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On June 29, 2019, US President Donald Trump meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Group of 20 summit in Osaka, Japan. (Reuters/Yonhap)

By Kim Jung-sup, principal fellow at the Sejong Institute

The South Korea-US alliance will no doubt face changes and challenges on several fronts during the Trump era. The US Department of Defense recently internally distributed its interim national defense strategic guidance, in which it indicated that Washington will prioritize the deterrence of China in the Indo-Pacific. 

The US appears to be adjusting its main defense objectives by limiting them to preventing an invasion and occupation of Taiwan by China and to protecting the US homeland. When it comes to other threats, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has called on US allies to take increased responsibility for their defense. 

Gen. Xavier Brunson, the commander of US Forces Korea, has also referred to USFK as part of a greater US Indo-Pacific strategy, in what many see as an expression of intent to refocus US military capacity and readiness on deterring China. 

This is a two-sided challenge for South Korea. For the peace and safety of the Korean Peninsula, we need to ramp up efforts to bolster our ability to defend ourselves. But at the same time, we also need to gather our wisdom to ensure that we do not become dragged into the conflicts of greater nations against our will. 

In this context, the conflict over Taiwan presents a particularly great risk. From what perspective should South Korea approach this issue? There are three questions to consider. 

First, what are the implications of changes in the status of the Taiwan Strait to the greater East Asian order, and how critical of an issue is it to South Korea? Second, how can we reduce our chances of involvement in the event of an armed conflict over Taiwan? Third, if South Korean troops are called on to defend Taiwan in the framework of the South Korea-US alliance, how should South Korea respond? 

First off, some believe that if Taiwan is invaded and taken by China, a portion of the waters of East Asia will effectively become China’s. Some also warn that if Taiwan falls, the US-Japan alliance and the South Korea-US alliance could falter, and that the US will ultimately be driven out of East Asia and the Western Pacific. Because of that, they argue, South Korea should view a conflict in Taiwan as a conflict directly involving Korea, and that we should share the burden of defending Taiwan with the US. 

However, this perspective is excessively pessimistic and overly simplistic. If the US fails to defend Taiwan, US credibility will take a hit, but it is extreme to conclude that it would result in the US losing its position and influence in the region. As demonstrated by the Vietnam War, the dominoes don’t fall quite as easily as some would think. We therefore need to be leery of the argument that South Korea’s national security is directly tied to the fate of Taiwan.   

Second, we need to overcome the fatalistic view that sees Korea being inevitably drawn into any conflict that occurs over Taiwan. The most worrisome scenario would be the US Air Force using the Korean Peninsula as an airbase.  This is the problem of the “strategic flexibility” of US troops stationed in Korea. 

However, if we play our cards right, Korea could reduce its chances of being dragged into a conflict. The most important thing is to prevent US fighters from taking off from and landing at the airbases in Osan and Gunsan while engaging in operations in or around the Taiwan Strait. If we cannot prevent that, we need to compromise by calling for a portion of USFK to be transferred to the US base in Okinawa. 

This is a reasonable option for the US when it comes to refueling, supply transport, and flight security. In this regard, our stance differs from that of Japan. 

Guam and Okinawa have served as hub bases for the deployment of US forces from the get-go. Geographically, the Senkaku Islands are 350 km away from Taiwan, and Yonaguni, Japan’s westernmost island, is a mere 110 km away from Taiwan. 

This is why former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe once said, “A Taiwan emergency is a Japanese emergency.” However, we need to be more careful before concluding that a conflict in Taiwan is a conflict in Korea. And we must not forfeit efforts to reduce our chances of involvement.  

Lastly, the defeatist claim that South Korea, as a US ally, cannot avoid becoming involved in a Taiwan conflict, is overblown. Some say that if South Korea abandons its duty of mutual defense, there will be no future for the alliance. However, from South Korea’s perspective, the deterrence of the North Korean threat remains the highest national priority, just as it’s always been. 

Even if an armed conflict breaks out over Taiwan, it’s important for the alliance to prevent North Korea from entertaining ideas of military adventurism. 

If the US gets involved in Taiwan, it will need to avoid becoming entangled in a second front in the Korean Peninsula. In this regard, the most that South Korea could do is provide diplomatic support and military supplies — indirect support that does not involve combat. 

The peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait are very important. If a conflict breaks out, it is likely that it will expand into a greater war between superpowers that exceeds Ukraine in its gruesomeness. For that reason, it’s imperative that the international community adheres to an opposition to any and all attempts to change the status quo by force. 

But we also need to avoid the pitfalls of obsessing with fatalistic theories that posit we have no say in the matter. It’s a dangerous world out there. Korea would do well to remain as flexible and balanced as possible while dealing with these thorny issues. 

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]