hankyoreh

President Lee Jae-myung of South Korea and members of his Cabinet face the flag ahead of a Cabinet meeting on June 25, 2025, the anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War. (courtesy of the presidential office)

Consider the following two definitions of inter-Korean relations.

(1) The relationship between South and North Korea is not “a relationship between states” but “a special interim relationship stemming from the process towards reunification.”

(2) The relationship between the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a relationship between states, a special relationship aimed at integration.

The first sentence, which borrows language from a basic agreement on reconciliation, nonaggression, exchanges and cooperation between the two Koreas signed in 1991, defines inter-Korean relations as a special relationship oriented toward unification. The second sentence, of my own composition, describes what I hope will become the consensus position in South Korea and the subject of a future agreement, reached through dialogue, with North Korea.

A comparison reveals how my definition differs from that in the 1991 basic agreement. First, my definition uses the two sides’ official names and defines the current status of inter-Korean relations as the relationship between states in the general sense of the term. Second, it stresses the special nature of that relationship while expressing an aspiration for “integration,” rather than “unification.”

What we need is to take a fresh look at the general and special aspects of this relationship. Three months before reaching the basic agreement, the two Koreas were simultaneously admitted into the United Nations. But the basic agreement ignores that general aspect and focuses on the special aspect of the “process towards unification.”

However, the prospects for unification are more forbidding than ever — and not only because North Korea has abandoned the idea of unification and crafted a narrative of the relationship as one between two hostile states. Since the basic agreement’s adoption, South Korea’s policy toward North Korea and unification has ricocheted wildly between administrations, even as attitudes toward unification have grown progressively more negative.

The companion piece to the inter-Korean basic agreement was the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. But North Korea has now become a de facto nuclear weapons state. Inter-Korean dialogue, exchange and cooperation long ago withered away to nothing.

Along the way, South Korea has formed diplomatic relations with nearly all the countries in the United Nations, while North Korea now has diplomatic relations with 157 countries. In effect, the special aspects of inter-Korean relations have vanished, and both South and North Korea have pursued a more general relationship.

As all this suggests, it’s no exaggeration to say that the 1991 system — which rested on the twin pillars of the basic agreement and the joint declaration on denuclearization — is now defunct.

Still, I’ve argued we should keep trying to resolve the nuclear issue, shifting to arms control with the eventual and ultimate goal of creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

What I’d also like to propose (as mentioned above) is framing inter-Korean relations as the relationship between states, a special relationship aimed at integration. The goal here is to recognize the general aspects of the relationship that already exist while restoring the special aspects that have fallen by the wayside.

There are two reasons for my use of the word “integration” instead of “unification.”

First, it supports a shift from rigidity to flexibility. When one side doesn’t want unification and the other side keeps talking about it, it’s difficult to overcome a level of hostility in inter-Korean relations.

A bigger issue is internal. There are manifold ways to conceive the future of inter-Korean relations, and focusing on unification limits our imagination and our flexibility.

In contrast, integration is a concept that comprehends a wide range of approaches: the establishment of diplomatic relations; social, cultural and economic exchange and cooperation; economic integration along the lines of the European Union; and, ultimately, even unification.

That leads to another important point. Integration, given its ability to accommodate unification, conforms to the spirit of South Korea’s Constitution.

Resetting inter-Korean relations along these lines, in my view, is pragmatic and future-oriented, and would also boost our strategic autonomy in an era of rapid geopolitical changes.

Such a reset is pragmatic for reasons that are evident when compared with the other options. As long as we insist on a special relationship oriented toward unification, we will struggle to break through the deadlock in inter-Korean relations. Such insistence, therefore, runs contrary to our interests and vision.

That said, we can’t simply abandon unification and officially declare the existence of two states as North Korea has. Short of a constitutional amendment, such an approach would create a constitutional crisis and provoke tremendous internal strife.

In contrast, my proposal could be palatable to North Korea while also amenable to consensus-building in South Korea.

In that way, it is also a future-oriented approach. Redefining the relationship may give us leverage in recommencing dialogue with North Korea, as relaying a message of mutual respect for one another as states while building a friendly inter-Korean relationship based on peace may open up the table for North Korea to reconsider its official stance on South Korea.

In this regard, I hope that the Lee Jae-myung administration starts to lay the groundwork for moving in this direction, creating the conditions to dispatch a special envoy to the North and resume US-North Korea talks. The key to doing so will be for Lee to use close, summit-level communication with Washington to call off the large-scale joint military drills between the two sides scheduled to take place on and around the Korean Peninsula in August, and the unveiling of a vision and policy for inter-Korean relations in his Liberation Day address on Aug. 15.

We only have to go back six years to the summer of 2019 to remind ourselves how crucial suspending the August military drills would be. At the time, US President Donald Trump promised North Korean leader Kim Jong-un that he would halt the joint military exercises with the South. But when the exercises went forward as scheduled, all the effort put into normalizing the relationship between Pyongyang and Washington came to naught.

North Korea ridiculed former President Moon Jae-in’s Liberation Day address, saying that such comments would “make a boiled head of a cow provoke a side-splitting laughter,” and declared that it had no plans to “sit with [South Korea] again.” The current administration should learn from such a mistake.

It is also important that we recognize that North Korea is being so unwelcoming of the second Trump administration’s attempts at reconciliation due to its ongoing bilateral military drills with the South and trilateral drills with Japan. It would not be an exaggeration to say that whether or not Lee calls off the massive war games will be an indicator of the direction that the Korean Peninsula and inter-Korean relations are headed. 

