[News analysis] NK shifts strategic focus from sanctions to regime security

Posted on : 2019-04-29 16:26 KST Modified on : 2019-04-29 16:26 KST
Kim Jong-un’s summit with Putin reveals outline of his post-Hanoi strategy
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at Vladivostok railway station to depart for North Korea after his summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Apr. 26. (Yonhap News)
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at Vladivostok railway station to depart for North Korea after his summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Apr. 26. (Yonhap News)

The first phase of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s post-Hanoi strategy is apparently strengthening his hand in his negotiations with the US by launching a new honeymoon in North Korea-Russia relations. Kim also signaled a “strategic shift” in future talks with the US by treating Russia, a traditional ally of North Korea, as a new messenger. Kim’s message that he will be refocusing the agenda of the denuclearization talks around a security guarantee for the North Korean regime is thought to prefigure a change in the way the negotiations are framed.

On Apr. 26, North Korea’s state-run Rodong Sinmun and Korean Central News Agency reported that Kim told Russian President Vladimir Putin during their extended summit the previous day that the second North Korea-US summit in Hanoi had broken down because of the US’ “unilateral attitude and bad faith.” Kim didn’t hesitate to describe the current situation as a “deadlock” and a “dangerous place that could take us back to square one.”

Kim also put pressure on the US in his remarks: “The peace and security of the Korean Peninsula will be completely decided by the future attitude of the US. We will prepare for every eventuality.” This corresponded to Kim’s “first warning” that North Korea could go down a “new path” if the US fails to adopt the “proper attitude” and find a “methodology that can be shared” by the end of the year, as Kim said during a speech on the second day of the 1st Meeting of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly on Apr. 12.

It’s notable that this situational understanding provided the backdrop for Kim’s visit to Russia and his meeting with Putin. Kim’s demand for a security guarantee for the North Korean regime, predicated on denuclearization, which was confirmed in Putin’s press conference following the North Korea-Russia summit on Apr. 25, suggests a strategic change in Kim’s negotiations with the US.

“North Korea had been asking for an end-of-war declaration and sanctions relief. But since the Hanoi negotiations broke down, it’s determined to shift the agenda of the talks away from sanctions, which are being treated as a vulnerable point for the North, and toward a security guarantee,” said a former senior official in the South Korean government who is familiar with affairs in North Korea.

Kim said during his speech before the Supreme People’s Assembly that the North will no longer be obsessed over issues such as lifting sanctions. While Kim did not reveal what cards he would play in the negotiations during that speech, he has now basically outlined a concrete methodology.

Regime security original reason behind North’s nuclear program

While there’s nothing new about the North Korean regime’s desire for a security guarantee, it is the North’s most fundamental demand, as well as the original reason it embarked on developing a nuclear program. As such, many observers believe there are challenges in store for the denuclearization talks. Since regime security is at its heart a military matter, it also means that issues such as the presence of US troops on the Korean Peninsula, South Korea-US joint military exercises, the UN Command, and even the US nuclear umbrella could also be brought up at the negotiating table.

The idea of a security guarantee is surrounded by thorny questions that have remained unanswered for nearly 70 years because they involve the conflicting interests of surrounding countries, questions that could furthermore undermine the security landscape in Northeast Asia. As a consequence, it isn’t easy to find a compromise. This inevitably would create even more opportunities for the South Korean government, under President Moon Jae-in, to get involved.

“For North Korea to raise the issue of a security guarantee makes the situation much harder to resolve than it is currently. In the end, this means that North Korea thinks the denuclearization talks will become protracted,” said a former high-ranking official in the government.

North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho made remarks along these lines during a late-night press conference held shortly after the Hanoi summit came to a premature end. “The more important issue for us as we take steps toward denuclearization is a security guarantee, but we suggested that the US could partially lift sanctions as a corresponding measure because we assume the US is still reluctant to take measures in the military area.” In the end, North Korea appears to be raising the stakes. But since Kim said he would wait until the end of the year for the US to make a bold step, it’s presumed that there’s still room for negotiations before this strategic change is set in stone.

Pyongyang seeks to increase leverage against US by strengthening ties with Moscow

Though Kim only spent three days in Vladivostok, Russia, some analysts believe it was long enough to reveal a rough outline of Kim’s strategy following the Hanoi summit. Whereas North Korea has relied on South Korea and China for its leverage against the US, they say, its first summit with Russia in eight years was aimed at recruiting Russia for additional leverage while strengthening its international position. The summit’s emphasis on “strategic and tactical cooperation” with Russia on Korean Peninsula issues and the announcement of a new golden age in the development of their bilateral relations can be interpreted along the same lines.

“North Korea has used Russia to deftly show that, if things remain as they are, it could ultimately go down a different road,” said Hong Min, director of the North Korea research office at the Korea Institute for National Unification. In effect, Kim has thrown the ball back to the US.

By Kim Ji-eun, staff reporter

Please direct comments or questions to [english@hani.co.kr]

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