hankyoreh

In this photo released by North Korea’s state-run Korean Central News Agency, attendants at the Eighth Workers’ Party of Korea Congress read the Rodong Sinmun, the newspaper of the WPK Central Committee, at the April 25 House of Culture in Pyongyang, on Jan. 6. (Yonhap News)

The Hankyoreh has confirmed that North Korea deleted language in the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) rules about a “two-track line” of nuclear and economic development and added language about building the economy through “self-sufficiency” during the Eighth WPK Congress, held in January.

The Hankyoreh found Tuesday that a section stating that “the WPK holds to a parallel line of building the economy and building a nuclear arsenal” had been removed in its entirety.

In place of the language about this “two-track line,” the revised version of the WPK rules adopted in January includes new language about the WPK “pushing to build the economy under the banner of self-sufficiency and strengthening the material-technical base of socialism.”

The revised rules also state that “constantly improving the material and cultural lives of the Korean people” is the “supreme principle behind the WPK’s activity” and that that “the construction of a rich, powerful, and civilized socialist society” is the “WPK’s objective.”

But while the new rules deleted language about the two-track line, they added a section stating that the WPK “ceaselessly reinforces the national defense by diligently strengthening the Republic’s armament in terms of political ideology and military technology and by developing autonomous national defense industries.”

Comparing the previous and revised versions of the rules shows a clear shift in focus from the military to the economy. This shift can be regarded as adjusting the rules in line with decisions made at several meetings of the WPK Central Committee under the guidance of North Korean leader Kim Jong.

During the Third Plenary Meeting of the Seventh WPK Central Committee on April 20, 2018, the WPK declared the end of the “parallel line of building the economy and building a nuclear arsenal” and said that “focusing all energy on building a socialist economy” was the “Party’s [new] strategic line.”

That was shortly before Kim Jong-un held summits in short succession with South Korean President Moon Jae-in at Panmunjom, on April 27, 2018, and with US President Donald Trump in Singapore, on June 12, 2018.

During the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Seventh WPK Central Committee on Dec. 28-31, 2019, Kim went on to declare “a fight between self-sufficiency and sanctions” and “a frontal breakthrough offensive [through self-sufficiency]” in which the economy is the “key front.”

The strategy of holding out through self-sufficiency gained fresh emphasis following the breakdown of dialogue in the second North Korea-US summit in Hanoi in February 2019.

The two-track line of simultaneous development of the economy and a nuclear arsenal was officially adopted during a plenary meeting of the WPK Central Committee on March 31, 2013, early in the rule of Kim Jong-un. That line was added to the preface of the WPK rules in the Seventh WPK Congress in May 2016.

Following the adoption of the two-track line, North Korea carried out its fourth, fifth, and sixth nuclear tests — on Jan. 6, 2016; Sept. 9, 2016; and Sept. 3, 2017. After the North test-launched its Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on Nov. 29, 2017, Kim Jong-un declared the “completion of the state’s nuclear force.”

In light of those trends, the deletion of the “two-track line” language from the WPK’s revised rules may not seem so surprising.

Nevertheless, it’s an irregular move that’s pregnant with strategic implications. Not only was the two-track line deleted from the revised rules, but the word “nuclear” no longer even appears in the document. That’s a significant omission considering that the expression “nuclear state” appears in the preface of the current version of North Korea’s “socialist constitution,” which was amended and adopted on April 11, 2019.

The deletion of the two-track line from the WPK’s new rules could be seen as laying the groundwork for giving Kim more options in his nuclear diplomacy with the US, which could involve trading denuclearization for a lifeline and security guarantee for his regime. That would be in line with joint declarations made with South Korea at Panmunjom on April 27, 2018, and with the US in Singapore on June 12, 2018, in which Kim promised “the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”

Furthermore, the economic language that was added to or adjusted in the new rules reflects the policy commitment that Kim expressed in a speech at a military parade on the 75th anniversary of the establishment of the WPK on Oct. 10, 2020: “What remains now is for the Korean people to lead lives of abundance and civilization in which they no longer know any suffering.”

Of course, Kim also mentioned “researching the design of new nuclear-powered submarines,” and North Korea’s nuclear activities continue at Yongbyon and other sites. That makes it clear that the deletion of language about the two-track line shouldn’t be interpreted as signaling willingness to denuclearize right away.

By Lee Je-hun, senior staff writer

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