hankyoreh

A police officer stands guard on Nov. 3 at the entrance to the alleyway in Itaewon where the deadly crowd crush took place on Oct. 29. (Yonhap)

While the police’s own investigation into identifying those responsible for the Itaewon crowd crush is ongoing, revelations of details regarding the police’s woefully inadequate initial response to the disaster continue to come out.

Before the disaster, a police officer in charge of the scene asked Yongsan Police Station to dispatch a traffic police squadron but had his request rejected under the pretext that officers were busy managing a candlelight march protesting the president. It was also revealed that one riot police squad from the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency (SMPA) was on standby nearby but was not deployed.

In addition, it has also been made public that the situation manager of the 112 public order all-source situation room, where the initial reports about the Itaewon situation were received, violated his work duties and ended up leaving the situation room during those vital moments.

According to the Hankyoreh’s news coverage on Thursday, a Yongsan Police Station officer who was managing the situation at ground zero in Itaewon on Saturday, requested the police station’s traffic bureau to urgently dispatch a traffic police squadron of 20 people to the scene at 7:34 pm, but had his request denied.

“After 7 pm at the scene [in Itaewon] I asked the traffic bureau to dispatch riot police, but they said it would be difficult due to the management of the rally,” the police officer in question told the Hankyoreh in a phone call on Thursday.

"About two hours later, at 9 pm, I received an answer from the traffic bureau that the rally was now over, so [additional] backup was now possible,” the officer added. The actual deployment, however, came at around 9:30 pm, when the riot police finished their dinner.

At 4 pm on the day of the crush, a “nationwide candlelight march for a special prosecutor’s investigation of first lady Kim Keon-hee and the resignation of Yoon Suk-yeol” took place at Samgakji Station in Seoul.

Organized by an association of progressive groups calling themselves Candlelight Victory Action for Change, the march was being held near the presidential office, around 2 kilometers away from where the tragedy would occur.

“We were unable to send [riot police] officers who were managing the rally,” an official from Yongsan Police Station’s traffic bureau said. “Since the officers of the traffic police squadron worked without having dinner, I instructed them to go to the Itaewon site by 9:30 pm after finishing their meal [after the rally],” the official explained.

It was also revealed that, around that same time, one SMPA riot police squadron was on standby near Itaewon.

According to the “Oct. 29 forces management plan” obtained by National Assembly lawmaker Lee Hyung-seok's office from the National Police Agency, the police had deployed one riot police squadron of 60 officers for a nightshift to Noksapyeong and Samgakji stations, both very close to Itaewon, in connection with the rally near the presidential office.

Although a riot police squad of this size was on standby minutes away from Itaewon, they were not dispatched to the site of the crush.

“Police officers, who should ensure the safety and save the lives of people, turned a blind eye to the people’s signals for help to protect the president's office and the president's private residence,” Ahn Ho-young, a senior spokesman for the Democratic Party of Korea, said on Thursday.

“President Yoon Suk-yeol was the cause of the police’s overall poor response that kept the Itaewon disaster from being prevented,” Ahn criticized.

In addition to the dispatch of additional forces, the 112 emergency call reporting system was also a mess.

It has now been revealed that the situation manager of the 112 public order all-source situation room at the SMPA, who was in charge of police reports at night, violated his work duties and left the room during his shift, only to return more than an hour after the disaster occurred.

Ryu Mi-jin, the situation manager in question and chief of personnel education at the SMPA, reportedly returned to the 112 situation room at 11:39 pm after receiving a belated report concerning the situation in Itaewon by the third team leader of the situation room. By this time, it had already been one hour and 24 minutes after people were losing their lives in Itaewon.

In the meantime, 195 reports related to the Itaewon crush alone had already been received. Since the situation manager has the authority to dispatch riot police and other officers, the initial action taken by the police may have been very different if Ryu had been aware of the situation sooner.

On Thursday, the police also revealed that there had been earlier reports mentioning “crushing” coming from Itaewon at 6:17 pm and 6:26 pm on the day of the accident. Both these times are earlier than 6:34 pm, when police said the initial report was received. Regarding why these two earlier reports were omitted until now, the police said they had judged them to be “not related” to the disaster in Itaewon.

The same day, the special inspection team of the National Police Agency placed Ryu on leave from his duties. Regarding Lee Im-jae, the former head of the Yongsan Police Station who had also been put on leave on Wednesday, the inspection team said that it had been confirmed that Lee had neglected his command management duties and delayed the reporting of the disaster. The inspection team requested an investigation into both Lee and Ryu.

By Lee Woo-yun, staff reporter; Jang Ye-ji, staff reporter; Cheon Ho-sung, staff reporter; Chai Yoon-tae, staff reporter; Lim Jae-woo, staff reporter

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