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North Korean leader Kim Jong-un speaks at a Supreme People’s Assembly meeting in Pyongyang on Sept. 8. (KCNA/Yonhap)

North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) passed a law on Thursday concerning the country’s nuclear weapons. The law “on the state policy on the nuclear forces” clearly stipulates the mission, constitution, and command and control structure of the country’s nuclear forces as well as decision procedures and conditions for using these nuclear weapons.

Experts believe the new law is meant to strengthen North Korea’s deterrence capabilities by clearly stating the details of its use of nuclear weapons. Some also say the law points to an internal and external declaration announcing the return to the “byungjin” policy line of pursuing economic growth and nuclear weapons at the same time.

“The adoption of a law related with the policy of the nation's nuclear forces in accordance with the unanimous will of all the Korean people is a noteworthy event that proclaimed at home and abroad that we have come to possess by law a war deterrent as a means for defending the state,” Kim Jong-un, general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and chairman of the DPRK’s State Affairs Commission, said during a speech given at the seventh session of the 14th SPA on Thursday.

Regarding the US, Kim said that “its final objective is to overthrow our government” while also emphasizing that his country will “never give up the nuclear weapons however harsh the circumstances are in the political and military situations the United States has created on the Korean peninsula.”

The new law, made up of 11 articles and 23 paragraphs, states that “the nuclear forces of the DPRK shall obey the monolithic command of the president of the State Affairs of the DPRK” (Article 3, Paragraph 1). The law also goes on to stipulate that “the president of the State Affairs of the DPRK shall have all decisive powers concerning nuclear weapons” (Article 3, Paragraph 2). DPRK is short for North Korea’s official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

In Article 6, five specific conditions for the use of nuclear weapons are presented. Two of these conditions state that nuclear weapons may be used 1) in case of an attack by nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, and 2) in case of a nuclear or non-nuclear attack targeting the state leadership and the command organization of the state's nuclear forces.

“Most nuclear-weapon states, except for the US, try to remain as ambiguous as possible regarding the use of their nuclear weapons to avoid limiting their choices in certain situations,” a source in the diplomacy-security field shared. "North Korea, however, seems to be trying to increase its deterrence effect by clearly and specifically revealing its nuclear [weapons use] doctrine,” the source added.

Another noteworthy point lies in Article 9, Paragraph 1, which stipulates that North Korea will “constantly assess outside nuclear threats and the change in the posture of international nuclear forces and correspondingly upgrade and beef up its nuclear forces in a qualitative and quantitative way in response to it.”

This is why some are speculating that North Korea could conduct its seventh nuclear test any time after Xi Jinping is confirmed for a third term as president during the upcoming 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party scheduled for Oct. 16.

Meanwhile, North Korea’s byungjin (simultaneous pursuit) policy, which Kim Jong-un had declared a “victory” one week before the April 27 Panmunjom summit in 2018, seems to have been clearly revived.

In his speech, Kim Jong-un stated that “it is a crucial and vital requirement in achieving a steady development and prosperity of socialism that conditions and an environment that allow no aggressive threat be created,” adding that “to this end, we should possess an absolute strength with which we can definitely overwhelm the enemy.”

Koo Kab-woo, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies, explained, “If North Korea engaged in diplomatic negotiations to improve its economic conditions in 2018, their logic has now changed [toward a belief] that nuclear weapons are needed at least to improve economic conditions.”

Koo also added that “the return of the byungjin policy line seems to have been declared since external conditions like the improvement of US-North Korea relations have not been met.”

By Jung In-hwan, staff reporter

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