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President Yoon Suk-yeol heads to the presidential jet on April 24 as he leaves for his state visit to the US. (Yonhap)

The focus of South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s six-day visit to the US, which he departed for on Monday, is on strengthening the US extended deterrence over South Korea against the North Korean nuclear and missile threats, according to explanations from the presidential office.

In particular, the two sides are expected to produce a joint document stating their measures for boosting their extended deterrence execution capabilities. The key question in this case is how much of a role Seoul is able to play in the US’ operation of nuclear capabilities.

But some observers predicted that South Korea could emerge with little to show for the visit in that regard, since the US president would continue to hold final authority on the use of nuclear weapons — with no past examples of sharing that with allies.

According to accounts from the administration and politicians, South Korea and the US are discussing the adoption of a special document at their leaders’ summit on Wednesday that would include practical measures on the strengthening of their extended deterrence against the North Korean nuclear threat.

More specifically, the two sides reportedly plan to include written provisions about the “nuclear umbrella” over South Korea, a system in which the US would respond with its nuclear capabilities to a nuclear attack by North Korea against South Korean territory.

A source with the ruling People Power Party explained that the leaders would “issue a special document stating that South Korea and the US would make decisions and respond together from the planning stages if North Korea carries out a nuclear attack.”

The source added that the system would be “at a stronger level than NATO.”

The concept of the nuclear umbrella is one where the US would respond to a nuclear attack on South Korea by using its own nuclear capabilities to reduce North Korea to ashes. The terms were first presented in a joint statement issued at the 11th Security Consultative Meeting — a meeting of the two countries’ defense chiefs — held during the Park Chung-hee presidency in July 1978.

The US reaffirmed its nuclear umbrella pledge at annual Security Consultative Meetings through 2005.

After North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006, South Korea demanded a stronger defense pledge from the US at the next Security Consultative Meeting. This marked the first appearance of the term “extended deterrence.”

Intended as a more concrete military strategy-based definition of the nuclear umbrella — which had previously been more of a general political concept — extended deterrence encompasses not only nuclear weapons but all other forms of military capabilities, including conventional weapons and missile defense.

Kim Jong-dae, a visiting scholar at the Yonsei Institute for North Korean Studies and former Justice Party lawmaker, explained, “They were saying that [the US] would pursue nuclear retaliation if South Korean territory came under attack — meaning the same nuclear umbrella that had existed since the time of the Park Chung-hee administration.”

“It might look like a new agreement, but it was basically another word for the same thing,” he said.

The reason many South Koreans still see the nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence concepts as “lip service” in spite of the US’ pledges has to do with the fact that there have been no examples of the US taking action beyond its promises. Also, there are no official procedures or systems in place for discussions with the South Korean government if the US does decide to use nuclear weapons in an emergency on the peninsula.

Many have continued to insist that an institutionalized form of extended deterrence would require the two sides to share nuclear-related information and allow South Korea to participate in the planning and execution stages for any US use of nuclear capabilities.

Co-planning in this case would mean that both sides take part in developing deterrence strategies and operational plans to prepare for North Korea’s potential use of nuclear weapons. The level of that participation will only be clear when the South Korea-US summit outcome is known.

Possible levels of participation range from the mere sharing of opinions to institutional frameworks for discussions — and there have been no precedents of the US sharing final authority on nuclear weapon use decisions with an ally.

Even the NATO model of nuclear sharing, which is often cited as an example of the US sharing its nuclear capabilities, is one in which the US does not grant its NATO allies possession, decision-making authority, or veto powers on tactical nuclear weapons.

The US is exclusively in control of nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and responsible for their management, upkeep, and repair. NATO air forces are responsible for dropping them on targets. In short, the NATO nuclear sharing model is not one of actually “sharing” the weapons, but sharing nuclear deterrence duties and the associated political responsibilities.

The extended deterrence discussions at the upcoming summit could be seen as intended to assuage public opinion in South Korea, where many are calling for independent nuclear weapon development and redeployment of US tactical nuclear weapons.

The US is opposed to both of those approaches, but it has refrained from explicitly saying as much out of consideration for the South Korean public’s feelings and the South Korean government’s position.

By Shin Hyeong-cheol, staff reporter; Seo Young-ji, staff reporter

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