hankyoreh

Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan (from webpage of Office of the Prime Minister)

Jiro Yamaguchi

Japan’s government and ruling parties are currently pushing forward with fundamental security policy changes by deciding to revise the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Program Guidelines, and the Mid-term Defense Program by the end of the year.

Among the policy changes being proposed, the current defense plan includes a call to increase defense spending from the current 25 trillion yen (US$189.5 billion) over five years to 43 trillion yen over the next five years. There are also proposals to increase Japan’s current counterstrike capabilities by allowing the country to attack enemy bases preemptively.

For 75 years after the adoption of Japan’s pacifist constitution, Japan has followed a peaceful path according to Article 9 of the document. Neighboring countries have also recognized this fact.

Based on Article 9, Japan’s military, which pursued wars of aggression and colonial rule that inflicted devastation on Asian countries in the 1930s and 1940s, adopted a “no war” stance based on a defensive security policy.

According to this policy, Japan will only use force when attacked and, even so, will minimize the scope of its use of force as much as possible. Over the years, this policy line has reassured Asian countries greatly. Because of this, discussions on changing the foundational spirit of Japan’s security policy must be conducted carefully.

There are various issues with the security policy line being pursued by the Kishida administration. First of all, it is not completely clear what is meant by having to protect the “country.” A country is made up of three elements: territory, sovereignty and people. There has long been a national consensus that an appropriate level of self-defense is needed to protect a country’s territory and sovereignty.

Japan’s recent problem, however, is that many of its citizens in need of protection are being devastated and impoverished by economic and social issues, not by external enemies.

This kind of structure also existed in the 1930s, when Japan’s invasion into the Chinese continent continued after the 1931 bombing incident in Manchuria. As national policy increasingly prioritized the military, rural areas became devastated and the number of unemployed skyrocketed.

Some politicians and soldiers emphasized a wider definition of defense policy and argued that poverty and unemployment should be resolved. They believed that, in a situation where financial power was low and the people were struggling with living difficulties, national power was reduced and, even if weapons were built up, the country’s defense capabilities would not markedly improve.

However, since discussions at the time were aimed at creating a “strong military force,” it is difficult to apply this rhetoric to Japan today.

Nevertheless, the number of annual births in Japan has fallen below 800,000 while the country’s trade deficit is becoming increasingly solidified due to declining competitiveness and a weak yen.

It is important to realize that the people’s lives, which the government is supposed to safeguard, have begun to collapse. There are concerns that, if the government decides to raise defense spending by significantly increasing taxes, it will only accelerate the damage to society, leaving the people hurting.

Threats to the lives and livelihoods of the people and to the sustainability of Japanese society exist inside of Japan, not outside.

Securing the ability to attack enemy bases will not help Japan’s security.

It is impossible to have weapons or intelligence capacity that can identify all the enemy’s attack points and destroy them all at once. How can we acquire information that an enemy has launched an attack on Japan?

In order for such a strategy to work, Japan will inevitably have to depend on the US military. There is, however, the possibility that the US could leak false information that an attack has begun against Japan, just to pull Japan into a war. In such a case, there would be a risk of Japan launching a preemptive strike, which, in reality, has nothing to do with the country’s national defense.

Changes in Japan’s defense policy are currently underway through expert meetings organized by the Kishida government and discussions between the ruling coalition made up of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito.

One noteworthy point, however, is that the main opposition party, the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) of Japan, is also holding talks on the subject within its own party. According to media reports, at this point, discussions within the CDP are leaning in favor of the Kishida administration’s desired policy changes.

However, since the CDP’s main ideology is based on constitutionalism, it should not take part in the de-facto destruction of Article 9 of the statute.

It is true that threats coming from China and North Korea have been adding to public anxiety. However, the first step in discussing security policy is to review the internal stability of defense capabilities and determine whether they will contribute to Japan's security. For example, by reviewing the introduction of Aegis-equipped ships, which has been ongoing for 10 years, and that of stand-off missiles, which can be launched outside the opponent’s range of attack.

There is a national consensus that defense spending will inevitably rise. However, there need to be in-depth discussions regarding exactly how much spending will be increased and who will bear the burden of these costs. The responsibility of the Diet is being called into question.

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