hankyoreh

Views on inter-Korean relations and THAAD according to age group

How should the chilled reaction of the younger generation toward the unified Korean women’s ice hockey team at the Pyeongchang Olympics be interpreted? Should it be viewed in accordance with the commonly held view that young people are conservative and their national consciousness has weakened?

Bae Jin-seok, a research professor at Korea University’s Peace and Democracy Institute recently presented a paper entitled, “Generational and Ideological Factors in North Korea and Security Policy Evaluation,” in which he criticized the partisan approach of viewing the young generation’s perceptions toward North Korea and unification as a deviant attitude or as a failure of unification education in the aftermath of 10 years of conservative government in South Korea.

Based on the results of a public opinion survey taken during last year’s presidential election, Professor Bae analyzed the existing generational and ideological structures toward North Korean and national security policies, and explained the background of young people’s critical reaction to the formation of the hockey team from the standpoint of a generational divide.

Following a controversy about fairness during the formation of the unified Korean women’s ice hockey team at the Pyeongchang Olympics, a lively discussion took place over whether young South Koreans are conservative. There have been many studies focusing on people in their 20s which have pointed out that a negative perception of North Korea is a characteristic of this generation. Unlike previous generations, today’s younger generation also has divergent perceptions about Korean unification.

This young generation, which is focused on individual benefit, takes into consideration issues such as social conflict and economic consequences that could result following Korean unification. As a result, analyses have shown this generation to have negative perceptions toward unification.

“Based on the existing separation of progressive and conservative viewpoints according to their perceptions of North Korea, we can view this younger generation as being conservative,” said Professor Bae. They emphasize the utility of the US-South Korea alliance rather than independent national self-defense, and, after years of the North’s nuclear and missile tests, have become sympathetic to the idea that exchange and cooperation with North Korea is pointless.

“If we look at the results of the public opinion survey, in actuality young people don’t perceive themselves as being conservative,” Professor Bae explained. “In the subjective evaluation of their own ideological beliefs, they perceive themselves as being more progressive than previous generations.” A panel survey held by the East Asia Institute immediately prior to the 2017 presidential election found that more than half of those people born in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s considered themselves to be progressive.

Research has shown that because young and old generations differ in the process of political socialization, their basis for determining ideological tendencies is also different. Although the middle-aged generation, which has been influenced by the discourse of nationalism, defines its ideology by its perception of North Korea, this is not the case for the younger generation.

“Young people who live in an age without growth in the job sector tend to base their ideology around social welfare issues such as economic growth and distribution, rather than on attitudes toward North Korea,” explained Professor Bae. As a result, for young self-identified progressives who are burdened with a tough job market, it is not contradictory for them to support policies that prioritize social welfare over growth, while also backing a hardline policy toward North Korea.

Professor Bae went on to add that, “this younger generation displayed a critical reaction to the formation of the unified women’s ice hockey team at the Pyeongchang Olympics. Their ideology in terms of expanding the social welfare system and their view of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation is different from previous generations, and provides a working example of this change.”

Older generations display a high correlation between their views on North Korea policy and ideological tendencies, but this pattern of influence does not hold for the young generation. In looking at the results of the East Asia Institute’s panel forum, a combination of various opinions emerged toward the issues of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation and deployment of the THAAD missile defense system.

Out of a total of 1091 respondents, 33.3 percent shared the typical progressive view of supporting inter-Korean exchange and cooperation and opposing the THAAD deployment (A group), while 36.5 percent took the typical conservative attitude of supporting a hardline North Korea policy and approving of the THAAD deployment (B group). Also, 21.3 percent of respondents supported both inter-Korean exchange and cooperation and the THAAD deployment (C group), while nine percent supported a hardline North Korea policy, but were opposed to the THAAD deployment (D group).

This shows that about 30 percent of respondents hold attitudes that clash with the existing standard for progressive and conservative viewpoints as it relates to North Korea and national security policy.

The highest proportion of respondents in the C group (supporting both inter-Korean cooperation and THAAD) were those born before the 1970s (26.9 percent). The highest proportion of respondents in the D group (supporting a hardline North Korea policy and opposing THAAD) were those born after the 1970s (16.9 percent). Those born prior to or during the 1970s who considered themselves to be progressive tended to support policies for inter-Korean cooperation and exchange, but this was not true for the younger generation.

Among the C and D group, it was an increase in age rather than an absence of ideological influence, that determined whether a person supported both inter-Korean cooperation and the deployment of THAAD. Likewise, younger people in these groups opposed THAAD and favored a hardline North Korea policy. As traditional progressive-conservative policies are mixing, this generational effect has filled the vanishing ideological space.

An interesting point concerns those born in the 1970s. Unlike other generations, this group did not exhibit large shifts in its ideological perspective during the four presidential elections from 2002 to 2017. Among other generations during the past five years, support for inter-Korean exchange and cooperation has plummeted in light of North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests. However, this change has not been evident among those born in the 1970s.

The 1970s generation also showed stronger support for inter-Korean cooperation and exchange and stronger opposition to the THAAD deployment in relation to other age groups. For this generation, subjective ideological perceptions have remained stable over the long term, and this has had an effect on its analysis of North Korea policy. From this context, it can be inferred that the 1970s generation has a higher level of support for inter-Korean exchange and cooperation as compared to other age groups.

“We need to re-examine the existing contention that attitudes toward North Korea are the most useful and certain measure for determining whether a person can be considered left or right-wing, liberal or conservative,” concluded Professor Bae. “Although the North Korea problem has been expressed as a difference between ideological conflicts and generational differences, the manifestation of this issue is not the same, and it varies from one age group to another.”

By Kwon Hyuk-chul, Director of the Hankyoreh Peace Institute

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