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President Masoud Pezeshikian of Iran is sworn in before parliament in Tehran on July 30, 2024. (EPA/Yonhap)

After Israel’s assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of Hamas, in Iran on July 31, the streets of Tehran were tense, with people worrying about a hot war breaking out between Iran and Israel. Many are watching to see what moves Masoud Pezeshkian, Iran’s newly elected president, will make. 

As the only reformist candidate in the presidential race, Pezeshkian made waves by defeating his conservative opponent on Aug. 5. Pezeshkian was the health minister under former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, also a reformist, from 2001 to 2005. This is the first time that a president affiliated with the “Reformist Front Coordination Council,” a coalition of political parties and factions who call for social reforms under the rule of the Islamic Republic of Iran, has been elected to the presidency since 2005. 

Inaugurated on July 30, the new Iranian president needs to walk the tightrope between the country’s Ayatollah, the “supreme” theocratic leader, and its military government. Experts and pundits, both at home and abroad, have offered their views on Pezeshkian and the route he’s likely to take. The president’s power is greatly limited under the de facto leadership of the Ayatollah, but experts seem to agree that we cannot completely discount the president’s influence. 

Can a full-scale war with Israel be avoided?

Recent reports from Western media outlets suggest that Pezeshkian is attempting to “persuade” not only Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, but also the country’s hard-line military leadership to avoid a full-scale war with Israel. On Aug. 9, the UK daily The Telegraph reported that Pezeshkian is working to scale back the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) planned retaliation for Haniyeh’s assassination, citing a source close to the Iranian president. While the IRGC is reportedly seeking to strike military bases within Israel, such as the one in Tel Aviv, Pezeshkian is concerned that direct attacks on Israel could lead to “serious consequences” and has proposed an alternative — targeting secret Israeli bases in neighboring countries like Iraq.

Signs that the Iranian government is trying to avoid a full-scale war with Israel can also be seen in recent diplomatic efforts. On Aug. 7, an extraordinary meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation was convened in Saudi Arabia at the request of Iran and Pakistan. The organization issued a statement strongly condemning Haniyeh’s assassination, for which it holds Israel “fully responsible.” 

The statement also denounced Israel’s actions as constituting an “infringement upon Iran’s sovereignty and national security, in flagrant violation of the principles of international law and the provisions of the United Nations Charter.” 

Yu Dal-seung, a professor of Persian and Iranian studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, noted in a phone interview with the Hankyoreh on Aug. 9 that Iran seems to “be signaling a preference for a gradual, political resolution rather than physical confrontation.”

Hamidreza Gholamzadeh, the deputy for international affairs at the municipality of Tehran, noted in an email interview with the Hankyoreh that “Iran is not only looking into a military option” and that diplomatic solutions that “highlight Iran's right to defend itself” will also be pursued.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshikian (center) stands for a photo with former political leader of Hamas Ismail Haniyeh (left) after his inauguration in Tehran on July 30, 2024. (AFP/Yonhap)

Iran’s approach to US relations: Will the Iran nuclear deal be revived?

Immediately following his inauguration on July 30, Pezeshkian began to rally key figures involved in the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. For example, he appointed former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif as vice president for strategic affairs, and on Aug. 11, Reuters reported that Pezeshkian had proposed former Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to become his foreign minister. 

During the 2015 nuclear negotiations, Zarif was in charge of the country’s foreign policy, while Araghchi, who was appointed as deputy minister for international and legal affairs in 2013 under the Hassan Rouhani government, managed the practical aspects of the negotiations. Araghchi has also continuously served as Iran’s representative on the joint commission monitoring the nuclear deal's implementation since 2015, when the agreement was reached. According to Yu, these appointments reflect the president’s desire to improve ties with the US.

While the supreme leader holds the ultimate decision-making authority in Iranian state affairs, and the military leadership has powerful sway over national security and defense issues, the president, who also heads the country’s Supreme National Security Council, can exert some influence over foreign and security policy decisions. 

Historically, when reformist or moderate presidents have taken office, Iran has sought to improve relations with the US. In 2015, moderate president Hassan Rouhani (2013-2021) achieved the nuclear deal via behind-the-scenes negotiations with then-US President Barack Obama. 

“It was Rouhani who proposed negotiating the nuclear issue in connection with economic sanctions,” Yu explained. “While Khamenei was also supreme leader at the time, [the election of a new] president led to a fundamental shift in Iran’s foreign policy.” 

Similarly, in 1997, reformist president Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) made reconciliatory overtures toward the US. Yu noted that the chances of improving relations are higher when there is a Democratic government in the US and a reformist government in Iran.

However, there are significant challenges that could hinder rapprochement with Washington, including Tehran’s nuclear program, its support for Russia in the Ukraine war, and worsening relations with Israel — issues that are essential for improving US-Iran relations but difficult for Iran to relinquish. 

In particular, Iran’s support for Hezbollah, a Shiite militant group in Lebanon, remains a major obstacle in diplomatic relations with the West. However, with the military’s control over this issue, the president has limited influence. 

Hamidreza Azizi, a visiting fellow at the Africa and Middle East division of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, noted in a report published on July 8 that for Pezeshkian, “balancing his pro-reform agenda with the interests of the IRGC will be key to implementing his plans effectively.”

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian meets with Hezbollah’s deputy leader, Naim Qassem, on July 28, 2024, in Tehran. (AFP/Yonhap)

Will Pezeshkian pave the way for social and economic changes, and how will he respond to the hijab protests?

Experts agree that the Pezeshkian administration will bring about various social and economic changes, particularly in terms of social policies such as the mandatory hijab law and internet restrictions. Despite low voter turnout and public apathy towards politics, the victory of a reformist president “presents an opportunity for incremental progress in a country yearning for change,” according to Azizi.

Under Pezeshkian, the government’s response to anti-hijab protests is likely to be more flexible. According to Gholamzadeh, while the mandatory hijab law will remain unchanged in Iran due to the fact that its law is based on Islamic teachings, the government will likely refrain from harsh crackdowns. He argues that “noticeable that social and cultural issues can not be handled merely by laws or restrictions” and anticipates that “the new government is expected to ease use of force and try to decrease tension in society.” He also mentioned that Iran’s “parliament or other entities would work on improvement of legislations and clarification of how to deal with the issue.” 

Yu argues that “the president is likely to introduce progressive policies related to the anti-hijab protests as part of internal reforms to consolidate his support base.”

However, the fact remains that hard-liners hold a majority in Iran’s parliament. Moreover, the new administration’s relations with the military and the IRGC, which, with the support of the supreme leader, wield considerable influence across Iran’s political and economic spheres, will be crucial to its success. Azizi stressed the importance of Pezeshkian “balancing” his reform agenda with the interests of the IRGC for effective policy implementation, stating that a “pragmatic approach to avoiding provoking resistance from the military.” 

Yu also noted that “the IRGC, with the Supreme Leader’s backing, holds key government positions such as the chief commander of the Law Enforcement Command,” adding that “it will be hard to get anything done without their cooperation.”

While on the campaign trail, Pezeshkian put forward an approach of endeavoring for relief from Western sanctions, opening up the Iranian market to foreign investors, and using international trade to shore up the economy. But overcoming the cumulative economic crisis caused by Western sanctions “won’t be easy in the short term,” assessed Yu. 

By Noh Ji-won, staff reporter

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