summit.

The 2007 summit was held after North Korea and the US reached an agreement (the Feb. 13 Agreement) for North Korea to close and seal its nuclear facilities in the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks in 2007, after high tensions following the North’s first nuclear test. In the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks in 2005, North Korea had agreed to give up all nuclear weapons and its current nuclear program in the Sept. 19 Joint Statement. But after the US designated Banco Delta Asia as likely being involved in money laundering and froze North Korean accounts there, the North protested fiercely by refusing to implement the Sept. 19 Joint Statement.

North Korean then retaliated with its first nuclear test on Oct. 9, 2006. After that nuclear crisis was deflated by the Feb. 13 Agreement, President Roh Moo-hyun sent then-National Intelligence Service Director Kim Man-bok to Pyongyang as a special envoy that August and reached an agreement about holding the second summit the following year.

What sets this summit apart from the previous two is that, during a tense standoff between North Korea and the US that even triggered talk of war on the Korean Peninsula, the Moon administration took charge of the situation by mediating between the two and narrowing their differences. It even maneuvered North Korea into pledging to denuclearize.

The fact that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has become a key agenda item for the inter-Korean summit is also a departure from the past. Even during the summit in Oct. 2007, the leaders of South and North Korea only referred to denuclearization obliquely, by including the following phrase in their summit statement: “We will make a joint effort for the smooth implementation of the Sept. 19 Joint Statement and the Feb. 13 agreement.”

One factor was that there was little the two leaders could agree on regarding denuclearization since an agreement had already been reached to disable the North Korean nuclear program (Oct. 3 Agreement) during the Six-Party Talks. But the bigger reason was that North Korea had repeatedly refused to discuss the issue with the South, insisting that the North Korean nuclear issue was the result of the US’s “hostile policy” and that it therefore had to be deliberated on a bilateral level between North Korea and the US. But this time around, the leaders of South and North Korea have explicitly listed denuclearization as one of the summit’s three key agenda items.

There is a sense in which this summit inherits and improves upon the legacy of the preceding summits. The issues of the establishment of peace and the development of inter-Korean relations, which are the main agenda items to be addressed during the summit, are in a general sense much the same as the main agenda points during the second summit. Matters that were agreed upon during the 2007 summit but never implemented – such as ending the armistice system, establishing a lasting peace regime and designating “waters of peace” and joint fishing grounds – will probably return to the negotiating table during this meeting.

Economic cooperation projects aimed at joint prosperity – such as establishing a “special zone for peaceful cooperation” in the West Sea, which was proposed in 2007 – are expected to be discussed again in the future in connection with the results of this summit and the North Korea-US summit to follow. In fact, the Oct. 4 Summit Statement is thought to contain a specific implementation plan for the June 15 Joint Statement in 2000, which laid out the general principles for developing inter-Korean relations.

The June 15 Joint Statement, which included five points of agreement reached during the first inter-Korean Summit in June 2000, affirmed that the principle of unification was a “Korean issue which should be solved by Koreans” and recognized the commonalities of the two sides’ respective unification plans of “a loose federal system” and an “inter-Korean confederation.” The main agenda items dealt with at that summit were settling the issue of families divided by the Korean War and promoting economic, cultural and social cooperation and exchange.

Another difference from past summits is the level achieved by North Korea with its nuclear arms, missiles, and other weapons of mass destruction. Following the launch of the Hwasong-15 ICBM on Nov. 29 of last year, North Korea declared the “completion of state nuclear force.” Previously, it had initiated plutonium and enriched uranium programs and completed a sixth nuclear test. Experts concluded that only the imminent acquisition of ICBM re-entry technology remained before it would be able to strike the continental US with a nuclear warhead attached to an ICBM. The capabilities and status of a bona fide nuclear power were at the very least imminent.

The 2000 summit, in contrast, took place when North Korea had only acquired plutonium extraction technology. It had previously reported the existence of seven nuclear facilities and possession of 90 grams of plutonium when it signed a nuclear security agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1992.

After frictions over the issue of special inspections, it moved in 1994 to freeze its Yongbyon nuclear facility according to the 1994 Agreed Framework reached with the US in Geneva, and pledged to remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and implement the IAEA security agreement terms. In exchange, the US agreed to mend ties with the North and provide it with two light-water reactors and fuel supplies.

The 2007 summit also took place when North Korea’s nuclear development capabilities were still at their nascent stages. Its first nuclear test in 2006 was seen as having been a failure, with the South Korean Ministry of National Defense estimating its explosive force as equivalent to 0.8–1 kilotons of TNT. North Korean’s uranium enrichment program had not yet been confirmed.

In a surprise gesture

The clearest difference between this summit and the two previous ones is its location. Both the 2000 and 2007 summits were held in Pyongyang, whereas the latest is being held at the House of Peace on the southern side of the Panmunjeom Joint Security Area, which is seen as a symbol of both the Cold War and the division of the Korean Peninsula. It also marks the first time a top North Korean leader has set foot in the South since the Korean War. While Kim Dae-jung traveled a direct line over the West (Yellow) Sea and Roh Moo-hyun traveled over land via the Gyeongui railway line, Kim Jong-un is crossing the “72 Hour Bridge” (so named because it was built by the North Koreans over a period of 72 hours in 1976) over the Military Demarcation Line in the opposite direction from Roh.

The Panmunjeom setting also places constraints on the formalities for the summit, ruling out large-scale welcoming events. An honor guard review for the three armed forces is taking place in reduced format. For the 2000 summit, Kim Dae-jung arrived at Pyongyang Sunan International Airport and received a welcome from hundreds of thousands of Pyongyang residents on the way to his Paekhwawon State Guest House lodgings. Roh Moo-hyun also had a motorcade in downtown Pyongyang in 2007.

The delegations also differ greatly in size from past summits. The delegation for the 2000 summit included over 180 people, including official attendants from different agencies as well special entourage members representing the fields of politics, economy, society, and culture; the one for the 2007 summit was nearly twice as large at 308 members. This time, Moon is traveling with seven official entourage members for the 2018 inter-Korean summit: President Chief of Staff Im Jong-seok, Blue House National Security Office director Chung Eui-yong, National Intelligence Service director Suh Hoon, Minister of Unification Cho Myoung-gyon, Minister of National Defense Song Young-moo, Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Kyung-wha, and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Jeong Kyeong-doo.

By Kim Ji-eun, staff reporter

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]