A new framework for a special relationship between states oriented toward integration will also benefit South Korea’s efforts to enact a pragmatic diplomacy that puts the national interest first in the midst of a rapidly changing geopolitical environment. 

Let’s start with the most pressing issue: defense costs. The Trump administration, which secured an agreement at the most recent NATO summit that stipulated that members of the Atlantic alliance would increase their defense spending to 5% of GDP, is now pressing South Korea to agree to a similar demand. 

South Korea’s defense spending in 2025 is about 61 trillion won (roughly US$45 billion), a little over 2.3% of its GDP. If we are to accept US demands and attempt to boost defense spending up to 5% of our GDP by 2035, we will be spending 165 trillion. This number is based on the assumption that the average annual GDP growth rate will be 2%, which means that South Korea will spend 112 trillion won on defense over the next 10 years.

However, if the situation on the Korean Peninsula remains at a standstill or worsens, it will only make it more difficult for South Korea to effectively respond to the US’ unreasonable demands. If, on the other hand, inter-Korean relations and the situation on the Korean Peninsula become stabilized through the resumption of inter-Korean and North Korea-US dialogue, South Korea will have more autonomy to appropriately dictate how much it wants to devote to defense spending.

A new definition of inter-Korean relations will also be vital for dealing with the worsening conflict between the US and China over Taiwan. The Trump administration, much like its predecessor, aims to rally its allies around its core strategy of deterring China from invading Taiwan, which is in line with its call for significant increases in defense spending. 

The US is also pushing for the role of the US forces stationed in South Korea to be adjusted to focus on deterring China rather than North Korea. If South Korea acquiesces to such demands, it will endanger South Korea-China relations, not to mention how it would leave South Korea embroiled in an unwanted war if armed conflict were to break out in the Taiwan Strait. 

This is why it is so urgent that inter-Korean relations be stabilized, and communication and dialogue resumed. South Korea is a key ally of the US, while North Korea is a key ally of China. If conflict erupts over Taiwan, the fate of the Korean Peninsula would depend entirely on the state of inter-Korean relations at the time.

Reconceiving inter-Korean relations will furthermore allow for Seoul to effectively respond to any major changes in Pyongyang-Washington relations. Many people, including the some in the Lee administration, think that a US-North Korea summit could lead not only to an easing of financial sanctions on North Korea and arms controls, including a freeze and reduction of nuclear weapons, but also a discussion of more foundational issues, like the adoption of a formal peace treaty and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the US and North Korea. 

On June 27, Trump said that he would “get the conflict solved with North Korea,” indicating that he is open to such a possibility. A summit between Trump and Kim resulting in negotiations and agreements on fundamental issues would certainly be welcome news. 

However, some worry that if the inter-Korean relationship is neither a relationship between two states nor a special relationship oriented toward unification, it could mean that South Korea is left out of any dealings between the US and North Korea. Even if sanctions are relaxed, if inter-Korean exchange and cooperation aren’t revived, the US could sign a peace treaty and establish relations with North Korea without consulting South Korea at all. 

To prevent this, we need to reset inter-Korean relations from the ground up in a direction that respects each other as states, so that we can maximize the opportunities created by changes in US-North Korea relations. Negotiations on arms control involving conventional and nuclear weapons could be devised centered on South Korea, North Korea and the US, and if peace talks commence between the US and North Korea, we can prevent South Korea — a key stakeholder in the matter — from being left out by establishing a South Korea-North Korea-US negotiation framework. If sanctions on North Korea are relaxed, a strong inter-Korean framework will also facilitate the resumption of economic cooperation. 

There could also be a push for establishing diplomatic relations between South Korea and North Korea, a move that would benefit inter-Korean relations the most. This has never been considered before on an official level. Establishing inter-Korean relations is part of the process of integration, so it would not violate the Constitution of South Korea.  

While many people perceive the establishment of relations as the end goal of an improvement in relations, that’s not necessarily the case. There are many cases where relations were established first. After that comes the building of liaison offices, missions, and embassies, which leads to a gradual improvement in relations. 

There are also instances where, after diplomatic relations are established, instead of appointing direct ambassadors, ambassadors from third-party countries act as mediators. South Korea established relations with Cuba in February of last year, but South Korea did not establish an embassy there until 11 months later. Cuba did not establish an embassy in South Korea until 16 months later. During the transition period, the South Korean ambassador in Mexico and the Cuban ambassador in China acted as the de facto ambassadors. South Korea also established relations with Syria in April, but there haven’t been any liaison offices or embassies built. 

These precedents tell us that if South Korea and North Korea take the initiative and establish diplomatic relations with the intent to improve their relationship, it could provide an unconventional and realistic alternative to what’s been tried so far. 

In summary, if the Lee administration were to make the objective of its new policy on North Korea the resetting of inter-Korean relations, it would dovetail nicely with its current vision of pragmatic diplomacy focused on the national interest.

At the prime moment, the issue of changing the name of the Ministry of Unification has come up. The most fitting name, in reflection of a “relationship between states, a special relationship aimed at integration,” would be the Ministry of Inter-Korean Relations.  

Whatever it ends up being called, I hope the renaming of the Unification Ministry marks a new start that is then followed by a suspension of the joint US-South Korea military drills scheduled for next month and the unveiling of a new vision for South Korea’s policy toward North Korea in Lee’s Liberation Day address on Aug. 15. 

By Cheong Wook-sik, director of the Hankyoreh Peace Institute and director of the Peace Network

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]