hankyoreh

A monitor at Seoul Station plays a news broadcast on North Korea, showing footage of a military parade that included missiles, on Feb. 2. (AP/Yonhap)

Regarding the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, two “audacious” initiatives are circulating like ghosts. One concerns the denuclearization of North Korea while the other is about the independent nuclear armament of South Korea.

Both are like ghosts, with no possibility of materializing, yet they still continue to come and go and affect the thoughts and opinions of the public.

President Yoon Suk-yeol’s “audacious initiative” announced in his National Liberation Day speech last August involves providing large-scale economic support to North Korea premised on its denuclearization, taking corresponding political and military actions, and the goal to improve inter-Korean relations in a decisive and comprehensive manner.

North Korea reacted as expected. Pyongyang used dramatic language to describe the initiative, calling it “a replica” of the “Vision 3000: Denuclearization and Openness” plan proposed by Lee Myung-bak 10 years ago while expressing strong distaste toward Yoon himself, saying they will “never deal with him.”

Obviously, being bold or audacious means having the will and courage to achieve a goal at all costs while taking risks that go with taking the needed actions.

Being audacious only in thinking while not knowing the other party at all and being unable to actively initiate one’s own actions is an entirely different level of audacity.

Let’s not beat around the bush. That’s cowardice. Isn’t this the reason military confrontations and the crisis of war have escalated so much over the past few months on the Korean Peninsula?

The theory of South Korea’s independent nuclear armament predates the theory of requiring denuclearization first from the North by more than 30 years.

In the 1970s, South Korean leader Park Chung-hee pursued nuclear development. This was a time when North Korea was in an overall more powerful position than the South and when the US Carter administration had plans to withdraw US troops from South Korea.

Although Park’s plan was ultimately not successful, it did have some substance to it considering the fact that the plan was pursued. Even after the plan was shelved, it still remained, like a ghost, not ever fully disappearing.

According to a Jan. 30 poll conducted by Gallup Korea commissioned by the Chey Institute for Advanced Studies, about 77 percent of respondents said that it’s “necessary” for South Korea to develop its own independent nuclear weapons program.

Similarly, a survey conducted by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in May last year also showed support for nuclear armament to be 70 percent among respondents. Another survey conducted in December 2021 by Hankook Research commissioned by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs also recorded 71 percent support for a domestic nuclear program.

Other polls also show that, in recent years, well over half of respondents expressed support for independent nuclear armament.

The polls themselves are not wrong. Rather, it may be necessary to understand the thoughts of the majority of the public.

However, the reliability and usefulness of polls that look simply at the pros and cons of nuclear weapons possession, which is a highly complex issue that involves the fate of the nation, should be considered in a cautious and critical way.

Opinion polls on policies, not surveys about favorability in elections, should be designed in such a way that they take into account how much respondents actually know about the essence of the issues being asked about.

How would most ordinary people, who are non-experts on the issue, answer the abrupt question of whether South Korea should develop its own nuclear weapons. It’s obvious. Many may think, “I’m not sure, but I think it’ll be necessary,” and thus answer “yes.”

In particular, if North Korean missile tests are ongoing during the period of such surveys and military tensions on the Korean Peninsula are rising, then people will be more likely to answer based on fear and hostility instead of rational judgment.

Here, the desire to feel a sense of sovereignty and pride as a nuclear power would also play a role. As such, respondents are not the ones in the wrong.

Through arguments grounded in reality, many domestic and foreign experts have exposed just how unrealistic independent nuclear armament by South Korea would be.

Some of the issues include US opposition to such plans, the collapse of the South Korea-US alliance, the abandonment of the goal to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, diplomatic isolation, having nuclear fuel supply cut off and a possible energy crisis, economic sanctions, the costs of developing nuclear weapons and building testing facilities, turning conventional military conflict into possible nuclear conflicts, a regional nuclear arms race, and deepening security dilemmas.

Not a single one of these issues is realistically solvable or acceptable.

Even if South Korea risks all of this and “audaciously” goes for nuclear armament, it is highly possible that the country will end up becoming a rogue state that cannot gain international recognition and a failed state with a ruined economy.

The two Koreas would end up in a permanent state of war, much worse than division. A peace regime would be out of the question.

What would survey results show if they were conducted after holding such informative discussions, which don't even take so much time?

Awareness constitutes what the world is made of while the world, in turn, rules awareness.

While being a reflection of generally accepted ideas in society, polls showing that the absolute majority of the public supports nuclear armament can also play a role in determining this answer.

The real danger comes from here. In other words, these polls affect politics and policy.

On Jan. 11, President Yoon Suk-yeol told Defense Ministry officials that, if North Korean provocations become more intense, South Korea could “acquire its own nuclear weapons.”

This was the first time since Park Chung-hee that a South Korean president so openly spoke of nuclear armament. This policy line can be called this government's “Part 2” of its original audacious initiative, which requires “denuclearization first” from North Korea.

While the US may not have felt the need to directly comment on Yoon’s plans, they immediately “kindly” expressed their opposition. In the aftermath of the president's comments, the presidential office and National Defense Ministry also had to explain and try to water down the president’s comments while Yoon himself told foreign media in an interview that he “respects” the non-proliferation system.

If a handful of civilian scholars wish to call independently for nuclear armament, that is their freedom. But the politicians and policymakers in positions of responsibility should not be free to do the same.

Opinion poll findings may leave them feeling tempted to adopt a populist approach, but it’s a trap they must not fall into. History shows that when domestic social and economic variables come together with a deteriorating international political situation, this can lead to war.

I’d like to believe the Yoon administration is not resorting to Cold War-era security populism — with its focus on inter-Korean antagonisms and trilateral military cooperation with the US and Japan — in a bid to shore up its not especially high approval ratings. Though I can’t say I’m holding out much hope, I’d like to see them come out with an “audacious initiative” for achieving peace through peaceful means.

After all, there has been an initiative floated for forming an “alliance” between South and North Korea and the US. (“A Grand Bargain with North Korea,” Foreign Affairs, July 29, 2021)

The idea of South and North Korea spearheading a “joint security” regime oriented toward comprehensive security cooperation — as opposed to an alliance countering a specific enemy — is neither utterly new nor completely farfetched. Now that would be truly audacious.

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]