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South Korean Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong (2nd R) and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken (2nd L) bump elbows during the 11th Special Measures Agreement signing ceremony at the foreign ministry in Seoul on March 18. (photo pool)

In a press conference that followed a 2+2 meeting of the South Korean and US foreign and defense ministers on March 18, a reporter with the US site POLITICO posed a final question that seemed to strike deeply at the heart of the differences between Seoul and Washington over the denuclearization issue.

“And finally, if I may, for Minister Chung: The US delegation has repeatedly called for the denuclearization of North Korea — specifically North Korea, not the Korean Peninsula. So does the Government of South Korea back this call rather than [denuclearization of the] the Korean Peninsula?”

As the reporter noted, South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Chung Eui-yong had consistently used the term “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” every time he had the opportunity to speak. In contrast, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken had been persistently using the term “denuclearization of North Korea” since the day before and had declared in the same press conference that day that the US was “committed to the denuclearization of North Korea.”

Perhaps it is this difference that explains why the joint statement announced just after the press conference only said that the two sides’ ministers had “emphasized that North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile issues are a priority for the Alliance,” without specifying whether the final aim they are looking to achieve is “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” or “denuclearization of North Korea.”

Upon seeing this, South Korea’s conservative media launched a blistering attack on the administration, playing up the use of the term the “denuclearization of North Korea” in an earlier joint statement by the US and Japan on March 16.

In a March 19 editorial, the Chosun Ilbo accused the Moon Jae-in administration of “blocking the inclusion of ‘denuclearization of North Korea’ in the joint statement.” The same day, the JoongAng Ilbo published an editorial demanding that the administration “confront the change in the US’s stance that was made apparent at the 2+2 meeting.”

It’s been over a month since then. Despite the conservative media’s fears, the final choice by Washington to follow the most realistic path toward resuming dialogue with Pyongyang.

When White House press secretary Jen Psaki announced Friday that the Joe Biden administration had “completed” its North Korea policy review, she used the term “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”

In a Sunday appearance on the ABC network, White House national security advisor Jake Sullivan insisted that “our policy towards North Korea is not aimed at hostility,” stressing that Washington’s final goal was the “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”

Even Blinken, who caused so much consternation for the South Korean government in Seoul around mid-March, made no use of the term “denuclearization of North Korea” in London on Monday. Instead, he clearly stated his goal to be the “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”

These were all signs that the US had taken Seoul’s persistent persuading to heart and adopted a more pragmatic approach to its North Korea policy.

Why does it matter so much whether the goal of South Korea and the US is to achieve “denuclearization of North Korea” or “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”?

That term has been a key element of negotiations on the North Korean nuclear issue for almost 30 years, from the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in December 1991 to the Singapore Joint Statement signed by North Korea and the US in June 2018.

Washington’s acceptance of the term “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” indicates that it plans to carry on from the Singapore Joint Statement, which included a pledge from North Korean leader Kim Jong-un of “firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”

It could also be seen as signaling plans to resuscitate the Panmunjom Declaration of April 27, 2018, which served as a foundation for that pledge. In contrast with “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” — an approach in which the South denuclearizes first to elicit the North’s denuclearization as well — the unilateral abandonment of North Korea’s nuclear program implied by the term “denuclearization of North Korea” is a distant dream that could never be achieved through diplomatic means.

While the differences between Washington and Seoul over North Korean policy appear more or less ironed out, there is still a long way to go.

On Sunday, North Korea delivered a scathing broadside, with Kwon Jong-gun, director-general of its Foreign Ministry’s Department of US Affairs, dismissing the US diplomacy as “a spurious signboard for covering up its hostile acts.”

This suggests that without some kind of fundamental shift in Seoul and Washington’s policy, Kim Jong-un — who has resolved to proceed with a “dual-track strategy 2.0” of nuclear and economic development and is insisting on the “withdrawal of hostile policies” as a basic condition — is unlikely to readily return to the negotiating table.

Another lurking threat is Japan, which played the role of a saboteur during the Korean Peninsula peace process period between 2018 and 2019.

In a Monday press release on the outcome of a meeting of the US and Japanese foreign ministers, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs persistently used the term “denuclearization of North Korea.” This suggests that even with the Biden administration in office, unpleasant behind-the-scenes clashes over Washington’s North Korea policy appear likely to continue between Seoul and Tokyo.

By Gil Yun-hyung, staff reporter

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