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The A test launch of the SM-3 missile interception system on the US missile cruiser USS Lake Erie. (provided by the US Navy)

Controversy is brewing after revelations that military authorities effectively demanded the purchasing of SM-3 missiles. Many analysts contend that the SM-3 is unsuited to the Korean Peninsula battlefield environment as a ballistic missile interceptor.

The attempt by military authorities to introduce the SM-3 was confirmed in a parliamentary audit of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the National Assembly National Defense Committee. When asked by Democratic Party lawmaker and committee chair Ahn Gyu-back if a decision had been made on the SM-3’s introduction, JCS force planning department chief and Army Maj. Gen. Kim Seon-ho said, “A decision on the cost was made at a Sept. 2017 Joint Chiefs meeting.”

“The decision was for something at the SM-3 level,” he added.

Designed to intercept enemy ballistic missiles in midair, the SM-3 is launched from Aegis-equipped naval vessels. The SM-3 block IB developed by the US defense contractor Raytheon has an interception altitude in the 150–500km range, while the modified SM-3 block IIA jointly developed by the US and Japan has a reported interception altitude of 1,000km.

Explaining the role of the SM-3, Kim described it as part of a “system for intercepting enemy ballistic missiles at the upper tier of KAMD (the Korean Air and Missile Defense System).”

The plan described would create a four-level missile defense system adding the SM-3 at the top tier of the current three-level system in which incoming ballistic missiles would be intercepted in turn by THAAD, the L-SAM system, and Patriot missiles (or the M-SAM system).

But even within the military, many say the SM-3 is of limited use militarily. To begin with, it could not be used to stop North Korean ballistic missiles from landing on South Korean territory. Because of the Korean Peninsula’s small size – less than 500km in length from north to south – the biggest threats to South Korea are short-range missiles such as the Scud-B (with a range of 300km) and Scud-C (500km). For the most part, Scud missiles do not exceed a peak altitude of 150km.

With a minimum interception altitude of 150km, the SM-3 would not even have the opportunity to intercept them. In a May 1999 report to US Congress titled “Theater Missile Defense Architecture Options in The Asia-Pacific Region,” the Pentagon expressed a negative view.

“With a minimum intercept altitude of about 100 kilometers, the sea-based upper tier exo systems [like the SM-3] could not defend the northern two-thirds of the ROK [where most of the population and key facilities are located] against the low flying short range TBMs,” the report said.

The SM-3 is more effective in defending Japan, Okinawa, or US-controlled Guam. The missiles that North Korea would use in attacks on these regions have maximum altitudes over 150km, such as the Rodong missile (range of 1,200km) or Hwasong-12 (estimated range of 4,000–4,500km). Missiles of this kind approaching Japan or Guam could be intercepted using Aegis-equipped naval vessels in the East Sea. Indeed, mention of the SM-3’s adoption in the past has raised ongoing questions about whether it would be used to defend US forces in Japan or on Guam rather than in South Korea.

At the same time, adopting SM-3 on Aegis-equipped ships has been a longstanding aim of the South Korean Navy. Former Minister of National Defense Song Young-moo, himself a former Navy admiral, was especially proactive about the SM-3’s adoption. In a joint briefing by the Ministers of National Defense, Interior and Safety, and Environment in Sept. 2017, Song said, “In talking about things like introducing the SM-3 in the Korean missile defense system, we’re envisioning the creation of a multi-tier defense system.”

Sources in and around the military also said Song’s views had much to do with the Joint Chiefs’ decision in Sept. 2017 to present costs for the SM-3.

But adoption of the SM-3 could also throw cold water on the recent drive toward North Korea’s denuclearization and improvement in relations on the Korean Peninsula.

“If we were to push for the SM-3’s adoption after South and North Korean military authorities adopted an agreement with plans for arms controls and detente as an ancillary agreement to the Pyongyang Joint Declaration in September, North Korea is very likely to take that as a provocation,” a military official said.

No final decision has yet been made on purchasing the SM-3. Once the individual armed forces and Joints Chief of Staff propose costs for the purchasing of weaponry, it typically goes through a process of preliminary Agency for Defense Development (ADD) research, a vote by the defense project promotion committee (chaired by the Minister of National Defense), a feasibility examination by the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA), and reflection in the budget.

Sources reported that the preliminary research has been completed, with the purchase to be put before the defense project promotion committee as early as this or next month.

By Park Byong-su, senior staff writer

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