Backing out of GSOMIA a option for S. Korea to retaliate?

Posted on : 2019-08-03 13:53 KST Modified on : 2019-10-19 20:29 KST
Mixed assessments regarding agreement’s efficacy
Japanese Ambassador to South Korea Nagamine Yasumasa meets with South Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Cho Sei-young at the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Seoul on Aug. 2. (Yonhap News)
Japanese Ambassador to South Korea Nagamine Yasumasa meets with South Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Cho Sei-young at the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Seoul on Aug. 2. (Yonhap News)

Japan’s decision at a Cabinet meeting presided over by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on Aug. 2 to remove South Korea from its “white list” of countries receiving favorable treatment in export reviews for strategic goods has observers watching to see whether Seoul fires back with the threat of backing out of the two sides’ General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). With Tokyo’s decision shifting the conflict over resolving historical matters related to Japan’s colonization of Korea into the realm of security matters, many with the Moon Jae-in administration and ruling party are increasingly supporting the development of corresponding measures by Seoul.

To date, the South Korean government has used the threat as a way of stirring the US to become involved. Signed in 2016 amid a series of nuclear and missile tests by North Korea, the agreement was a reflection of the US’s East Asia strategy, which sought to build a trilateral security system to contain China. Seoul’s stance could be seen as one of encouraging the US to take an interest by sending the message that Japan’s measure placed trilateral security cooperation in jeopardy.

But with Japan moving on Aug. 2 to take South Korea off its white list, the question of backing out of GSOMIA has shifted from a matter of sending a diplomatic warning to one of a strategic response. Kim Hyun-chong, second deputy chief of South Korea’s National Security Office, said the administration planned to “pursue comprehensive response measures going forward, including the question of whether to continue sharing sensitive military information with a country that lacks trust in us and presents issues in terms of security.”

In logical terms, exiting the agreement would be an equivalent measure to Japan’s. Japan’s removal of South Korea from its white list signaled that it does not intend to view South Korea any longer as a “friendly power” in security terms. It stands to reason, then, that South Korea would also be unable to share sensitive military information with such a country.

“Under the circumstances where Japan is treating South Korea as a ‘country it cannot trust,’ we would be within our rights to pull out of the agreement,” said Yang Kee-ho, a professor at Sungkonghoe University.

“There may be worries and objections raised with regard to trilateral cooperation with the US, but the responsibility lies with Japan,” Yang said.

The agreement’s efficacy has received mixed assessments. Kim Jong-dae, a lawmaker with the Justice Party, said, “The information we provide plays a definite role in preserving Japan’s security, whereas the information that Japan provides tends mostly to fall outside the scope of the Korean Peninsula’s vicinity.”

“From the outset, this agreement has been part of Japan’s vision of exercising a say [on Korean Peninsula matters] and moving to do away with its Peace Constitution,” Kim argued. But many observers have countered that Japan’s intelligence assets are superior to South Korea’s in practical terms and have helped with South Korea’s security in substantive ways.

Potential shifts in Northeast Asian security framework

The key question has to do with the shift in the Northeast Asian security framework that an exit from the agreement would bring. Some analysts have speculated that South Korea’s exit could be the “detonator” that sets off changes in the Northeast Asian security order.

“The issue in short is one of the direction of trilateral South Korea-US-Japan security cooperation shifting,” said one military affairs expert. This leaves a lot to think about for the Moon Jae-in administration, which has been working to leverage trilateral cooperation into the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Another potential burden is the agreement’s increasing efficacy amid North Korea’s recent short-range missile launches.

Some are predicting that abandonment of the agreement could end up backfiring. If South Korea does back out of the agreement, it would come across as the first party to break with the trilateral security cooperation framework.

“We’ve tried to use the threat of abandoning the agreement and ended up getting the US involved,” said Nam Ki-jeong, a professor at Seoul National University.

“This could end up becoming a situation where we’re drawn in an unintended direction by the magnetic field of the South Korea-US-Japan security triangle,” he suggested.’’

By Yoo Kang-moon, senior staff writer, Lee Wan, staff reporter

Please direct comments or questions to [english@hani.co.kr]

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