hankyoreh

South Korean Minister of National Defense Song Young-moo presides over an emergency meeting of military commanders mentioned on a Defense Security Command (DSC) document outlining plans for martial law on July 16 at the Ministry of National Defense (MND). (Baek So-ah

On July 16, South Korean President Moon Jae-in ordered that all documents and reports related to the martial law decree document composed by the Defense Security Command (DSC) that were exchanged by the Defense Ministry and various military units be immediately submitted to the Blue House. This order applies not only to the Defense Ministry and the DSC but also to the army headquarters, the Capital Defense Command and the Special Warfare Command and the units that report to them. The martial law document mentioned mobilizing troops from these commands.

The president’s order is appropriate and, if anything, ought to have been made sooner. In order to ascertain not only the true nature of the martial law document but also whether the army had actually identified the citizens who had continued to hold peaceful demonstrations as “potential rioters” and had planned to bring military force against them, the most elementary step is investigating what orders were given and what steps were taken by the military units in question.

Then Defense Minister Han Min-goo asserts that he put a stop to the discussion after he was briefed about the DSC’s martial law document on Mar. 3, 2017, but his assertion should not be taken at face value. We have learned that the DSC had already prepared a step-by-step scenario at the end of Oct. 2016, shortly after the first candlelit rally in Gwanghwamun. Nor can we rule out the possibility of the involvement of “higher ups” such as then Blue House National Security Advisor Kim Kwan-jin or then acting president Hwang Kyo-ahn.

Examining what orders were given to the 1st, 3rd, 7th, 11th and 13th Special Forces Brigades (which were mentioned in a draft document called “Disposition of Forces to Execute Martial Law Duties”) and what preparations were made by their subordinate units should be able to bring us the full story not only about who gave the orders and how high they went but also the extent of the preparations for the plan to mobilize the military.

On a related note, there ought to be a thorough investigation of the behavior of Defense Minister Song Young-moo, who is embroiled in a controversy about covering up the document. Song was briefed about the existence of the document by current DSC Commander Lee Seok-gu on Mar. 16. The Defense Ministry asserts that Song even mentioned the martial law document as an example of the DSC’s political meddling when he briefed the Blue House on the Ministry’s plan to reform the DSC on Apr. 30.

This briefing was attended by Blue House Chief of Staff Lim Jong-seok and Senior Secretary for Civil Affairs Cho Kuk, among others. If Song was thorough in his briefing, he obviously ought to have understood the significance of the document, and the Blue House aides ought to have followed this up with action.

Since the implication is that Song glossed over the issue during the briefing and that the Blue House aides failed to comprehend its significance and importance, we need a more definite explanation. It’s largely because of this unclear communication between the Defense Minister and the Blue House aides that critics have responded to Moon ordering an independent investigation during a trip overseas by asking why the government did not make an issue of this until now. This is a matter that demands a thorough investigation.

Please direct comments or questions to [english@hani.co.kr]