hankyoreh

A US soldier watches as 155 mm artillery shells are moved at an airbase in Delaware on April 29, 2022. (AP/Yonhap)

It’s becoming increasingly clear that North Korea and Russia’s strategic contact that has noticeably worsened the political situation on the Korean Peninsula came as a result of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration in the South acceding to US demands to provide shells to Ukraine.

The Yoon administration’s rash decision appears to have led to improvements in North Korean ballistic missile technology that stand to precipitate disaster for the South’s national security.

One of the most attention-grabbing parts of a Washington Post exclusive on Monday on the circumstances of Ukraine’s counteroffensive since early June had to do with the back-and-forth surrounding artillery ammunition support to Ukraine between February and April.

According to the article, the US concluded at a Feb. 3 meeting presided over by White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan that the only one of its allies with the capabilities to provide Ukrainian forces with 155 mm shells was South Korea, which could transfer around 300,000 shells by air and sea if it “could be persuaded.”

Reports of Washington’s persistent demands to Seoul since that time have already been made public.

In April, the leak of a document on US interception of South Korean National Security Office communications caused shockwaves. That document reported Kim Sung-han, the office’s director at the time, as having held discussions around late February on an approach in which South Korea would provide 330,000 shells indirectly via Poland.

Explaining that the US’ “ultimate goal is to supply Ukraine with ammunition quickly,” Kim suggested a method involving the sale of shells to Poland, which borders Ukraine.

That proposed approach appears to have actually been implemented.

During a US visit around this time, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki said in an April 11 New York Times interview that he had been taking part in discussions with South Korea for several months on the supply of artillery ammunition.

“But I don’t think that this is going to be possible without the intervention of the United States,” he was quoted as saying in the interview.

As if anticipating the prospect of Russian retaliation, he significantly suggested, “[W]ithout the intervention of the United States and some kind of shelter, some kind of security guarantee that President Biden could give South Korea, I don’t think this is going to happen.”

The ultimate decision that Seoul made ahead of Yoon’s state visit to the US was to go ahead with providing the ammunition. In an April 19 interview with Reuters, Yoon said that “it might be difficult for [South Korea] to insist only on humanitarian or financial support” to Ukraine. This amounted to a declaration that Seoul could provide support with weapons as well.

The remarks prompted a vehement response from Russia, which has maintained friendly terms with South Korea since the two sides formed a diplomatic relationship in 1990. The day after the interview was published, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova warned that such actions by Seoul “may [have effects that] concern our approaches to a settlement on the Korean Peninsula.”

A month later, on May 24, the Wall Street Journal quoted a US government official as saying that South Korea was going ahead with procedures to transport hundreds of thousands of shells to Ukraine.

The rapid shift in Seoul’s approach contrasts with the actions of Japan. While Tokyo has been highly critical of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it has not only avoided supplying weapons but also held on to natural gas development concessions on Sakhalin Island, which account for 10% of its liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies.

Russia declared plans for retaliation, and in late July it put them into practice. In a visit to Pyongyang for the 70th anniversary of the armistice that paused the Korean War, celebrated as the “Victory Day” holiday in the North, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu met with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Around two months later, on Sept. 13, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Kim at the Vostochny Cosmodrome, a spaceport symbolically associated with Russia’s space development program.

When asked by local media whether he intended to help North Korea with its satellite development, Putin replied, “That’s why we’re here.”

On Nov. 21 came some evidence that Russia’s warning may not have been empty rhetoric. That evening, the North Korean National Aerospace Technology Administration announced that it had successfully placed the Malligyong-1 reconnaissance satellite into space order on a Chollima-1 rocket from its West Sea satellite launch site.

Two days later, on Nov. 23, the South Korean National Intelligence Service said at a closed-door plenary session of the National Assembly Intelligence Committee that Russian assistance “appears to have been a factor” in the launch’s success.

It’s a case of indirect ammunition assistance to Ukraine backfiring on South Korea.

By Gil Yun-hyung, staff reporter

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]