hankyoreh

North Korea’s Foreign Ministry threatened April 29 to test a nuclear device and an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) unless the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) immediately apologizes for adopting its “President’s Statement” against it and designating three North Korean enterprises, including the Tanchon Commercial Bank, for sanctions, saying the move infringed on its “sovereignty.”

The announcement becomes the first time Pyongyang officially hints of a nuclear test since its first test of a nuclear device in October 9, 2006, and the first time it has openly discussed testing an ICBM. Instead of talking around the matter, like with its recent test of what it described as a “satellite rocket,” it is declaring its intention to test missiles with military use.

By doing so, it plays all the cards it has in its effort to get the United States to the negotiating table at a time when the U.S. has been indifferent about direct, bilateral negotiations. Nuclear tests, ICBMs, and uranium enrichment programs are have something to do with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Foreign Ministry statement did not specify a timeline for the tests it threatens, and as of yet there have been no signs North Korea is making preparations for either type of test. It does not by itself, then, create a real “situation.” Rather, it is the highest level of language-based pressure Pyongyang can use towards Washington, a way of telling the Obama Administration to chose between confrontation or negotiation. If the U.S. is unable to find a solution to the issue early on in the course of high-level U.S.-North Korean negotiations, and if Pyongyang then tests a nuclear device or performs additional long-range missile launch, the political situation in Northeast Asia might quickly turn into a major standoff.

Firing a long-range rocket like it did on April 5, calling what it launched a “peaceful rocket,” was one thing. Specifically mentioning an ICBM with a range of more than 6,000 kilometers is another matter, since it means it wants to prove it has the ability to strike the U.S. mainland.

No one knows whether North Korea really does have that capability. While it failed to put a satellite into orbit on April 5, experts generally agree that Pyongyang has improve the performance of its long-range rockets since 1998. Some experts see the Foreign Ministry statement as Pyongyang’s way of saying it is going to concentrate efforts on the miniaturization of its nuclear weapons, since it discussed testing a nuclear device and ICBMs, which can carry nuclear devices as payload.

Another serious issue becomes the announcement that it is going to speed up development of its own ability to produce the nuclear fuel needed for a light water reactor, because that can be interpreted as meaning North Korea is going to develop a uranium enrichment program instead of going with its earlier method of plutonium extraction.

“It would take them several years,” said Lee Chun-geun, head of the North Korea desk at the National Science and Technology Council. “But at any rate, they’re openly declaring they are going to go ahead with technology development” on uranium enrichment. A key point of international contention during what is known as the “second North Korean nuclear crisis” was whether or not North Korea has a highly enriched uranium program (HEUP).

North Korea’s motive is clear. While on the surface it is fighting back at the UNSC’s President’s Statement and the recent UNSC sanctions committee action, Pyongyang’s move can also be seen as an attempt to turn around the political situation that has existed for it since the later half of 2008, which, as far as North Korean leaders are concerned, has been at a standstill over the issue of verification regarding its Yongbyon nuclear facility. The North Korean state’s official goal is to “construct a powerful and prosperous nation” (kangsong Taeguk) by 2012, and it is employing the strategy of increasing tensions in order to increase the pace for improving relations with Washington.

“The Obama Administration is consistently using a policy of ignoring (Pyongyang), having not even mentioned it in its list of foreign policy priorities,” said a South Korean foreign policy expert. North Korea is “reacting to the recent slow pace of discussion about bilateral U.S.-North Korean dialogue.”

Please direct questions or comments to [englishhani@hani.co.kr]