hankyoreh

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at the Korean Workers’ Party congress at the April 25 House of Culture in Pyongyang

The full text of a business summation report from North Korea‘s seventh Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) congress was published on May 9 in the Rodong Sinmun newspaper.

In it, North Korea states its plans to “permanently adopt a strategic two-track course of building of the economy and nuclear capabilities and further strengthen defensive nuclear arms,” as per the policy course stated by leader Kim Jong-un in his congress decision statement from a meeting during the congress’s third day on May 8.

But the decision statement also includes the proviso that the two-track course is to be strengthened “as long as the imperial nuclear threat and tyranny continue,” along with a pledge to “achieve miniaturization and diversification of nuclear weapons . . . to meet the demands of the two-track course.”

As directed by Kim, the decision statement also says North Korea “must produce and launch more working satellites.” It’s an indication of Pyongyang‘s commitment to continuing and expanding its launches using ballistic missile technology, which are currently banned by the United Nations Security Council.

The content amounts to an official decision at the congress to continue, develop, and expand the two-track course.

In a briefing the same day by spokespersons for the Ministries of Unification and National Defense, the South Korean government said, “It is the unanimous position of South Korea and the international community that North Korea cannot be acknowledged as a nuclear state.”

“Intensive sanctions and pressure from us and the international community will continue until North Korea abandons nuclear weapons,” it added.

In response to the Hankyoreh’s request for comments following the announcement of the content of Kim’s business summation report, the US government issued a statement in the name of Ory Abramowicz, spokesperson for the State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

“We are aware of the comments and continue to call on North Korea to focus on taking concrete steps toward fulfilling its commitments and international obligations,” the statement read, referring to Pyongyang’s pledges in the Joint Statement from the Six Party Talks on Sept. 19, 2005.

“U.N. Security Council resolutions [including UNSCR 2770] require North Korea to suspend all activities related to its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and to abandon them in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner,” it added.

Speaking at a press conference on May 9, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary and government spokesperson Yoshihide Suga said Tokyo “cannot accept the statement of intent to continue possessing nuclear capabilities.”

At the same time, Suga also used Kim’s official title of KWP first secretary and left open the possibility of bilateral dialogue, stating that Tokyo was “unchanged in adhering to principles of ‘dialogue and pressure’ and ‘action for action’ in addressing the abductee, nuclear, and missile issues in a comprehensive way.” Its tone differed sharply from that of the Park Geun-hye administration, with a Unification Ministry spokesperson coming out on May 9 to dismiss Pyongyang‘s proposal for military talks as “a completely insincere propaganda offensive.”

The Chinese government avoided commenting directly. In a regular briefing that day, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lu Kang said there was “no change in our position on the [Korean] Peninsula’s nuclear issue.”

“We believe that denuclearization of the peninsula, protection of the peninsula‘s peace and stability, and the resolution of problems through dialogue and negotiation accord with the interests of the various countries and peace and stability in Northeast Asia,” Lu added.

“We hope all countries will commit efforts that accord with the currents of the times,” he continued.

The conflict between North Korea’s two-track course and South Korea, the US, and Japan’s calls for denuclearization first is nothing new. Rather, it is a continuation of the peninsula’s situation from January to April following North Korea’s fourth nuclear test on Jan. 6 and the adoption of UNSCR 2270, with little in the way of qualitative change. In one respect, however, the possibility of a long-term stalemate over the nuclear issue now appears greater.

Noteworthy in this sense is the stronger institutional backing for integration of the two-track course with the leadership system under Kim Jong-un in the congress’s wake.

While North Korea previously amended the preamble to its Constitution in Apr. 2012 to define itself as a “nuclear state,” it could also now do so in its WPK regulations, which were to be amended during the congress according to Kim’s business summation report and the decision statement.

The elevation of nuclear and missile development officials among the congress’s executive branch - including military industry secretary Pak To-chun, KWP machine-building industry department chief Chu Kyu-chang, and second economic committee chairman Jo Chun-ryong - suggests the formation and expansion of a broad interest group in Pyongyang with nuclear arms, missiles, and other weapons of mass destruction as its reason for being - as does the increased standing of nuclear and rocket development technicians and the presence of various strategic forces in charge of missile launches and control.

The situation is potentially problematic, as it means less autonomy for Kim to change his policy course toward denuclearization. In contrast, father Kim Jong-il was able to present denuclearization of the peninsula as the “final instructions” of his own father, Kim Il-sung.

By Lee Je-hun, staff reporter, Gil Yun-hyung and Kim Oi-hyun, Tokyo and Beijing correspondents

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]